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ABSTRACT
Two primary motives behind Elizabethan trade with 
Asia were the desire to tap directly the markets of 
eastern Asia and the need to maintain avenues of dis­
tribution for English goods which were jeopardized by 
the decline of Antwerp* Though the first effort to 
reach eastern Asia by sea in 1553 failed it resulted 
in the formation of the Muscovy Company. Subsequently, 
that body attempted a land route and though it failed 
again the outcome was the beginning of direct English 
trade with Persia. Under the auspices of the Muscovy 
CompanyJtrade was conducted with Persia for 20 years 
and seemed finally to be on the verge of resulting in 
a permanent establishment when it was brought to an end 
in 1580 by a political controversy between the Russian 
and Ottoman governments.
By September 1581 the Muscovy Company's Asian 
trade had been replaced by that of the Turkey Company's 
trade with the Ottoman Empire, using the Mediterranean 
sea route. The timing of the Turkey Company's appear­
ance was probably determined in part by the political 
troubles in Persia and similar troubles which inter­
fered with Anglo-Spanish trade. The Turkey merchants
3traded in a joint-stock under a monopoly of seven years 
duration granted by letters patent. During the same 
period another group of merchants held letters patent 
which granted them a monopoly of trade by sea with Venice 
and the Venetian dominions to last for six years. This 
Venice Company conducted a regulated trade based mainly 
on the import of currants.
The two letters patent expired at about the same 
time and the companies subsequently decided to unite and 
form a single trading body encompassing both monopolies. 
This Levant Company, chartered in 1592 for 12 years, had 
a somewhat broader membership base and was organized as 
a regulated company. Because the Company raised large 
sums of money by way of an imposition on currants im­
ported by non-members, the patent was called into question 
and lifted at the end of eight years. A new patent in 
December 1600 transferred the income from these imposi­
tions to the crown at the rate of £4000 per year. Con­
troversies over these impositions and over the payment 
of the ambassador in Constantinople resulted in the vol­
untary surrender of that patent and its replacement in 
1605 by the charter of monopoly which, in effect, re­
mained in force until 1825.
The English were continually interested inland
periodically attempted,to.trade directly with east* 4
Asian markets. But it was not until the Dutch pre­
sented effective competition that any serious effort 
was made by the merchant community to organize a trade 
based on the sea route around Africa. This resulted 
in letters patent of 31 December 1600 which created 
the East India Company.
Throughout the period under consideration the 
companies were continuously faced with several problems. 
The need to secure a set of formal privileges from the 
government in whose territory they wished to trade; 
the need, consequent upon the first, to maintain some 
degree of formal diplomatic representation with those 
governments, and thus, the need to work closely with 
the English government; the need to maintain in those 
places where they traded, a permanent commercial estab­
lishment; and finally, the need to solve the problem of 
how to acquire the purchasing power to conduct an un­
favorably balanced trade in an area where payment in 
hard money was favored over payment in goods.
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LCHAPTER I 
Introduction
For future historians one of the great phenomena 
of the twentieth century will have been the dismantling 
of the Asian and African empires created by the Atlantic 
nations of Europe during the past few centuries. The 
most powerful and perhaps most influential of those em­
pires was that put together by the English. Today, in 
mid-twentieth century Britain, there is almost nothing 
left of it and one of the pressing political issues the 
British government periodically faces is the extent to 
which it should continue to maintain its pblitical and 
military presence in Asia - or to use the term that is 
a favorite of the English ,feast of Suez11. It is four 
centuries since the English first presented themselves 
in Asia and their active and continuous efforts were 
first directed that way. Those efforts, in their six­
teenth century origins, were primarily commercial in 
content, though they had political and military over­
tones. Since then much has been written about all as­
pects of the British in Asia, though most of it takes 
up a detailed, serious consideration beginning only with 
the English in India in the seventeenth century. This is
not surprising since the English East India Company - 
the instrument of English presence in India - was cer­
tainly one of the most spectacular and influential 
commercial organizations in England during the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries. It was also one for 
which there is extant an immense quantity of documentary 
material.
In the sixteenth century there were few if any 
Englishmen who thought in terms of empire. Those in­
terested in Asia were mainly businessmen and were con­
cerned to do what they could and what they thought neces 
sary to insure the continued, profitable functioning of 
their capital investments. By the end of Elizabeth's 
reign, this had led them, in the political arena, only 
to the point where they possessed somewhat precarious 
privileges to trade in some Asian territories and had 
a few diplomatic representatives to look after their 
interests. They also had traveled far and explored much 
by land and sea, from the 1550's, in order to find the 
most profitable ways in which to use their capital.
There was a unity in their activities, defined by their 
never ending desire to reach the markets of eastern 
Asia. But the efforts to realise that desire can be 
examined separately under the headings of the Persian
trade of the Muscovy Company, the west Asian trade of 
the Turkey and Levant Companies, and the foundation of 
the East India Company in 1600* It is with these and 
particularly the second theme, that this study will be 
concerned.
There has been some historical work produced which 
deals with Elizabethan interest in Asia. Sir William 
Foster* has written what is primarily a narrative of 
travel and exploration into Asia in a very interesting 
and useful book which covers all the various English 
attempts to reach India. The Persian expeditions of
2the Muscovy Company have been dealt with by E. V. Vaughan
in what is mainly a straight forward narrative of these
expeditions* T. S. Willan, in his history of the Russia 
3
Company, takes notice of the Persian trade but it is 
peripheral to his main concern. The Levant trade has 
been dealt with at greater length. A. L* Rowland,^ in 
a work similar to that of Vaughan's on the Persian ex-
1 England's Quest of Eastern Trade. 1933.
2 ^English Trading Expeditions Into Asia Uhder the 
Authority of the Muscovy Company (1557-81)", in 
Studies in the History of English Commerce in the 
Tudor Period. 1^12.
3 Early History of the Russia Company. 1553-1603. 1956.
4 England and Turkey: The Rise of Diplomatic and Com­
mercial Relations" in Studies in English Commerce and 
Exploration in the Reign of Elizabeth* 1$24.
9peditions, attempts no more than a narrative history*
The two studies of the Levant Company by A* C* Wood 
and Mordecai Epstein^ deal only superficially with the 
trade under Elizabeth* The latter is mainly useful for 
a few documents printed in the appendices* The former 
is mainly concerned with the Company from the seventeenth 
to the nineteenth centuries.
Two tasks will be attempted in the following pages* 
First, to fill in or supply the narrative history of this 
trade which has not so far been presented and second, 
where possible to analyse and make some critical comments 
on the problems inherent in the trade and how they were 
net by the merchants concerned* For both tasks the most 
important means will be a critical re-examination of 
sources already known. This is justified on the grounds 
that for the most part the previous writers on this sub­
ject have made only casual and superficial use of the 
documentary evidence* It has sufficed for them to pre­
sent an exposition of the trade but not an explanation 
of it* There are gaps even in the exposition. For 
example, the Venice Company, which became an integral
5 A History of the Levant Company* 1935 and The English 
Levant Company, Its Foundation and its History toUtt. 1S66. -------------
part of the Levant Company, has never been adequately 
presented. Making closer and more critical use of 
material already known and cited, a fuller and more 
coherent account than hitherto is presented in Chapter 
££• Similarly, re-examining old material in the same 
manner, an account is given of the origins of both the 
Turkey and Levant Companies in Chapters III and VI. No 
attempt is made to give an explicit narrative of the 
Russia Company's Persian trade because that has been 
done in some detail. But in Chapter II the six expe­
ditions into Persia are re-examined with the object of 
pointing out and discussing some of the problems faced 
by the English in a commercial enterprise in Asia. To 
the extent possible, these same issues are followed up 
in Chapters 3 ^  and VII for the differing conditions of 
Asian trade under the Turkey and Levant Companies. Aside 
from new light shed by known documents there is that cast 
by new documents. On the one hand these are scattered 
items found in expected and unexpected places; some 
previously overlooked altogether, some whose signifi­
cance had been missed. On the other hand there are the 
results of a systematic search through the surviving 
official government records kept in the Public Record 
Office. In addition to the State Papers - which really
11
are included in the remarks above - the most important 
are those found in the various departments of the Ex­
chequer and in the High Court of Admiralty. Between 
them they have provided much of the material for the 
list of Mediterranean shipping in Appendix C. From the 
former has been learned most of what is known about the 
size and nature of cargoes in the Mediterranean.
It is essential at the outset to make clear cer­
tain limitations on the study that is to follow. These 
stem from two shortcomings in the evidence. First, the 
survival of the official, government records of trade 
has been so haphazard that there is seldom found the 
same kind of data for more than two consecutive years. 
Second, there has been virtually no survival at all of 
the private records of the companies and merchants that 
conducted this trade to Asia. A great part of the extant 
evidence was generated originally out of the formal re­
lations between the merchants and companies and the 
crown and its officials. Thus there are questions which 
cannot be answered. For example, what was the basis upon 
tdiich decisions were made in London about the kinds and 
quantities of goods^were sent out each year? How was it 
decided where the ships would go in the Mediterranean? 
Though it is known where a great many of them did go, it
is only possible to suggest why they went to particular 
places in different years• Knowledge of the total move­
ment of goods and money both inward and outward is not 
known for even one year during the sixteenth century*
Thus questions of price structure, of changes in invest­
ment from year to year, and all the other questions which 
one might ask about the internal functioning of a commer­
cial enterprise cannot be raised here. A model for the 
analysis of an early business enterprise in Asia based 
on the kind of records that are missing for the Eliza­
bethan period is to be found in the recent study of the 
East India Company by Dr. K. N. Chaudhuri.^ For the earlier 
period, under consideration here, the historian has to be 
content to observe from the outside. With this limitation 
it is still possible to offer greater knowledge and under­
standing of this trade in the sixteenth century than has 
been done to the present. Questions about why the trade 
came into existence when it did, where it did and in the 
manner it did can be asked and reasonable answers pro­
vided. Something of the nature of this organization 
can be exposed, and more particularly, why that organi­
zation went through several changes. It is possible,
6 The English East India Company. 1965*
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viewing from the outside, to say something of the inter­
dependence between company and government. Final ly; it 
is possible to raise some question about the overall 
problems the merchants faced in attempting for the first 
time to initiate a trade outside the confines of Europe.
It was pointed out above that English commercial 
relations with Asia during the second half of the six­
teenth century can be conveniently subsumed under three 
headings; the Persian trade, the Levant trade and the 
East India trade. The former and latter of these were 
of considerable interest and importance and will be dealt 
with, but the story of Anglo-Asian trade under Queen 
Elizabeth is primarily the story of the Turkey and 
Levant Companies.
The Turkey Company stands apart from other chartered 
trading companies of the Elizabethan period by virtue of 
its joint-stock financial organization and its role as 
the transmitter of Asian commodities to England. This 
is not to say that it was the only joint-stock enter­
prise of the period nor that it was the only medium 
through which Asian commodities reached England. It 
was, however, the only such company founded before 1600
that carried on a continuous, successful trade and whose 
express purpose was to deal in Asian commodities• The 
nearest rival for the above claims is the Russia Company, 
which was chartered in 1555 with a joint-stock capital 
and which traded into Persia from about 1560. The events 
which led to the founding of the Russia Company were in­
spired by the desire of the English to reach eastern 
Asia but the company, itself, was not founded for the 
purpose of carrying on a trade with Asia. It did carry 
on such a trade, which lasted for about 20 years, but 
this represented only a small portion of its total in­
vestment. The only other company trading specifically 
outside the boundaries of Europe was the Barbary Company 
founded in 1585 to trade with Morocco and organized on 
a regulated basis.^ The best known overseas enterprises 
of the Elizabethan period, which obstensibly had Asia 
as their objective, were those led by such persons as 
Frobisher, Cavendish, Lancaster, and others. However, 
they will not be considered here in the context of Anglo- 
Asian trade because it is questionable whether they were 
serious mercantile enterprises. An examination of this 
doubt is taken up in Chapter VII.
7 T. S. Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade. 
1959, pp. 99f.
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Though this Anglo-Asian trade in general and the 
Turkey Company, in particular, can be distinguished by 
a combination of purpose and financial organization, 
it would be a distortion of perspective to focus sharp­
ly on this singularity too soon. Failure first to take 
up a consideration of English export trade in general 
would obscure the fact that this direct trade with Asia, 
which came to be a major factor in London's economic
Q
life and ultimately developed into an empire, was, in 
the sixteenth century, only a minor consequence of a 
major re-orientation of English overseas trade which 
took place during the 1560's and 1570's. An under­
standing of this re-orientation will be facilitated 
by first examining England's export trade during the 
period in question.
The history of English exports in the third quarter 
of the century is, perhaps, best seen in relation to a 
general view of the entire century. It is an accepted 
generalization that cloth was dominant among English 
export commodities and that London was dominant among 
English ports. Thus the figures for London cloth exports
8 K. N. Chaudhuri, "Treasure and Trade Balance: the East 
India Company's Export Trade, 1660-1720", Econ. H.R«« 
vol. xxi, 1968, p. 480.
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reflect the general course of English trade. There 
has been some criticism of the reliance on cloth ex­
ports and in particular London cloth exports as an in­
dicator of the development of English trade by Profs. 
Lawrence Stone and J. D. Gould. ^  They both take figures 
for the number of sacks of wool exported during the cen­
tury, convert these into equivalent cloths per sack, add 
that to the actual number of cloths entered in the petty 
customs accounts, to arrive at a figure for total woolen
9 The generalization about the export of cloth was first 
highlighted by F. J. Fisher, "Commercial Trends and 
Policy in Sixteenth Century England", Econ. H.R.. vol. 
x, 1940, pp. 96ff.
10 Lawrence Stone, "State Control in Sixteenth Century 
England", Econ. H.R.. vol. xvii, 1947. J. D. Gould,
The Great Debasement. 1970. Prof. Gould's book ap­
peared after all the research on this Introduction 
had been completed by the present writer. His work 
is concerned primarily with the Great Debasement it­
self and is a detailed analysis of monetary policy 
and mint activity during that period. In the later 
part of the book Prof. Gould presents an analysis of 
woolen exports in light of his foregoing discussion 
of the monetary situation. He presents there much 
of the same material that follows in this Introduction 
up to the accession of Queen Elizabeth including Table 
II* In general Prof. Gould's conclusions do not de­
tract from any of the points made here. Where there 
are points at variance they are taken up separately.
It should be pointed out that neither Prof. Gould nor 
the present writer were aware of each other's work 
while research was in progress. Thus in so far as the 
present work is concerned it will stand as original 
work and no reference will be made to the same research 
done by Prof. Gould except where there is a point of 
difference.
I S
exports for the first half of the century. On the basis 
of the series so compiled it is contended that England 
actually experienced very little growth in total woolen 
exports. This is undeniably true and any analysis of 
sixteenth century English economic life must take this 
observation into consideration. But the fact remains 
that the export of cloth as opposed to wool and grown 
in volume considerably by mid-century and then maintained 
itself roughly at the level reached in the 1540's through­
out the second half of the century. The exigencies of 
the export of this cloth acutely exercised the Merchant 
Adventurers in the 1550*3, 60*8, and 70*8; the re-orien- 
tation of English trade after 1560 was largely focused 
on the disposition of this cloth; and finally, it was 
this English cloth and not English wool which found 
markets throughout Europe and in some cases throughout 
the world. An attempt to emphasize the relatively stable 
level of total woolen exports at the expense of rising 
cloth exports can only result in the obfuscation of a 
major development in the overseas trade of the Tudor 
period.
Sixteenth century London cloth exports were charac­
terized by a long term growth lasting until about mid­
century. Then from 1560 to 1575 they showed fluctations 
greater than any previously experienced which ended with
a sharp rise followed by virtual stagnation for the re­
mainder of the century. It is convenient to look at 
these fluctuations during four separate periods. The 
first was the growth during the first four decades of 
the century, the second was the period of the debasement 
of the coinage, the third was a period of re-orientation 
in English export trade, and the last the latter part of 
Elizabeth’s reign. Though the fluctuations of the dif­
ferent periods can be seen by an inspection of the annual 
figures, it is possible to present a fairly simple mea­
sure of this instability through some statistical ana­
lysis which makes the picture clearer. The method used 
was to calculate the amplitudes between succeeding turning 
points in the annual movements of cloth exports, then to 
take an average of these amplitudes for different periods 
during the century for purposes of comparison. The re­
sults of these calculations are shown in Table I. It 
can be seen from the table that at no time during the 
sixteenth century could the annual exports of cloth have 
been described as stable. At best, during the first 
period, it could be expected that on an average of every 
two years the level of cloth exports would rise or fall 
by about 17% from its previous high or low point. Simi­
larly, during the last quarter of the century there was
<910
TABLE I
A numerical measure of the of
total annual London cloth exports
Inclusive Avg. amplitude be-
dates tween turning points
Avg, period of 
turning points
1,8 years
1.6 M
1497-1541 17,3%
1542-1552
1560-1576++
28.7%
66.3% 2.7 »
1577-1604 15.7% 1.2  '*
+ The calculations are based on the annual cloth exports 
from London the sources for which are given in Table 
II and the g r a p h p , J f e  •
It should be noted that within each of these periods 
there was a wide spread in the sizes of the amplitudes. 
During the first and last periods this spread was from 
2,27. to 48,2% and during the middle periods from 36,9% 
to 143%,
++ Incomplete returns account for this seven year break.
an average change of 16% nearly every year. However, by 
contrast, during the debasement this instability increased 
to changes of about 29% every year and a-half. Finally, 
during the first fifteen years of Elizabeth's reign changes 
of 66% could be expected about every two and a-half years. 
Even in a century when merchants ordinarily must have been 
accustomed to the unpredictable affecting their trade - 
adverse winds delaying their sailing times, political 
conflicts closing their ports, and royal needs debasing 
their money - the middle decades of the sixteenth century
21
probably seemed especially uncertain and trying times 
for mercantile pursuits*
Both the long term growth of the first half of 
the century and the fluctuations of the third quarter 
are said to have been largely functions of England's 
economic dependence on Antwerp* ^  The growth of the 
first half of the century though slow in the long run 
was not steady* It was marked by periods of changing 
rate of annual increase. These changes have been attri­
buted to the depreciation of the coinage begun in in the
121520's and continued into the 1550's* Another analysis 
of this same phenomenon categorically denied this attri­
bution and emphasized the relation between changing
market conditions in Germany and the fluctuations in
13English cloth exports* A recent analysis of the de­
basement of English money and the course of the London-
Antwerp exchange supports a de-emphasis of their effect
14on movements in cloth exports. Though the evidence 
seems to support this de-emphasis it is difficult to 
understand how a depreciation in the rate of exchange 
from 26/8 FI to 13/4 FI per pound sterling between 1526
11 Fisher, op. cit., p. 97. 12 Ibid., pp. 99-101.
13 Stone, op. cit., p. 100.
14 Gould, op. cit., pp. 132 + 33.
and 1551 could have had no effect at all on the over­
seas market for English commodities* Table 1 shows that 
during the debasement there was a greater instability in 
cloth exports than prior to it* It also shows, however, 
that the greatest instability in cloth exports was ex­
perienced after the coinage had been returned to normal*
A close look at the separate movements of the London 
cloth exports of English, alien, and Hanse merchants^ 
brings to light some interesting and neglected factors 
operating during the 1540's and 1550's which were not in­
herent in the market itself and which help explain the 
instability remarked upon above.
One such element was a royal proclamation promul­
gated in April 1539 to the effect that alien merchants 
would henceforth for 7 years be required to pay only 
such customs and subsidy as do the King's own subjects*
The text of the proclamation states that it was issued 
for the purpose of encouraging trade*^ It succeeded 
in this in the most spectacular manner for the alien 
merchants. Over the 43 years preceeding this proclamationj
15 Fisher, op. cit., p. 99.
16 The figures representing these exports are presented 
in Table II.
17 Hughes and Larking, Tudor Royal Proclamations. 3 vols. 
1964-9, no. 189.
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TABLE II
Annual export of short cloths from London
M'mas-M'mas
1537-38
38-39
39-40
40-41
41-42
42-43
43-44
44-45
45-46
46-47
47-48
48-49
49-50
50-51
51-52
52-53
53-54
54-55
55-56
56-57
57-58
58-59
59-60
Sources;
Denizen
492881 
37699 
47934 
52684 
44701 
32363 
69094, 
29766” 
461307 
494802 
7933l6, 
(803531' 
87181° 
69859' 
6569010
9699311
8729512
79141H  
8986315
Alien
4608 
28319 
24567 
29746 
29268 
14679 
23295, 
503592 
42008° 
147932 
1063, 
1361 
1183 
2979 
5454
10703
13583
8
Hanse
30778
31143
27262
27619
23412
24226
27052,
339632
31050|
296892
38816?
43584°
44302°y
10
39854’
13829*
n 2790311
12 1116012
13 14
15 838115
Total
84674
97161
99762
110049
97381
71268
119441
114088
119188
93962
119210
(125298)
132666
112710
84968
135599
112038
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
12
14
1537/38 - 1543/44: E. M. Carus-Wilson and Live Cole­
man, England's Export Trade, 1275-1547. 1963. pp.
118-isr--------- ----------»----------
PRO:Customs Acct. 165/7*
BM: Cotton, Claudius EVII, f. 99 v-100.
PRO:Customs Acct. 165/8.
PRO:ESda*Accts. Various 347/16.
PRO:Customs Acct. 84/4 and 84/5.
Estimated. 
PRO: Customs 
PR0:Cus toms 
PRO: Customs 
PRO: Customs 
No Account.
Acct. 167/4. 
Acct. 166/8. 
Acct.166/1. 
Acct. 86/7.
11 PRO:Customs Acct. 87/4. 
13 PRO:Customs Acct. 86/12.
15 PRO:Enroiled Customs Acct.,28.
Comments on Table II;
The statistics printed by E. M. Carus-Wilson and 
Olive Coleman are based on the LTR Exchequer Enrolled 
Customs Accounts. However, the last roll from Henry 
VIII1 s reign /no. 27/ lacks the London returns for the 
years 1544/5 to 1546/7 and the next roll /no. 28/ be­
gins with the year 1559/60. Thus the figures for the 
intervening years have had to be supplied from other 
sources, mainly miscellaneous KR Customs Accounts.
London cloth returns for Henry VIllfs reign have been 
in print for many years in George Schanz, Englische 
Handelspolitik gegen end des Mittlealters, 1881. vol.
II, pp. 86-S7. For the last three years of the reign 
Schanz supplied figures for denizen merchant's exports 
by taking the average of the five previous years and 
applying it to each of the unknown years. His figures 
for alien and Hanse merchants he took from an earlier 
printed source, Johann Martin Lappenberg, Urkundliche 
Geschichte Hansische Stahlhofer zu London. r3ST. p7 175. 
The document printed by Lappenberg/no. 154/ contains 
the missing figure^ /Jlfcomed from BM:Cotton, Claudius EVII, 
ff. 99-100. This entire Cotton volume, of some 400 
folios, consists of contemporary copies of a great 
variety of documents pertaining entirely to the af­
fairs of the Hanseatic merchants in London. The last 
document in the volume dates from the mid-1550's sug­
gesting that it was put together shortly after that^when 
the English were working to deprive the Stillyard of its 
privileged position. The item in this collection, prin­
ted by Lappenberg, is a list of the number of cloths 
shipped annually from London by alien and by Hanse 
merchants for scattered years beginning with Edward II 
and then for every year from 1537 to 1550. For the 
years before 1545 there are figures in the Enrolled 
Accounts as well as those in the Cotton Mss. Compari­
son of the two sets of figures shows them to be nearly 
identical thus providing confidence in the reliability 
of the figures for years when there are no official re­
turns. Using the returns for aliens and Hanse given in 
this Cotton Mss. it is possible also to find the correct 
figures for the exports of denizens during the years 
1545 to 1547. For each of these years there is a KR 
Customs Account book which contains the daily entries 
of the cloths passing through the customs house. Two 
of these books (165/7 and 165/8) contain entries for
Comments on Table II, cont.:
all three classes of merchants. Thus it was only neces­
sary to count the cloths entered in these books, and 
subtract from that total figures for alien and Hanse 
merchants, to find the number of cloths exported by 
denizen merchants during those years. For the third 
year in question, 1546/7, there is a similar book which 
contains only cloth entries for denizen merchants. A 
count of these gives the denizen exports for that year.
In the recent work on the Great Debasement cited 
above, J. D. Gould presents a series of tables of Eng­
lish cloth exports for the years 1544/5 to 1560/1 (pp. 
173-81). In these he presents the figures for the out- 
ports as well as for London and thus has fuller infor­
mation than is to be found here. The figures for the 
outports confirm that their cloth exports were insigni­
ficant next to those of London. In so far as the London 
figures are concerned this table and Prof. Gould’s table 
are in complete agreement with one exception - the denizen 
exports for the years 1544/5 to 1546/7. For those years 
Prof. Gould presents no figure at all evidently unaware 
of the method for determining them which was described 
in the proceeding paragraph. For the second of the 
three years in question - 1545/46 - he gives the figure 
for denizen cloth exports of 45.857 which he found in a 
Declared Account for that year (E351/607). This writer 
overlooked that document in his researches and thus re­
sorted to the more cumbersome procedure described above.
Though Prof. Gould presents no figure for denizen 
cloth exports for 1546/7 he does present a lengthy cri­
ticism (op. cit., Appendix D) of a document (PR0:SPD 
Edward VI, 2 no. 13) which purports to give a figure 
for that year which suggests that total exports were 
about 172,00 short cloths for that year. His contention 
is that the document itself is ambiguous and that there 
is no literary evidence to suggest 1546/47 was such a 
boom year. The figures presented in this table confirm 
Prof. Gould1s doubts.
the annual cloth exports of those merchants averaged 8300
18short cloths per year* Over the seven years the pro­
clamation was in force - 1538/9 to 1545/6 - the average 
was over 30,000 short cloths per year* The year follow­
ing the expiration of the proclamation, alien cloths ex­
ports fell to 14,600 and during the remainder of the cen­
tury averaged only about 6000 per year* It can be argued 
that the sudden increase in alien cloth exports was only 
the expected consequence of debasement. It will be noticed 
though, that the overall rate of growth of cloth exports 
remained unchanged* What was actually happening was that 
denizen exports remained fairly level while those of the 
aliens increased* This effect is best seen on the Graph 
and by noting that the alien merchants share of total 
exports also increased* Thus during the period 1497 to 
1538 their average annual share of cloth exports from 
London was 14%; during the period the proclamation was 
in force this average was 30%, and during the period 
from 1546 until the end of the century this average was 
under 6%* There are two possible ways in which a re­
duction in duty could have stimulated cloth exports*
s dThe old rate for aliens was 4 9 for a white cloth or
18 The average for alien cloth exports were made up from 
the annual exports for the entire century the sources 
for which are given in the Graph and Table II*
6s3d for a colored cloth and the new rate was ls2d for
19either type of cloth. Thus the alien merchants saved 
with*"3s7d or per cloth. The importance of this
reduction in customs lay in the area of the difference 
between the buying and selling price of the cloth. Its 
effect could have been to reduce the selling price and 
thus make the cloth more competitive with cloth trans­
ported by English merchants or it could have left the 
selling price unchanged and simply reduced the costs 
and stimulated investment by increasing profits. There 
is no positive evidence as to which of these policies 
was followed. But it is reasonable to conclude that in 
view of the leveling out of denizen exports during the 
period of equal customs duties, that the aliens presented 
effective competition to the English merchants. This may 
also explain why the proclamation was not renewed in 1546, 
A drop of 20% in cloth exports coincided with the 
expiration of the favorable customs concession for alien 
merchants. It might have' been expected that the English 
merchants would have immediately gained lost ground.
But their exports increased only slightly in 1547. This 
can be explained in part as a consequence of oversupply
19 T, S. Willan, A Tudor Book of Rates, 1962, pp. 71-2.
and in part as the consequence of the disruption of the
20internal communications of Germany. Thus changes in 
the level of exports can be explained partly as the re­
sult of oversupply, partly as the result of the expir­
ation of a grant of favorable duties to one segment of 
the merchant community and partly as the result of the 
disruption of communications in Germany.
By 1548 total cloth exports were back up.to their
1546 level. A look at the breakdown of the figure for
total exports in that year shows that the greatest part
of the net increase was accounted for by an increase in
0
the exports of English merchants. A recovery was only 
to be expected with alien competition removed and once 
stocks had been sold off and conditions returned to 
normal in the market area. However, it is worth noting 
another factor which probably contributed to this re­
covery. In November 1547 the Merchant Adventurers com­
plained that increases in the price of cloth made it 
impossible for them to transport as many cloths as pre­
viously without violating a statute of 27 Henry VIII w W K
20 It was in the Spring of 1547 that the Bnperor 
Charles V marched an army into Germany and de­
feated the Protestant Schmalkaldic League at Mtlhl- 
berg. Prof. Stone alludes to this in explaining 
the export decline of 1547 (op. cit. p. 106.).
forbade the export of cloths above a certain price.
21Their request that this statute be lifted was granted. 
This would have had the effect of making it possible 
for the Merchant Adventurers to meet a demand for a 
wider range of cloths. It is not possible, of course, 
to indicate thqfcrecise extent to which the release of 
this prohibition affected exports.
The recovery which began in 1548 continued until 
1550, when the total exports for London reached 132,666 
short cloths. This recovery was about proportionately 
equal for both English and Hanse merchants with alien 
exports remaining insignificant. Then in 1550 there be­
gan what appears to be another collapse from oversupply 
in the market. Indeed, in April of that year the Mer­
chant Adventurers reported to the Privy Council that 
there 11 lie at Andwerpe such a numbre of our clothes
onsolde, that till they were uttered these here /London/
22wolde not well be bought. A decline in the total
London exports for 1551 reflected the conditions of 
which the merchants complained. This decline was, again,
21 PRO:Customs Account 195/25. The statute referred to 
is 27 Henry VIII c. 13 which prohibited the export of 
unfinished cloth whose value exceeded £4 for white 
and £3 for colored cloths.
22 APC, 1550-52, p. 20.
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about equally proportionate for English and Hanse mer­
chants. The fall in exports continued in the following 
year dropping to 88,000 cloths or a decline of 33.5% 
in two years; seemingly a continuation of the result 
of the oversupply of 1550. However, the figures for 
the three classes of merchants show that from 1551 to 
1552 the exports of English merchants remained nearly 
unchanged, those of the alien merchants increased slight­
ly and those of the Hanse merchants fell to about one- 
third of their immediately previous number and account 
for the entire fall in cloth exports from 1551 to 1552. 
The explanation for this radical drop in Hanse exports 
is found in a decree of the Privy Council, dated 24
February 1552, which cancelled the privileges, liber-
23ties and franchisies11 of the Hanse merchants. Thus, 
again what appears on the surface to be simply the ex­
pected consequence of a market condition turns out to 
be largely the result of the intervention of an element 
from outside the market proper.
It must be said again that the above analysis is 
not intended to deny the efficacy of the factors cited
23 Salis. Mss., vol. 247 f. 270. This decree was re­
voked on 28 October 1553 (ibid., f. 1) and a new set 
of Hanse privileges was given in 1560. (Ibid., f. 47.)
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by Profs. Fisher and Stone but merely to point out 
first, that those factors were not mutually exclusive, 
as Prof. Stone would seem to have them, and second, 
that there were non-market internal elements at work 
which caused or intensified changes in export levels 
which have been explained solely in terms of internal 
monetary and external market conditions.
The merchants engaged in active trade during the 
years under consideration here were aware, certainly, 
of these extra-market factors and of the effect they 
were having on the export of cloth. They would have 
been aware also that export instability caused by the 
factors cited above could not be corrected by simply 
redirecting one's trade to other geographical areas.
Of course, such a redirecting of one's trade might be 
an efficacious response to exchange instability in a 
given market. But during the third quarter of the 
century the only new enterprises undertaken which might 
be seen as an attempt at redirecting trade were the 
1553 Northeast Passage voyage with its resulting Mus­
covy trade and the West African and Moroccan trade. 
Neither of these areas, however, absorbed very sub­
stantial quantities of English cloth. Nevertheless,
the English did not at that time seek further for new
3dL
markets. Thus it can be suggested that despite the 
disturbances in the level of exports the merchant com­
munity did not interpret the situation as one which 
necessitated any long term readjustment in its markets.
Prof. Fisher has emphasized the seeking of new 
markets as a response to the depressions of the 1550*s, 
60's, and 70's.^ But it can be seen from the previous 
discussion of the 1540*s and 1550fs, that if the extra­
market factors had not been present the whole picture 
of a period of depression and instability in exports 
would have taken on a different complexion. Further­
more, the English merchants, to judge by their actions, 
seem not to have taken seriously the need for new markets. 
Hie decline of cloth exports in the early 1560*8 was per­
haps not a depression in the strict economic sense of the 
term. The fall in cloth exports beginning in 1561 was a 
consequence of strained relations between England and 
Spain which resulted in the Low Countries issuing a 
complete prohibition on English imports early in 1563.
In that year and the following, London cloth exports 
fell to half of what they had been in 1560. The ex­
porters of cloth - the Merchant Adventurers - were tinder
24 Op. cit., pp. 105-6.
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no illusions that this fall in exports was the result 
of economic instabilities. They were aware that it 
only required a settlement of political differences 
between England and Spain to set their trade back on
its old course. Trade was restored effective 1 January
o ^
1565 and cloth exports for the subsequent year shot 
up to 134,000 pieces, completely cancelling out the de­
cline of the two previous years. In fact, the total 
number of cloths exported during the three years 1563 
to 1565 was only about 7% below the total for the pre­
vious three years - 1560 to 1562 - and almost exactly 
the same as the total number exported during the follow­
ing three years - 1566 to 1568. This suggests that cloth 
export fluctuations during the 1560's do not reflect eco­
nomic depression arising from unstable demand but rather 
the arbitrary and erratic influence of factors external 
to the economics of the market. A similar situation 
existed in the early 1570's. Trade between England and 
the Low Countries was stopped in 1571, as an aftermath
of the English seizure of the Spanish pay ships in 1568,
26and was not restored until 30 April 1573. Decline and
25 Hughes and Larking, op. cit., no. 530.
26 Hughes and Larking, op. cit., no. 595.
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recovery in cloth exports perfectly match these dates#
Prof# Stone's explanation for the changes that
took place in English trade is that the "reorganization
of the whole export business was brought about largely
by chaotic monetary conditions produced by reckless
debasement and sudden deflation followed swiftly and
27unpredictably one after another". The trouble with 
relying too heavily on monetary conditions for an ex­
planation of the unstable trade conditions of the 1540's, 
50's, and 60's is that the precise effect of any given 
alteration in the coinage cannot be known unless one 
also has detailed information on both prices and demand 
elasticities# Very little is known about the former and 
nothing about the latter. The best that can be said is 
that monetary conditions were unstable until Elizabeth's 
revaluation and that this must have had some effect on 
overseas trade# But it is perhaps going too far to bur­
den monetary conditions with responsibility for the "re­
organization of the whole export business". Furthermore, 
this "reorganization" did not really take place until 
after the money was returned to normal in 1560# Never­
theless, there is little reason to doubt that both mone­
27 Stone, op. cit., p. 106.
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tary conditions and markets were operative elements 
in the changes that took place in English trade.
Both Profs* Fisher and Stone agree on the import­
ance to English trade of the Antwerp market* The former 
made an observation that has become a basis for any con­
sideration of English overseas trade during the period 
in question when he stated that 11 It was a commonplace 
of the age that English commerce was overwhelmingly de­
pendent upon the Low Countries and that economically 
London was a satellite of Antwerp11. He goes on to say 
that f,it is hardly fanciful to see a connection between 
the growth of London trade and the fact that it was dur­
ing these years that Antwerp was climbing to the zenith
of its power as the commercial and financial center of
28the western world11. Prof. Stone concurs that prosperous
trade conditions demanded normal political and economic
relations with the Low Countries. But he extended the
London-An twerp line by arguing that prosperous trade was
also dependent on open communications across to north
29Germany and down the Rhine to the markets of Italy.
28 Fisher, op. cit., p. 97.
29 Stone, op. cit., p. 106.
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The whole issue of the inter-relations among the
increase of English cloth exports, the German market,
exchange depreciation, and Antwerp is a very complex
affair. It involves, further, the inter-relations
among other diverse elements from climatic conditions
to the relative price of gold and silver. All of this
cannot be rehearsed here. It has recently been set out
in all of its detail in three substantial volumes by the
30Dutch historian, Herman Van der Wee. Before discussing 
some of the specific reactions of English merchants to 
the troubles that beset their relations with Antwerp it 
is not amiss to summarize some of what Van der Wee has 
to say about the Antwerp market, particularly with res­
pect to those things which might be relevant to English 
commerce.
Van de Wee emphasizes that the emergence of the 
Antwerp market at the beginning of the sixteenth century 
was inseparably connected with the growth of the trans-
31continental trade which was centered in Central Germany11. 
This trade was stimulated by the commercial expansion of 
South Germany which was, in turn, connected with the in-
30 The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European 
EconomyT~~3 voIs.. 19^3.
31 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 119.
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crease in the production of German silver from the mid­
fifteenth century. The effect of this silver production 
was to draw the South Germans to the Brabant fairs where 
they exchanged it for Flemish and English cloth, ^  Be­
tween 1496 and 1512, the same time this German silver
was finding its way to Antwerp, English cloth merchants,
3 3
secured a number of advantages with respect to tolls 
which served to facilitate the penetration of English 
cloth on the Antwerp market at the expense of Netherlands 
cloth. To this mutual stimulation of English cloth and 
German silver was added the Portuguese spice trade which 
was centered at Antwerp from 1501.
Silver played a far more direct role in channeling 
the spice trade than it did in channeling the cloth trade. 
This is explained, in part, by the higher price of silver 
in Asia than in Europe. Initially, in the fifteenth cen­
tury, German silver was channeled into Asia by way of 
Italian commerce, partly by direct trade between Germans
and Italians but mainly through the Italian overland trade
34with the Netherlands, The Portuguese discovery of the 
sea route to India very quickly undermined the Venetian 
spice trade in Antwerp, But even before the discovery
32 Ibid., p. 124 n. 65, 33 Ibid., p, 123
34 Ibid., p. 124.
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of this route the Portuguese had been attracted to
Antwerp, in part because of the German silver for
which they sold their spices and in part because they
found it profitable to make payments there with gold,
because its price there was higher than in Spain and 
35Portugal. Furthermore, the Portuguese used consider­
able quantities of copper in their African and Asian 
trade, which they acquired in Antwerp from various Ger­
man merchants. To meet this demand the Fugge^s export 
of Hungarian copper shifted from Venice to Antwerp between 
1497 and 1515.36
During the first half of the sixteenth century all 
of these interacting elements came together at Antwerp 
and contributed to its growth into a European entrepot. 
Silver,was, perhaps, one of the most influential of these 
elements not only in the rise of Antwerp but also in its 
subsequent decline. It was the increased production of 
German silver which stimulated the expansion of the South 
and Central German market areas, attracting English cloth 
and Portuguese spices to Antwerp which functioned as the 
market place where these were exchanged* Similarly, it 
was the decline in the production of German silver and
35 Ibid., p. 125. 36 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 66.
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the introduction into Europe of ever increasing quanti­
ties of American silver which began the decline of Ant­
werp. German silver production reached its maximum in 
the decade 1526-35 at the same time as American silver 
began to push silver prices in Seville below those in
Germany thus compelling the Portuguese to buy in the 
37former city. Added to this declining attractiveness 
of the German market were the disturbances of the Re­
formation which drove up grain prices and interfered 
with the east-west overland trade between Antwerp and 
South Germany.
It was not until the 1540's and 1550's that the 
South German market showed serious signs of decay which 
placed the market for English cloth in jeopardy. It can 
be seen from the graph that the long term increase in 
cloth exports was slow and Van der Wee feels that the 
collapse of the Antwerp portion of the English market 
would have happened before it did except for the de­
basements of Henry VIII which effectively enabled Eng­
lish cloth to replace Netherlands cloth in the German 
38market. But the growth of English cloth exports could "y\oh 
continue indefinitely; the market had limits to its ability
37 Ibid., p. 159. 38 Ibid., p. 185.
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to absorb more cloth and the benefits of exchange de­
preciation could not last forever*
Van der Wee was apparently unaware of the non­
economic events peculiar to England which affected the 
changes in English cloth exports and he concentrated on 
exchange depreciation, thus supporting Prof. Fisher, and 
on the German market, thus supporting Prof* Stone. He 
has little to say about the effect of political relations
between England and Antwerp, especially about their effect
39on English trade after 1560. He does make clear, how­
ever, that Antwerp was in decline before the break with 
England. It can be suggested from this that the re­
orientation of English trade would have taken place be­
cause of Antwerp^ economic decline if it had not taken 
place because of the political break between England 
and the Spanish Netherlands. This hypothesis cannot be 
tested, of course, but there is very good reason to 
support the contention that it was not exchange de­
preciation, nor export depressions, nor disturbed markets 
in Central Germany that impelled the re-orientation of 
English trade but rather the severance of commercial 
relations between England and Antwerp which was the
39 This is only to be expected since Van der Wee was 
writing about Antwerp and not about England.
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result of worsening political relations between Queen 
Elizabeth and King Philip II.
The merchant group primarily concerned with this 
problem of the break with Antwerp was the Merchant Ad­
venturers and an account of this break-down of commer­
cial relations is primarily an account of that company. 
But an account of the Merchant Adventurers proper is 
out of place in this study. Nevertheless, they cannot 
be entirely dismissed because it is through their argu­
ments and negotiations for suitable alternative market 
towns that there can be seen some signs of the English 
merchant's awareness of Asian markets.
One of the general explanations given for the mo­
tives of English merchants with respect to overseas 
trade between 1550 and 1575 is couched in terms of the 
search for new markets. While the general truth of this 
is not questioned, clarification of the term “markets11 
will serve also to clarify some points which often pass 
unnoticed or, at least, whose significance is not em­
phasized. The term “market" is used in two, often over­
lapping, senses. First, in referring to the place or 
area where the goods are consumed or to the group of 
people by whom they are consumed; second, as the place 
where the goods are sold to other merchants to be trans­
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ported to more distant places. The first meaning is 
the proper use of the word and the second is better 
designated as "outlet11. If "market11 is taken in the 
first sense of the word then the only new markets deve­
loped after 1550 were Russia and Morocco. This leaves 
the above generalization about new markets to be one 
concerned with outlets and, in fact, the evidence bears 
this out.
It cannot be said just when the English became 
aware of the weakness of Antwerp. It would be surpris­
ing if some merchants were not sensitive to the situation 
in the 1540's but debasement and official friendly re­
lations with Spain under Queen Mary served to reduce 
their active response to the growing decay of Antwerp. 
However, from very early in Elizabeth's reign, when poli­
tical relations with the Spanish Netherlands began to 
take a turn for the worse, there are a number of docu­
ments which indicate that the merchants were very much 
aware of the growing disabilities of Antwerp and which 
offer solutions to the problem.
The earliest of these was a paper drawn up by the 
Ilerchant Adventurers in response to queries put to them 
by Sir William Cecil, who was no doubt gathering infor- 
nation and views about the stoppage of trade with Antwerp.
It specifies the final markets, ranging from the Low
Countries to the Indies, for tin, lead, and a variety
of English cloth. This list of markets is followed by
a statement which makes two points illustrating something
of the context in which the merchants were thinking.
First, that rl...suche comodi ties as be consumed in other
places except the Low Countries maie be transported, ut-
tered^and solde in other places...11. Second, that **...
leving apon occasion the saide Low Countries we thincke
that for sarving of Eastland, Germany and Itlay, Elnden
40in frizeland or hamboroghe to be the fittest place.1*.
By December 1564 the stoppage had become alarming enough
to the merchants to persuade them to address the Privy
Council, this time more to the point. '*If the breach
with the Low Countries cannot be healed then steps must
be taken to see to the vent of those commodities else-
where.**^ The paper then goes on to suggest what the
alternatives are.
Firste that those which are to be spent in 
Spain, Portugal, Barbary and Levant are to 
be transported directly thither.
Such other of the same commodities as are
40 PRO:SPD Eliz. 15 no. 67. The calendar dates this
paper 1560 but there is no internal evidence which
precludes its origin from a few years later.
41 PRO:SPD Eliz. 35 no. 28.
spent in France and have usually been trans­
ported thither, are in like manner to be con­
veyed into that Realme. The like is for 
Russia, Muscovia, Media, Persia, and all other 
places northeastwards within the sound.
Touching the residue being the great masse and 
consumed and uttered in the Lower and higher 
Germanyes, hoist, mecleburgh, Pomerland, Swethin, 
Denmark, Boheame, Hungar, Itlaye and Turkye it 
is not reasonable to be denyed but that Emdeyne 
or Hamburgh by their situations are moste apte 
and surer to be trafyqued unto for places of 
discharge of the commodities of this Realm 
thither shipped, there to be uttered and from 
there transported into any the later mencyoned 
Regions«
Cecil put the problem in more general terms when he wrote, 
in the same year, that 11 •••the commodities of England ought 
to go to sundry places rather than one, especially one 
whose lord is so powerful,11 ^  It can be seen from the 
above examples that the English were more concerned to 
find new routes along which to send their commodities 
than they were to find new markets for them.
The Merchant Adventurers, however, were themselves 
not involved in carrying their goods directly to the 
final consumer area and thus were always at pains to assure 
the government that the various continental merchants would 
be on hand at Bnbden, Hamburg, or elsewhere, to buy the 
goods from the English and transport then to their final 
destinations, Cecil, at the end of the document cited
42 Tawney and Power, vol, 2, pp. 45-7.
above, commented on a specific commodity, kerseys, which 
lfwer wont to be sent into Italy by experience may pass 
thyther from Embden11. A more pointed and detailed state­
ment on this issue was made by Thomas Aldersey, a promi­
nent member of the Merchants Adventurers Company, In a
letter to Cecil, dated May 1564, just before the first
43English cloth fleet sailed for Snbden, he wrote:
“•••I dowt not but your honor doth consyder 
that the grownd of our hope to bryng the 
trafficke to Emden a place not acostomid from 
andwarp which is so famous for trade of mar- 
chandyse is that the comodyts of Yngland be 
of soche estemasyon and so nesarary for all 
contrayis that the being together in any 
plase (convenyent to be comen unto) wyll 
drawe marchants owt of all Contaryis to 
fetche the same and also to bryng there 
commodyts to the same place, ..,l
Fourteen years later the Merchant^ Adventurers 
still showed concern for the continued flow of goods 
to their old markets. In 1578, after ten years stay 
at Hamburg, a quarrel xvith the authorities of that city 
provoked the Merchant Adventurers into looking for a new 
mart town. In the process they again communicated with 
the English government by way of memoranda and petitions 
which throw light on some of their thinking and give evi­
dence of some of the new routes already in use by other
43 PRO:SPD Eliz. 34 no. 3
English merchants. In a memorandum addressed to Lord 
Burghley, arguing in favor of Einbden as the replace­
ment for Hamburg it was repeatedly emphasized that 
“All theis commodities shipped by Italians and other 
strangers, .may be as well and as safely shipped by way 
of Embden as by the way of hamborogh...11 A more general 
statement about trade to the northern ports is made in 
another memorandum of the same year. Arguing that the 
English can be independent of the vent of the Hanse towns 
the document points out that these northern towns are 
small users of English goods and pass them on to other 
markets. Their trade thus depends on English goods com­
ing to their ports. These English goods, however, can 
get to their final markets other ways. The document 
then discussed some of these alternate routes.^
"Where by some few of the Hanse townes some 
small quantity of our kerseys were conveyed 
to Venice and other parts of Italie in time 
of restraint: We have also open (beside many
places in Germany) many good places of vent 
for that trade to utter as many as went by 
the Hanses and many more. For we have open 
for cloth and especially for kerseys the trade 
of France by Rohan and other places, some to 
be spent there, and some to be carried to Lyons, 
to Marsilies, and by land wayes into Italie and 
further by sea into Turkye.
We have open the whole trade within the Streights,
44 PRO:SPD Eliz. 127 no.88 45 PRO:SPD Eliz. 126 no. 27.
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and of the Levant seas of late greatly fre­
quented* We have also open for colored 
clothes and kerseys the whole trade of Russia 
and those northe partes* Speaking nothing of 
Spaine, barbarie and those partes.”
Thus in the late 1570's, the Merchant Adventurers whose 
trade exceeded in bulk and value that of any other seg­
ment of the English merchant community, were still pri­
marily motivated by concern with access to old markets 
raidler than the seeking of new markets* The arguments 
presented here have not been done so to convey the im­
pression that English merchants, in general, were in 
no manner interested in new markets but rather that the 
adjustment of English trade during the 1560's and 1570's 
was dominated by the need to insure continued access to 
market areas already long supplied by English goods.
One of these market areas was the Mediterranean; 
in particular Italy and the lands bordering the eastern 
Mediterranean. Though the Merchant Adventurers at no 
point actually discussed access to Asia^they were al­
ways conspicuously concerned with access to Italy be­
cause at that time it was mainly through the hands of 
Italian merchants that English goods reached Asia. It 
was the kersey, a light-weight, inexpensive, cloth that 
figured largely in consideration of the continued access 
to the Italian market* The document of 1560 which lists
the final markets of various kinds of English cloth
states that:
(,Hampshire kersies and such like and northerns 
are mainly sold in Hungary and Italy and 
countries beyond them.
White kersies called devonshires - the finest 
being the least in number - go to Spain and 
the Indies •11
This statement goes on to indicate that some of the better 
white cloths of Wiltshire, Gloucestershire, and Somerset­
shire, and Kentish cloth went to Italy.^ In the list 
of alternate routes, presented in December 1564, Embden 
or Hamburg are stated to be places from which goods could 
be transported to Italy and Turkey.^ In his general 
discussion of the Antwerp trade Burghley remarked that
the kerseys which nwer wont to be sent into Italy by
48experience may pass thyther from Embden11. The clearest 
statement on this issue was made by Thomas Aldersey in 
his letter of Hay 1564. At the time of the stoppage of 
trade with Antwerp in 1563-4 many merchants avoided the 
restriction by passing through France before or after 
going to Antwerp. Aldersey, in trying to persuade Cecil 
not to permit this, conveys to the modem student some 
sense of the importance of the Italian market for ker-
46 PRO:SPD Eliz. 15 no. 67. 47 PFwO:SPD Eliz. 35 no. 28.
48 Tawney and Power, vol. 2 pp. 45-7.
seys. He said that,
f,...seing Carsis which is a good part of 
owre comdyts serve most for Ytaly and other 
Contrayis beyond the same yt is of nesesete 
to kepe them with in the lymytts of ower 
trade otharwyse a thyrd part of the effect 
hopid for is cut off at one choppe; for yf 
the Italyans maie pas throwe franee to and 
fro every man maye se that in short tyme 
all carsis spent in Ytaly and beyond yt 
shall by the sayd Ytalyans be transported 
that waye and the whole Comodyts of Ytaly 
and comying throgh it shalbe by them broght 
into this Realme the same waye so that the/y/ 
and the whole trade of there contrayis shalbe 
cutte of from us...11
This awareness of the market for kerseys was repeated
H-b
in 1578 in the document quoted above, /p. 33/
Though Aldersey*s attribution to the Italians of 
one-third of the trade in English cloth is a clear ex­
aggeration, the trade in kerseys was an important branch 
of the doth trade and one of the most important markets 
for this trade was the Levant. That this was so can be 
shown both qualitatively and quantitatively. Kerseys 
were exported long before the sixteenth century but it was 
only from late in the reign of Henry VIII that they seem 
to have become a significant portion of cloth exports.
Van der Wee attributes a large part of the expansion of 
cloth exports in the 1540,s to the increasing export of
49 PRO:SPD Eliz. 34 no. 3.
kerseys. This he attributes to the English textile 
industry’s shift to the production of lighter cloth 
to meet the demand of the expanding southern and Levant 
markets.^ The importance of the Levant market is at­
tested to further in the correspondence of the Van der 
Molen commission merchants in Antwerp. From their let­
ters it has been concluded that all kerseys bought by 
Italians were sent to the Levant.^ Those bought by 
German merchants were sent to Hungary and says, a cloth 
similar to kerseys, were bought by Italians for their 
home consumption. The fluctuations in demand for ker­
seys, which paralleled the fluctuations in political
relations between the Venetians and Turks, give further
52proof of the importance of kerseys in the Levant.
It is unfortunate that the quantitative information 
about kerseys in the Levant is based on data from the 
export end of the trade. The historian might feel a 
little more at ease if he could actually see these large 
quantities of kerseys in the warehouses of Levantine 
ports. There are, however, a few qualitative judgments 
on the importance of the kersey trade. It is one his-
50 Op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 185-6.
51 Florence Edler, "Winchcombe Kerseys in Antwerp 
(1538-44)11, Econ. H.R.. 1936, p. 57.
52 Ibid., passim.
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torian*s judgment that ttkerseys were truly the foundation 
of the commerce with Syria and for a long time one of the
53essential products of exchange between Occident and Orient*11
A similar judgment was made in 1513 by a Venetian though
54he did not specifically mention the Levant*
The early date of this opinion raises the question 
of what portion of the English cloth trade was accounted 
for by kerseys and when this portion began to increase*
It has been said that kerseys began to be exported in 
large numbers at the end of the fifteenth century.
However, the earliest numerical data found for the six­
teenth century dates only from 1538* For a period of three 
decades following this it is possible to piece together 
enough export figures to gain some general idea of the 
importance of the kersey trade* /Table III/ Host of 
the figures that have been found are those for the 
Italians and destined for the Mediterranean. This is
53 Lettres d fun marchand venitien: Antrea Berengo (1553-6). 
ed. with an introduction by Ugo Tucci, 19^, p. 1(57
54 Fernand Braudel, La Mediterranean et le monde medi­
terranean ^  l^poque de Philippe II* 2de ed., 2 vols., 
1^6?, vol. I, p. 194-5. Braudel quotes a document 
from the Venetian archives. The statement translated 
by Braudel into French is that kerseys were rtun des 
plus importants fondements du commerce dans n'importe 
quelle partie du monde* ••11
55 Eileen Power and N. M. Postan, Studies in English 
Trade in the Fifteenth Century. 1933. p. 3^4.
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Table III: EXPORT OF KERSEYS FROM LONDON
Year Number of ke rseys
• /.  of 
English 
cloth 
exports
•/• of 
Total 
cloth ' 
exports
Med. 
kerseys 
as % of 
total cloth 
exports
Source
1
Dec
1538
16 000 directly  
to Chios
5.5 Florence Edler/'W inchcom be kerseys in 
Antwerp (1538 -44)"  Econ HR ,1936, p 59
I I 1544 30 777 by English 
merchants
14.85 PRO:KR Customs Acct. 165/6
III 1543 -  45
45 828 exported 
from Antwerp per 
year of which 
28 982 per year 
were exported by 
Ita lian  merchants
14
8.9
Wilfrid B ru le z /’Les routes com m erci- 
ales d'Angleterre en Italic au 16« 
S iec le".in  Studi en onore de Antore 
Fanfani .1362 , voL IV. p 129 n 21
IV 1547 35 139 by English 
merchants
23.8 PRO: Exch Accts.Various 347/16
V
1 May 1549 
to
30Apr 1S50
49 964 to A n t­
w erp by the M er­
chant Adventurers
21.2
Oscar de Sm edt. De Enaelse Natie te 
A n jw e rp e ^ n  de 16 eeuw .1950-51.
VI
Oct .1560 
to 
Oct. 561
21 175 received by 
Italian merchants 
in Antwerp
8.6 PRO:SPD Eliz. 20 no. 14
V II
Easter
1565
n y g e
27 463 of which 
6 866 w e re  
exported by 
Italian merchants.
17.5
4.4 PRO: KR Port Books 1/4 and 2/1
VIII
Oct -Sept
1569-70
1570-71 
1571 -  72
35 570 re-exported 
19 132 from  
14 162 Hamburg
13.1
8.3
7.5
Richard Ehrenberg. Hambura und 
England. 1896, pp. 329-30
IX 1578
17 017 t o Hamburg 
by Italians and 
other strangers
5.6 PRO: SPD Eliz; 127 no.8 8
X 1592
4 584 bv the 
Levant company 1.4 PRO:LTR Enrolled Customs Acct. no.29
X I 1593
9 948 by the  
Levant Company 3.9 i bid.
X II 1594
7 776 by the 
Levant Company 2 .3 PRO:KR Customs Acct. 213/19
XIII 1596
20 968 by the 
Levant Company 7.25 ibid.
XIV 1598
54 731 of which 
18 031 by the 
Levant Company 
and
5 663 by aliens 
overland to 
Venice
17.3
5.7
7.5
1.8
PRO: SPD Eliz. 268 no.101
i
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Comments on Table III:
Kerseys are expressed as the actual number of pieces 
but for the purpose of calculating percentages they 
are converted to notional short cloths on the basis 
of three kerseys to one cloth.
The term ‘'Mediterranean kerseys11 includes those going 
to Italian markets as well as to the Levant.
I. The only reservation about the percentage here is 
that there is no way of knowing whether or not these 
kerseys represent all that were sent to the Levant in 
this year.
II. and IV. These figures were compiled by counting 
entries in these cloth books.
III. To arrive at these figures Brulez surveyed a 
known portion of the packs of cloths exported from 
Antwerp during 31 months in the years 1543-45. The 
London cloth export figure used to calculate the per­
centages was the average for 1542 to 1545. Since 
Brulez1 s figures represent only the kerseys that went 
to Antwerp the percentage is probably low.
V. This figure is for a twelve month period but it is 
one which does not coincide with the Exchequer year.
The percentage is based on the average of denizen ex­
ports for 1550-51 and as in number III above it is only 
for kerseys sent to Antwerp.
VI. This figure derives from a document addressed by 
English merchants to the English government complaining 
of some Italian merchants who have evaded alien customs. 
It names the merchants and states how many kerseys each 
of them received. It is worth noting that this number 
of kerseys represents a greater number of notional short 
cloths than is ascribed to aliens in the Enrolled Customs 
Accounts. Clearly one of the parties was not honest.
VII. The percentage is based on only half the year - 
Easter to Michaelmas - but unless the proportion of 
kerseys exported is greater in the first half than in 
the latter half of the year this percentage should not 
change.
Comments on Table III. cont.:
VIII. Ehrenberg gives figures for monthly re-exports 
from Hamburg for three years running. From his table 
totals were chosen to match the Exchequer year.
IX. This document is a memorandum from the Merchant 
Adventurers written at the instance of their leaving 
Hamburg in 1578. It argues that "all theis commodi­
ties /cited in their statistics/ may be as well and 
as safely shipped by way of EnSden as by the way of 
hamborogh.••" Any doubts as to the accuracy of their 
figures are dispelled by BM:Harl. 167 ff. 75-96 which 
is a detailed list of all the merchants, not of the 
Merchant Adventurers, who shipped goods out of London 
during the Exchequer year 1577-78. The totals taken 
from the Harleian Mss. are identical to those in 
PRO:SPD Eliz. 127 no. 83; thus the latter must have 
been derived from the former which in turn was derived 
from the relevant Port Books. That this was so is clear 
from the form of the entries in the Harleian Mss. which 
are identical in form and language to those found in the 
Port Books.
X. and XI. These entries in the Enrolled Customs Account 
probably resulted from a provision of the Levant Company's 
charter of 1592 which permitted the company six months 
from the date due to pay its customs.
XII. and XIII. These two figures are probably in the 
accounts for the reason given for items X and XI. They 
derive from a book of miscellaneous customs accounts.
This book appears to be something in the nature of the 
customer's final work book in which the completed entries 
were made prior to being enrolled. However, for some 
reason, there are no detailed entries in the Enrolled 
Customs Account for the four years 1594 to 1597.
XIV. As well as the information given here this do­
cument lists the cloth exports of the various trading 
companies. No reason for its compilation is given.
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not merely a fortuitous coincidence but a reflection of 
the general concern of the Merchant Adventurers for 
this branch of the cloth trade in the 1560's and 1570's. 
The size of the trade as a portion of total cloth ex­
ports is about 15% for all kerseys exported and about 
5-8% for those going to the Mediterranean. It cannot 
be said that the latter amounts to a very large part 
of total cloth exports but it was large enough to be 
taken into account in any proposed move of the Merchant 
Adventurers. This is clear from the repeated references 
to the Italian overland trade in the Merchant Adventurer's 
petitions and memoranda addressed to the government dur­
ing the 601s and 70's•
The above discussion of English trade has focused, 
so far, on the export trade. This is mainly a reflection 
of the issues raised most often by the Merchants Adven­
turers, themselves. They constantly emphasized their 
immediate concern for getting their cloth to a suitable 
outlet. However, at the same time they did not fail to 
point out that the foreign merchants who commonly ex­
changed their goods for English cloth at Antwerp would 
now come to whatever new port the English chose and 
bring with them their same goods. Thus^ the solution 
to the one problem provided a solution to the other.
5U
Table IV: SPICES UNLADED AT LONDON AND SOUTHAMPTON
Year Port Spice (lbs ) Total Source
Cinnamor i Clove Ginger Mace Nutmeg Pepper
U 0 8
London
S'htn
110
N il
216
7077
2931
4546
142
1300
Nil
Nil
3882
27 455
7281 
40 378
KR Customs A cct. 7 8 /7  
"  142/10
1492 S’htn Nil 8225 47 854 5980 5275 89 575 156 909 M 142/11
1495 London 201 U 2 8 3369 1275 1325 4900 12 498 ** 7 9 /5
1501 S’ htn 1335 1000 7486 N il N il 4520 14 345 “  2 0 9 /2
1506 S ’ h tn 1 333 522 432 287 39 1614 ” 1 9 5 /8
1517 S ’ htn Nil 6 116 Nil N il 266 388 ** 143/2
1520
London 
S’ htn
536
N il
1142
N il
7322
5700
Nil
100
758
N il
34 245 
4300
44 003 
10100
** 8 1 /8  
”  143/5A
15A7 London 2225 1517 2274 259 275 60 916 67 466 ** 8 5 /3
155 A London 414 1980 2027 45 450 30 331 35 247 •* 8 6 /2
1557 Londor 610 870 3175 368 383 18638 23 994 ”  8 6 /6
1560 London 11 666 3568 14 867 2790 4083 142 224 179198 SPD E liz . 8 n o .31
1566 London ------- 3000 1300 27 000 31 300 Lansdowne 8 f .75
1568 London 1916 2976 17 332 1800 3324 63 234 90 582 KR: Port Book 4 /2
1584
London 
S' htn
500 4936
300
------ 1355 ------ 57 514 
21 305
64 305 
21 605
Lansdowne 41 ff.115-134v
1588 London 5740 1911 54 937 428 55 995 19 960 138 973 KR:Port Book 7/8 and 8/1
1596 London 1292 9925 7875 3278 19 524 5860 47 754 Lansdfw ne 811115
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This leaves an unfortunate blank in the record, for where 
it was possible to piece together contemporary material, 
other than statistical, on kerseys, an important export 
to Asia, there is no similar material on spices, the most 
important import from Asia* Some statistical material, 
however, does exist which makes it possible to form a few 
generalizations. This material, based mainly on the 
Customs Accounts, is summarized in Table IV.
Spices had two characteristics which make it fairly 
easy to trace their movement. They all originated out­
side the boundaries of Europe and none of them were sub­
jected to any secondary processing other than garbling.
It was only necessary to transport them from one place 
to another. Furthermore, there were seldom more than 
one or two routes by which they were transported into 
Europe and there were relatively few merchants or groups 
of merchants involved in the transportation. All of these 
characteristics make spices easier to follow than many 
other commodities. The purpose here will be to examine 
only that branch of the spice trade which reached England.
Until the first years of the sixteenth century
spices were imported to England almost entirely by Italian
56merchants, principally Venetians, and by 1485 these
56 A. A. Ruddock, Italian Merchants and Shipping in 
Southampton. 1270-1600. 1940. p. 79.
s?
spices, and other luxury goods, were being unladed al-
57most entirely at Southampton* The customs returns
A
for 1488 and 149Z demonstrate this clearly* There are
figures for both London and Southampton in 1488 from
which it can be seen it was the latter rather than the
former port which was receiving the spices* There is
X
only a Southampton return for 149/; but the large quan­
tity for that year suggests that London imported only 
a small quantity* The low return for London in 1495 
adds support to the contention that the capital was im­
porting directly only small quantities of spice. From 
1501 the position of Southampton rapidly deteriorated 
as seen in the returns from that year and for 1506 and 
1517* This was in large part because in 1501 the Portu­
guese first began bringing their spices to Antwerp* It 
was only to be expected that these spices would enter 
the London-Antwerp flow of trade goods and that London 
would begin to replace Southampton as the importer of 
spices* Because there are only Southampton customs re­
turns extant between 1501 and 1520, this expectation 
cannot be confirmed, though there is no reason to doubt 
it. However, returns for both ports in 1520 showing that
57 Ibid., p. 84*
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London imported four times as much spice as Southampton, 
confirms that the shift had actually taken place. Even 
though there are no further complete returns for Southamp­
ton, the relatively high figures for London during the 
rest of the century suggest that the capital remained 
the dominant port for the English spice trade. The 
settling of the Portuguese spice mart at Antwerp was 
thus instrumental in bringing the English spice trade 
to London and cutting into Italian trade with England.
But even before the Italians lost their spice trade their
carrack and galley trade with England, in general, was
58well into a decline which was only hurried along by 
the advent of the An twerp-London spice trade.
A further interesting point about the English spice 
trade is that it was concentrated in the hands of re­
latively few merchants. It is possible to determine 
this for those years and ports where there is extant a 
Customs Account or Port Book. However, in some cases 
the quantities imported were so small that it would be 
meaningless to speak of their being concentrated in only 
a few hands. In the other cases though, the conclusion 
is quite definite and quite consistent. At no point can
58 Ibid., p. 207.
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it be said that very many merchants were engaged in 
the spice trade. For the earliest years recorded in 
Table IV there were a total of 17 merchants importing 
spices to Southampton, all of whom were Italian. In 
1492 there were 27 such merchants, again all of them 
Italian. The largest number of spice importers was 58, 
all English, in 1568. The concentration went further 
than this. In 1488 three merchants imported 65% of the 
pepper to Southampton; in 1492 four merchants accounted 
for 51% of the pepper. In the same year four merchants 
also accounted for 65% of the ginger brought to Southamp­
ton. These examples all refer to the years when the spice 
trade was in the hands of Italian, mainly Venetian, mer­
chants. The situation was no different after the shift 
from Southampton to London and from Italian to English 
merchants. Thus in 1520, six English merchants imported 
52% of the pepper into London and four merchants accounted
for 66% of the ginger. In 1547, seven merchants accounted
for 51% of the pepper and in 1568, ten merchants accounted
for 53% of that spice. The same pattern is discernible
for ginger, the only other spice generally imported in 
large quantities.
The fact that so few merchants could supply the 
market needs for spices facilitated the ease with which
uthe market shifted from place to place in England. Un­
like the export of cloth, which required years to adjust 
to new circumstances, spices shifted from Southampton to 
London and from Italian to English merchants very quickly. 
Similarly, with the advent of English sea-going trade to 
the Levant one would expect to find that spices were now 
concentrated along that route and in the hands of the mer­
chants monopolizing that route. However, only one year, 
1588, yields evidence on this point. In that year the 
Turkey Company imported 41.9% of the pepper, 38.2% of the 
cinnamon, 88.57® of the nutmeg and all of the mace. If the 
company is thought of as a single importer this shows a 
considerable degree of concentration. The import of 
spices shown in Table IV for 1584 are all from Spain 
and Portugal and indicates that substantial quantities 
of spice, especially pepper, were coming from that source. 
This was the result of another shift of the spice trade9 
due, this time, to the closing of Antwerp.
Kerseys and spices were the two primary commodities 
of exchange between England and Asia. Tin and silk also 
figured in that trade but it has not been possible to 
find similar statistical material for them. The total 
export of tin can be determined but there is almost no 
indication of how much of this entered the Asian market.
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Silk, though it appeared in the Customs Accounts and 
Port Books, is difficult to identify as to its source*
Unlike spices, raw silk had to be fashioned into fabric 
and it is nearly impossible to tell from the customs 
entries whether the fabric had been manufactured in 
Asia or in Italy. Raw silk, of course, is easy enough 
to identify and there are scattered figures for it.
£see Appendix B/ But figures for total silk imports 
are so few as to be useless for making general remarks 
about them.
Before turning to the Asian trade, itself, some
remarks are in order concerning the general framework
within which long distance trades had to operate in the
second half of the sixteenth century. Some of the basic
problems which beset such trades were a consequence of
the particular character of certain economic factors
59which were peculiar to the time. In general, invest­
ment was in the form of circulating capital. In the ex­
port trades this took the form of goods rather than precious 
metals. The reason for this predominance of commodities
59 In the following discussion some of the detail and 
much of the conceptual framework is based on the in­
troduction to B. E. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change 
in England. 1600 - 1642. 1959; and on R. W. K. Hinton, 
"The Mercantile System in the Time of Thomas Hun",
Econ. H.R.« 1955, pp. 277-90.
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over metal was the general shortage of the latter and 
official attitudes with respect to bullion as wealth 
which resulted in a prohibition on its export.
In face of a shortage of money rapid turnover be­
came of paramount importance in providing capital for 
expansion so that a relatively small initial investment 
could do the work of several times its value in a year's 
time. If the process of investing £100 in goods for ex­
port which are then turned into goods for import the 
sales of which are then reinvested, with profit, in exports, 
is repeated three times in a year then the velocity has 
enabled the merchant to gain the same benefit from a £100 
investment as he might have from £300, At the same time 
the merchant avoids tying up his capital for a longer 
time in a period of relatively high interest rates.
The success of this process depends, of course, on short 
trade routes and on substantially equivalent demands for 
both imports and exports.
These economic factors - a short money supply and 
a premium on rapid turnover of investments in goods - 
tend to discourage the long term investments required 
to explore distant markets. As trade routes lengthen, 
turnover slows down and initial investment must increase 
in order to maintain the same effective level of profit.
These requirements need not present insuperable barriers, 
though they will mean that the small merchant cannot 
operate independently as he could in the short distance 
trades* However, a more difficult problem to overcome 
is one where the foreign demand for domestic exports is 
less than the domestic demand for foreign imports* This 
was the case vis-a-vis England and Asia. The problem was 
compounded further by the fact that the gold-silver ratio 
was lower in Asia than in Europe* Thus to a limited 
consumer demand for English cloth there was added the 
pressure of making payments in money because of its 
relatively higher value* This problem constantly beset 
the English during the second half of the sixteenth cen­
tury* The manner of its solution cannot be spelled out 
because of the paucity of records* But the inclusion 
in the East India Company^ charter of the right to ex­
port bullion and constant references to the need for 
money prior to 1600, certainly suggest that the mer­
chants involved knew how they would have liked to solve 
the problem*
IcS
CHAPTER XI 
THE MUSCOVY COMPANY1S PERSIAN TRADE
The Levant and East India Companies so dominated 
England's Asian trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries that the history of those companies has domi­
nated the history of that trade* This has not so much 
distorted the perspective in Anglo-Asian trade as it has 
tended to obscure the Muscovy Company's Persian trade*
For nearly a quarter of a century it was the only English 
commerce with Asia. Several historians have written 
accounts of this Persian trade, based on Hakluyt's docu­
ments, but they have treated it either as an independent 
entity* or in connection with the Muscovy trade^ rather 
than as an integrated; part of England's continuous effort 
and desire to trade with eastern Asia. Sir William Foster 
included a chapter on the Persian trade in England's Quest 
for Eastern Trade but his presentation of it is detached 
from any consideration of other efforts to trade with 
Asia. None of the accounts of the Levant trade so much
1 Earnest V. Vaughan, "English Trading Expeditions into 
Asia Under the Authority of the Muscovy Company (1557- 
81)" in Studies in the History of English Commerce
in the Tudor Period. 1^12.
2 T. S. Willan, The Early History of the Russia Company. 
(1553-1603). 1956.
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as mention it.
All present day accounts of this Persian trade are 
indebted to Richard Hakluyt for preserving most of the 
record. But his disconnected presentation of the story 
is responsible for its obfuscation. In one section of 
his anthology he stated that Elizabethan shipping to the 
Levant was discontinued for twenty-five years^ then in 
an entirely different section he presented his account 
of the Persian trade which took place during this interval. 
Thus any sense of the continuity in England's trade with 
Asia is severed. There is no reason to believe that 
Hakluyt, himself, intended to create a sense of division 
or that there was any confusion in his own mind about the 
relation between these trades* The separation between 
them in the Principal Navigations rather stems from the 
anthology's organization along geographical lines. The 
inclusion of material in one part or another of the work 
seems to be based on the direction in which one sailed
3 Mordecau Epstein, The English Levant Company, 1908;
A. C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company. 1935; and 
A. L. Rowland^ ^England and Turkey: The Rise of Diplo­
matic and Commercial Relations" in Studies in English 
Commerce and Exploration in the Reign"of Elizabeth. 1924.
4 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations Voyages 
Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation. 12 
vols., 1904; V,168. This edition is used hereafter 
throughout and will be cited simply as "Hakluyt" fol­
lowed by volume and page number*
5 Hakluyt II and III passim.
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upon leaving English shores rather than upon one's ulti­
mate objective. It is clear throughout the story of 
this Asian trade that the markets of Eastern Asia were 
the ultimate objective of the merchants concerned. But 
it remains to examine more closely the connecting links 
between the various attempts to reach those markets.
The renewal of the Levant trade in the late 1570's 
was, in large part, a result of the demise of this Persian 
trade. But that the reverse may have been true in the 
early 1550's can only be speculated. The juxtaposition 
of the end of the one trade and the beginning of the other 
lends itself to this speculation - perhaps even inspires 
it. The last merchants' voyage recorded by Hakluyt which 
sailed into the eastern Mediterranean was that of the 
Bark Aucher. It departed from Plymouth in January, 1551, 
made port at Cadiz, Messina, Candia, and Chios, and re­
turned to England probably late that year or early the 
next.^ Two other ships, the Jesus of Lubeck and the 
Mary Gonson. both belonging to the King, were chartered 
by merchants in 1552 for a voyage to "Levants end1'^ . 
Finally, Hakluyt records the voyage of the Mathew Gonson 
which, in March 1553, intended to sail to Candia. However,
6 Hakluyt V, 77 ff.
7 James A. Williamson, Maritime Enterprise, p. 233.
the account does not follow her all the way so it is not 
known if the voyage was completed* 8 This marks the end 
of the Levant trade of the early sixteenth century for 
there is not another English merchant ship known to have
Q
been in the Mediterranean until 1572* III But two 
months after the departure of the Mathew Gonson* Richard 
Chancellor and Hugh Willoughby departed with their small 
fleet to seek out the North-east Passage to China* This 
may have been merely a coincidence*
The chronology of the events alone does not permit 
one to be more definite about this* But the presence of 
some merchants in both the Levant trade and the Russia 
Company suggests that there might have been something 
more than mere coincidence at work* At least three mem­
bers of the Russia Company, John Gresham, Thomas Curtis, 
and John Starkey*^ appear in Hakluyt1s accounts of the 
early Levant trade*^ In addition, Hakluyt mentions 
William Locke and Nicholas and William Wilford in this 
trade* The former is probably the William Locke who was 
the father of Thomas Locke, a charter member, and of 
Michael Locke, who became active in the Russia trade several
8 Hakluyt V, 76. 9 Numbers in brackets are ref­
erences to the entries in the Shipping List, Appendix C*
10 T* S* Willan, The Muscovy Merchants of 1555* 1953.
11 Hakluyt V, 62-69.
years later* ^  The case of the Wilfords is based on 
less certain evidence. In the 1555 charter there appears 
an Elizabeth Wilford, widow, and a John Wilford,^ but no 
connection has been established between either of them 
and Nicholas and William Wilford. It is reasonable to 
suggest that in the case of these merchants their decision 
to enter the new enterprise was prompted by the fact that 
the Levant trade was no longer desirable and that the 
capital formerly invested in the Mediterranean was now 
seeking new employment. But this does not confirm that 
the demise of the Mediterranean trade provided the im­
pulse behind the enterprise of 1553. If a large number 
of the Russia merchants had previously been Levant 
merchants, then such an argument could be made. But 
there were only those few named above, out of some 200 
persons listed in the 1555 charter, who can be connected 
with the Levant trade. There may have been more but had 
there been many more the fact would probably have come 
out, either in the contemporary accounts or in Prof. 
Willan*s researches on the Muscovy merchants.^
A further argument against any substantial con­
nection between the two trades is the fact that none of
12 Willan, op. cit. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.
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the reasons given by contemporaries for undertaking the
1533 voyage makes any mention whatever of the Levant,
Clement Adams, whose account of that voyage was printed
by Hakluyt wrote, as an explanation of it, that
,f•••out Merchants perceived the commodities 
and wares of England to be in small request 
with the countreys and people about us, and 
neere unto us, and that those Merchandizes 
which strangers in the time and memories of 
our auncesters did earnestly seeke and de­
sire, were nowe neglected, and the price 
thereof abated, although by us carried to 
their owne portes, and all forreine Mer­
chandizes in great accompt, and their prises 
wonderfully raised,•./thus/ certaine grave 
Citizens of London.•.began to think with 
themselves howe this mischiefe might bee 
remieded.•./and/ seeing that the wealth of 
the Spaniards and Portugals, by the dis­
co verie and search of newe trades and 
Coun treys was marveilously increased, sup­
posing the same to be a cause and mean for 
them also to obteine the like, they there­
upon resolved upon a newe and strange Navi­
gation. • •
Thus Adams ascribes the voyage to the desire for new
markets and to emulate the Spaniards and Portuguese.
The Russia Company, itself, in an explanation of its
origin, written in 1600, said that
flIn the time of King Edward VI the king 
and his councell, finding it inconvenient 
that the utterance of the comodities of 
England, especiallie cloth, should soe 
muche depend upon the Lowe Countries and 
Spain and that it should be beneficial
15 Hakluyt II, 339-40.
that the 1550,s was a period of severe flucuations in 
cloth exports, that nearly three-quarters of the original 
members of the Russia Company were described as merchants, 
and about half of them were engaged in foreign trade. 1** 
Furthermore about 75 of them were exporting cloth between 
1547 and 1554. Thus their primary reason for engaging 
in any new enterprise at that time would be related to 
their interests in the cloth trade.
It must be concluded then that if there was more 
than a casual relation between the early Levant trade and 
the enterprise of 1553 it was too tenuous to have left 
any evidence of its existence. The evidence that does 
exist points toward internal conditions and their re­
lationship with England's cross-channel trade as the main 
cause of the new enterprise. The evidence also points 
toward the successes Portugal had in taping Eastern wealth 
as an inspiring factor. The historian of the Russia 
Company makes no reference to the Levant in his discussion 
of the reasons for the 1553 voyage and concludes that no 
single reason can be found but that its purpose was 
"...to tap the riches of the east by a route free from 
Portuguese interference and to open up a new and direct
18 Willan, op. cit., pp. 22, 37. 19 Ibid., p. 24
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source of supply for gold and spices. f,20 The only issue 
that might be taken with this statement of purpose is 
that it does not take into account the problems faced 
by the exporter of English cloth. To have an unhampered 
means of acquiring wealth is a continuous and fundamental 
motive for all businessmen at all times. It requires 
something more to explain why a particular course of 
action, leading to that end, is taken at a particular 
time.
There is, nevertheless, one more connecting link
between the two trades worth noting - perhaps the most
interesting link of all - in the person of Anthony Jenkin-
son; a link which is formed by his own activities and
possibly also by his personal connections. In January
211568 he married Judith Marsh, daughter of John Marsh,
one of the charter members of the Company.22 Judith Marsh,
through her mother, was the grand-daughter of William 
23Gresham. It is probably this William Gresham, brother 
of Sir John Gresham, the charter member, and uncle of 
Sir Thomas Gresham, who is mentioned by Hakluyt in con­
nection with the early Levant trade. ^  There is nothing
20 T. S. Willan, The Early History of the Russia Company. 
1956, p.2. -------------------------
21 Miscellanea Geneologica et Heraldicae. 2nd Series, vol.
v7 p .
22 Willan, Muscovy Merchants. 23 Ibid.
24 Hakluyt V,6i.
amore than this to go on, and it may mean nothing* All
of Jenkinson's connections with the Marsh's and the
Gresham's may have originated only after the beginning
of his service with the Russia Company* It should be
noted, however, that Jenkinson was admitted to the Mer-
25cers Company in 1555 by redemption gratis and that the 
Greshams were prominent members of this company*
More definite is that in 1553 Jenkinson was in 
Aleppo, in Syria, when the Sultan Suleiman arrived on 
his way to wage war on Persia* He received from the Sultan 
a safe conduct to trade with Ottoman territories# Unfor­
tunately, the most important question about his presence 
in the Levant cannot be answered* Did he secure this on 
his own initiative or was he acting for some mercantile 
interests? However, it can be suggested, from a remark 
he made some years later, that his expectation was greater 
than his achievement* In 1562, when he was in Persia, 
Jenkinson was asked by Abdullah Khan, the king of Shirvan, 
if the English were friendly with the Turks* He replied 
that they had never been "and therefore they would not
suffer us to passe through their countrie into this
26Sophie his dominions • • •** He could not have been denied
25 M6cC, lxxxviii; see note 30 for this reference in full*
26 M&C, 143.
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this passage unless he had asked for it, suggesting
that his purpose in 1553 may have been to try to open
up a trade with Persia. In the end he was given only
27the privilege printed by Hakluyt.
Jenkinson does not appear on the scene again until 
three and a-half years after his presence in Syria. It 
is not known when he returned to England though it could
o Q
not have been much before early 1554. In the meantime, 
some months before this, Chancellor and Willoughby had 
set out to tap the Asian trade by another route. Though 
Chancellor succeeded in opening trade with Russia, he 
had not attempted, in effect, the Northeast Passage, 
thus leaving its feasibility still an open question.
Before it was pursued further, the merchants who backed 
this original voyage secured letters patent forming them 
into a corporate body and then immediately sent a dele­
gation to the Czar to formalize their relations with 
him. It was thus not until April 1556 that Stephen
Borough, in the Searchthrift, began the second attempt
29to find the Northeast Passage. Like all those who 
came after he failed to penetrate the ice and fog at the
27 Hakluyt V, 109.
28 He witnessed the entry of Suleiman into Aleppo on
4 November 1553. (Hakluyt V, 105.)
29 Hakluyt II, 322.
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entrance to the Kara Sea. On his return he wintered at 
Coimogro and arrived in England the following year, pro­
bably sometime in the spring.
It was not until Hay 1557 that Anthony Jenkinson 
departed from London on his projected overland voyage 
to eastern Asia. What his activities had been from 
November 1553, when he was in Aleppo, until then is not 
known. It is reasonable to suppose that he returned 
with his privilege from the Sultan with the intention 
of putting it into effect, finding, when he arrived back 
in England that plans to tap Asian trade by another route 
had already been put into operation. If this route should 
prove successful Jenkinsonfs privilege would be irrele­
vant. Thus no action was likely to be taken on it until 
definite news was heard from Stephen Borough. His fai­
lure left open the way for one further possibility - the 
overland route through central Asia. Whether the initia­
tive came from Jenkinson or the Russia Company cannot be 
determined. In view of his previous experience he was 
the logical person to send, a decision which was fully 
justified by the results he achieved. Within a few 
years he had succeeded in laying the ground-work for 
the Russia Company^ trade with Persia. The correspon­
dence of the Company with its agents in Persia and their
7?
accounts, written during the 20 years this trade lasted, 
constitute a record from which it is possible to make a 
useful and interesting analysis of some of the commer­
cial and political problems presented by trade in Asia
In its inception this Persian trade bears an in­
teresting parallel to its parent Muscovy trade* Just
30 These documents have been used by E. V. Vaughan, op* 
cit*, but he presented an essentially chronological 
narrative of the expeditions as they occured one 
after the other* It is very useful, as such, in 
keeping the story clear in one's mind* Foster, op* 
cit., has taken a similar approach to Vaughan's but 
with much less detail* Willan, op* cit*, has some 
interesting and useful comments and observations on 
the Persian trade scattered throughout his history 
of the Russia Company, but he did not attempt to give 
any systematic analysis of the trade* Much of the 
particular detail that appears in the following ana­
lysis has been used in the above secondary accounts; 
some of it has not been used. Because of the con­
fusion that would ensue from continual cross-reference 
to these secondary works and because all the original 
sources have been re-examined, references for the facts 
are made to these sources only. They have all been col­
lected together and edited by E. Delmore Morgan and 
C* H. Coote in Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and 
Persia* 2 vols*, 1&86. With the addition of a few 
items not printed by Hakluyt, these volumes contain 
all but three of the extant documents relevant to these 
Persian voyages* For convenience the documents have 
been referred to in this edition throughout the pre­
sent study and it will be cited simply as M&C followed 
by the page number. There were seven expeditions in 
all though only six were counted by Hakluyt as Persian 
expeditions. The Jenkinson voyage of 1557-60 stands 
separately from the others which were:
during this time.^
1st - 1561-63 
2nd - 1564 
3rd - 1565-67
4th - 1568-69 
5th - 1569-74 
6th - 1579-81
as the Chancellor-Willoughby voyage of 1553 - though 
failing in its main object of reaching eastern Asia by 
sea - discovered the Muscovy trade; so also the Anthony 
Jenkinson voyage of 1557 - though failing in its main 
object of reaching eastern Asia by land - discovered 
the Persian trade. The effort to find a route to the 
furthest reaches of Asia did not end with these two fai­
lures. It was to be continued, not only by the Muscovy 
Company but also by the English in general, until success 
was finally achieved in 1600. That this route was the 
purpose of the Chancellor-Willoughby and Jenkinson voy­
ages is clear enough but with the beginning of the Persian 
voyages it can be reasonably asked if, in view of the 
energy being devoted to developing and maintaining the 
trade with Persia, the Muscovy Company was still genuinely 
interested in gaining direct access to the east Asian 
markets. Examination of the letters and accounts of the 
voyages to Persia show that they always had the objective 
in mind though they did not continuously devote all their 
energies to this end.
Success was dependent on gaining permission from 
the Shah of Persia to pass through his lands. Thus the 
question only comes up in the records on the few occas­
ions when actual negotiations with the Shah were taking
place. In their instructions to Jenkinson in 1561, the
Muscovy Company specifically stated that he should attempt
to have included in the privileges from the Shah per-
31mission to pass through Persia to and from India.
When the privileges were granted, however, they were 
silent on this matter. In 1570, Thomas Bannister had 
an audience with Shah Tahmasp in Kazvin during which 
negotiations were conducted for further privileges. A 
year later, in a letter to William Cecil, Bannister re­
ported that the Shah 11 • • • grawnted all my requestes sav­
ing one and that was that we might passe through his 
domynyons into the indiaes which he should not then
32grawnt, but said an other tyme I shold have hitt.
It is never stated why the Shah refused this request, 
but the most likely explanation is that he wished to 
protect his own merchants who traded with India from 
English competition.
Because of this repeated refusal, the English 
merchants' most active concern was concentrated on 
Persia itself and the details of its trade. Neverthe­
less, the focus of this concern reveals that though pas­
sage through Persia was blocked their main interest was
31 M&C, 117.
32 PRO:SPForeign General Series, 118, 2 May 1571.
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still with the spices that came from further east* The
Company was quite explicit about this desire for spices
in its instructions to its agents in 1567* ,f0ur chiefe
desire is to have a greate trade for the said spices and
drugges to serve this reallme*••therefore you must use
herein all diligence, circumspection and travaill which
33waye it may be sonest and best brought to passe***1 
Part of their reason for expressing such concern for quick 
success was that they had 11. • • undertaken (at this late 
parliament tyme) to perfome the same to the Queenes 
Maiestie and the nobillitie of this Realme11^ *  Having 
committed themselves, they were now anxious that their 
agents in Russia and Persia rescue them. The emphasis 
on the spice trade was also reflected in a letter written 
a year later by Thomas Bannister and Geoffrey Ducket to 
Sir William Cecil in which they spoke of the benefits to 
be derived from the Muscovy trade, among which was ,l.*.the 
honor that will insewe by Bringinge the trayd of spyces 
this waye...11^
With the way through Persia into India remaining 
closed, the English considered other alternatives*
33 M&C, 220* 34 Loc* cit* The occasion for
this statement to the Queen and nobility was the 
petitioning for a new patent which was granted in 
December 1566* (Willan, Russia Company* pp* 75-77*) 
35 M&C, 260.
nJenkinson made inquiries among the merchants of India 
when he was in Kazvin between November 1562 and March 
1563. He asked them about the trade in spices and they 
assured him that they could bring as much spice as the
O A
English would buy. This is the only record of any 
attempt to deal directly with the merchants of India 
possibly because the English soon learned what Geoffrey 
Ducket reported some years later in his "Further obser­
vations concerning the state of Persia11 • He wrote that 
"The most part of spices which commeth into Persia is 
brought from the Islande of Ormus...The Portingals touche 
at Ormus, both in their voyage to East India and home- 
warde againe, and from thence bring all such spices as 
are occupied in Persia and the regions thereabout.
The possibility of opening trade in Ormuz was considered 
as early as 1566. In that year Arthur Edwards, in a let­
ter to the Company, stated that if he had had another 
Englishman with him to whom he could have intrusted his 
business he would have taken an interpreter and gone to 
Ormuz A year later the Company, having received 
Edward's letter, instructed its agents, who were pre­
paring for the fourth voyage into Persia, that they
36 M&C, 149. 37 M&C, 435. 38 M6cC, 401.
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should acquire some slaves who had been to Ormuz and spoke
both Portuguese and Persian and with them go to that place
1 there to practice for the trade of spices and drugges
39to be brought to the Casbin from Oromes or Callecut*1.
However, when they arrived in Persia, the English found
they could not follow through with this plan because a
war between the Portuguese and Indians had closed the 
40way to Ormuz, Unable to get closer to the source of 
the spice trade, the English had to be content to pursue 
their trade entirely within the boundaries of the lands 
of the Shah of Persia,
Confined thus, the detailed knowledge of this 
market became important to the merchants. This detail 
was not determined with the same precision that the pre­
sent day businessman would insist upon before committing 
his capital. At the same time a reading of the record 
impresses one with the amount of market exploration that 
did, in fact, take place. It impresses one, also, with 
the genuine effort that was made to be accurate and 
thorough in surveying the market. It is only to be ex­
pected that such information would be required inasmuch 
as this was the first time, in well over a generation,
39 M&C, 222. 40 M&C, 409.
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that the English had to concern themselves personally 
with transactions outside the boundaries of Europe.
The Persian trade was thus an unknown quantity to them. 
They might speak of the "traffique of Persia" but Persia 
was large and they had to find out just where in that 
largeness was to be £ound the best traffic. They had 
to determine just what kinds of goods could be sold 
where and what kinds were for sale; and at what prices. 
They had to assess the seriousness of the competition 
from Turkish, Armenian, Italian and other merchants. 
Finally, they had to insure for themselves formal, 
friendly relations with the Shah of Persia, for without 
the Shah's good will and without a written statement of 
privileges they could carry on no trade at all.
One might expect that a businessman would insist 
on some preliminary exploration of these problems before 
venturing his capital in the trade itself. But, unlike 
the present day businessman, the sixteenth century mer­
chant could not commit sufficient capital to carry him 
through an exploratory period without any return. Thus 
he had to explore and exploit at the same time. Should 
it turn out that there was no immediate return it was 
very difficult for him to raise further capital. In 
the sixteenth century merchant's account books there 
was no place for expenditure on research and development
SH
which could be absorbed by future profits. Merchants, 
therefore, could not always count on being able to fol­
low directly through to their objective. As important 
as it may have been to reach a given market to sell their 
goods it was even more important that the goods not re­
main in hand.
This can be seen from Jenkinson(s instructions for 
the first Persian voyage, written in May 1561. There is 
also discernible here the conflict between the desire on 
the part of the Company to open this trade and its desire 
for a quick turnover of its investment. The Company 
stated first to Jenkinson that it was lading 400 kerseys 
especially to be carried into Persia but ft.. .nevertheless 
if you chance to finde goode sailes for them in the Mosco, 
we thinke it were good to sell part of them there, and to 
carry the lesse quantity with you, because we be uncer­
tain what vent or sale you shall finde in Persia or other 
places where you shall come11.^ Further on in the in­
structions they reveal, in more detail, their indecision 
about what is really the best thing to do.
"...if passage can not be had in Persia by 
Astracan, or otherwise, the next Summer, which 
shall be the yeere 1562, then our minde is, that 
you procure to sell our kersies, and other such
41 M&C, 115-16.
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wares as are appoynted for Persia, in the 
Mosco or other the Efciperours dominions, if 
you may sell them for any reasonable price, 
and then to employ your selfe with such other 
of our servants as you shall think meete for 
the search of the passage by Nova Eeznbla, or 
else you to return© for England as you thinke 
good, Provided alwayes that if you doe percieve 
or understand, that passage is like to be had 
into Persia the Summer following, which shall 
be in the yeere 1563, and that if you can not 
sell our karseis in the Elnperours dominions, 
as aforesayd, at a reasonable price: then we 
will rather they may be kept till the sayd 
summer in the yeere 1563 and then you to pro­
ceed forwards upon your ioumey towards Persia, 
as aforesayd, If passage into Persia can not be 
obteined the next yeere, neither yet in the mean­
time, good sale of our karseis in the Emperours 
dominions, then we thinke good for you to see 
if you can practice to carry your sayd wares 
by safe conduct through Polonia, or any other 
wayes unto Constantinople, or els where you 
thinke sale may be had, then in Russia."^
While the above may show uncertaintyy it is uncertainty 
about market conditions and not about the priorities of 
business• First the goods must be sold at a reasonable 
price, and only then consideration given to the explor­
ation of a given market. Ideally both should be carried 
out. Behind all this is the implicit imperative to 
Jenkinson that the kerseys must not be brought back to 
England. This explains all the elaborate alternatives 
set out with the telling "or els where" at the end of 
the instructions. If the Company's investment could have
42 M&C, 117-18.
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been wholly in money instead of goods the entire problem 
of vent would have been eliminated and only the much 
simpler one of purchases would have been present.
For these reasons the English remained fairly cau­
tious and restrained in their efforts to open up the trade 
of eastern and southern Asia. They followed up leads 
which took them to the next town a few days journey away 
rather than striking out with boldness across a continent. 
This should not be held as a criticism suggesting that 
they might have accomplished more if they had been less 
timid. They had the temerity but were confronted by eco­
nomic and political conditions which, though they under­
stood, they could not overcome. Consequently most of the 
details of trade sent home by the merchants in Persia were 
concerned with the immediate problems of local trade.
First to be considered among these was the outlook
for the market itself. Jenkinson was disappointed in this
when he reached Bukhara, in central Asia, in 1558.
11 There is yeere ly grat resort of Mar chants to 
this Citie of Boghar, which travaile in great 
Caravans from the Contries thereabout adioyning, 
as India, Persia, Balke, Russia, with divers 
others, and in times past from Cathay, when there 
was passage, but these Marchants are so beggarly 
and poor, and bring so little quantities of wares, 
lying two or 3. yeeres to sell the same, that 
there is no hope of any good trade there to be 
had worth the following11^
43 M&C, 87
Not only did he find "no hope of any good trade1* but he 
also learned that even if the way to Cathay had been open 
it was a nine month's journey away.^ One cannot help 
but suppose that this would have been no inhibition to 
Jenkinson but it is doubtful if the Muscovy Company would 
have seriously tried to develop such a route. It had 
taken Jenkinson nine months to reach Bukhara from London; 
another nine months to Cathay would make a round trip of 
at least three years. Merchants would certainly have 
been reluctant to tie up their capital for that length 
of time even with assurance of a good return.
The blocked route to Cathay did not end matters, 
for Jenkinson*s inquiries concerned the trade of Bukhara 
in general. He learned that Indian merchants came there 
carrying cambrics, muslins, cottons and linen but no gold, 
silver or spices. In the main they took away with than 
silk, hides from Russia, slaves, and horses; "but of car- 
seis and other clothe, they make little accompt",^ This 
was the first indication of what ultimately had to be re­
learned by the East India Company; that the market for
£.6English cloth in India was minimal. Merchants of Persia, 
Jenkinson learned, bring linens, silks and horses and take
44 M&C, 91 45 M&C, 81
46 K, N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company, 1965, 
pp. 137-8.
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back with them hides and slaves. Woolen cloth, however,
they would not buy Mfor they bring thither themselves,
and is brought unto them as I have enquired from Aleppo
in Syria. and the parts of Turkie11. ^  In fact, Jenkinson
not only met with English cloth in Bukhara brought from
Aleppo, but it was being sold at prices competitive with
48those he offered. When he stopped at Astrakhan on his
return journey, he found things no different. There he
met with merchants of Shamakha, in Shirvan, and offered
to barter their goods for his kerseys but they refused on
the grounds that they could buy the same cloth in their own
49country for the same price.
It was thus clear that the desired trade could only 
be found by penetrating Persia itself. The six expeditions 
which did this all traveled down the Volga River to Astrak­
han, then continued by ship south along the west shore of 
the Caspian Sea to thejprovince of Shirvan where they 
landed and traveled inland to Shemakha, the chief city 
of the province. Shemakha became, in effect, the jumping 
off point for the journey into Persia and for the journey 
back to Russia. From Shemakha the regular route, followed 
by at least several members of each expedition, was south
47 M&C, 89. 48 M&C, 98. 49 Loc. cit
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as far as Kazvin, where the Shah held court. On the way 
they stopped to trade at Ardabil, Jevat, and sometimes 
Tabriz. From this regular route side journeys were made 
for the purpose of investigating market reports. For 
example, in April, 1563, Jenkinson sent Edward Clark into 
Arrash, in Georgia, to investigate the availability of 
raw silk,^ but apparently without success - though three 
years later Arthur Edwards gave a glowing account of the 
amount of silk available t h e r e . I n  156S several members 
of the 4th voyage were supposed to take some kerseys to
Arrash to sell but for some reason, not explained, this
52was not done. Thomas Bannister traveled there in 1571 
and evidently succeeded in buying some silk but while 
there he died.^
Another side journey off the route to Kazvin was 
to the province of Gilan along the southwestern shore of 
the Caspian Sea. Report of this locale was first made 
in 1565 by Edward Chenie who said spices could be had 
there. ^  In August of the following year, in his letter 
to the Company, Arthur Edwards also wrote of Gilan. He 
seems to have been formulating plans to make Gilan rather 
than Shirvan the port of call for English trade to Persia.
50 M&C, 150-1. 51 M&C, 388-9. 52 M&C, 408.
53 PRO:SP Foreign 118, 2 May 1571. 54 M&C, 381.
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He said that he sent his two previous letters with a 
company servant to Gilan, from there to embark for 
Astrakhan* He also said that there was much silk and 
galls available there and gave his calculation of the 
carrying charges from Gilan to England?^ This report 
evidently impressed the Company. Instructions for the 
4th voyage specifically stated that the agents in Persia 
should negotiate with the ruler of Gilan for permission 
to build forts, near a place of anchorage, to protect 
English shipping.^ Finally, in the spring of 1569,
Arthur Edwards sent Lawrence Chapman from Kazvin to Gilan, 
a distance of five days journey. Chapman was not enthusi­
astic about the situation. He described the journey there 
as very dangerous and troublesome. The area recently had 
been overrun by the Shah, he said, and was still suffering 
from the spoliation and only the poorest people travel 
there. ^  Thus no further effort was made to open this 
branch of the trade.
In addition to their remarks on the location of the 
market the English agents attempted to give some idea of 
the size and quality of this market. Their remarks were 
designed to give guidance to the merchants in London about
55 M&C, 400. 56 M&C, 220. 57 M&C, 412-13.
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what and how much they should send to Persia* Some of
these reports seem exaggerated and were often vague. In
1566 Arthur Edwards wrote to the Company that they might
have vent for 30 to 40,000 pounds a year which was one-
58half of what they might buy. The Company found this
report ambiguous and wrote back asking if Edwards meant
59
pounds in weight or sterling* Some months later Edwards
again wrote to London and reported that the Armenian are
said to carry over 150,000 pounds of silk each year to
Aleppo and return with over 15,000 kerseys.^ He also
estimated that the Company could have 200 to 300 tons a
61year lading from Gilan in silk and alum. It is perhaps
significant that at the same time he was giving these
reports, Edwards urged the Company to send him no more
62than 2000 kerseys. This more restrained - or perhaps 
realistic - view of the market is to be found in Lawrence 
Chapman's report of the 4th voyage in 1569. He said that 
in Tabriz no more than 300 to 400 kerseys could be sold, 
for money or barter, and no more than 1000 in the whole 
country. In 1570 Thomas Bannister confirmed this re­
port by saying that the agents of the 5th voyage had sold 
only 1000 kerseys in the various Persian towns they had
58 M&C, 388.
61 M&C, 400.
59 M&C, 210.
62 M&C, 397.
60 M&C, 397.
63 M&C, 410.
visited* ^
These great differences in the reports are not 
necessarily an indication of the unreliability of the 
reporters but rather that they were reporting different 
things. In the one case an attempt was being made to 
estimate the market potential; in the other case a state­
ment was being made about what part of that potential can 
be realized. The difference between them was considerable 
because the problems of buying and selling effectively in 
this market were considerable. Not the least of these 
was one which the English in Persia felt was fundamental 
to the eventual success or failure of their enterprise. 
This was the problem of the continuous presence in Persia 
of one or more factors. Though it is never stated in so 
many words, the record of these voyages conveys the sense 
that for each one the stock was raised anew and accounted 
separately. There is no doubt, however, that all the 
Englishmen in Persia - who had not died - returned to 
Russia or England at the end of each expedition.^ It 
was to the consequences of this that they addressed them­
selves in their letters to the Company. One result was 
not being on the scene to take advantage of the best
64 PRO:SPF General Series 111, 16 April 1570
65 Prof. tfillan makes this same observation about the 
separate voyages. (Russia Company, p. 152.)
market. Arthur Edvards first raised this point in his
66letter of April 1566. Three years later the 4th expe­
dition reported that by the time they arrived in Shemakha
in September, 1568 the market was already so glutted with
67goods that no one would buy a single kersey from them.
The implication here is that if a factor had been present 
throughout the year with a stock of goods he could have 
taken advantage of the best time for sales. The lack of 
continuous reports on the market could also inhibit good 
vent of commodities. In 1570 Thomas Bannister raised 
this problem when he wrote that 11 •••if there wire £were/ 
factor her/e/ had ben or merchants or a man of under­
standing that he had given good advice to have sorted 
the kersies in collers fitt for the country they had ben 
all gone if they had ben more but for lack of good ad­
vises the kersies were not sortid fitt for this countrey.•. 
There was, however, optimism that factors would eventually
be left in Persia. As early as 1566, Arthur Edwards,
69assumed that this would come to pass. Later in the 
same year he wrote of the desirability of making sales 
and purchases in time to deliver goods to Colmogro by 
the end of June so they could be laded on the Company*s
66 M&C, 388. 67 M&C, 408.
68 PRO-SPF General Series 111, 16 April 1570
69 M&C, 388.
ships making their regular annual return to England and 
he concluded that "This 1 doubt not to bring to passe 
within a yeere or two, when we are thoroughly settled 
in these parts, and better knowen".^
That there had to be factors left in a country in 
order to carry on a successful trade was taken for granted 
by all merchants. Even those who traded no further from 
London than Antwerp had their factors in continuous re­
sidence. For those in Persia this necessity was further 
impressed upon them by the presence of factors from other 
nations. Arthur Edwards reported that because the Turks 
have "manie in residence" in Persia they are able to buy 
silk at the best prices when it is first brought to mar­
ket Several years later Lawrence Chapman made a similar 
report complaining that when he arrived at Tabriz he found 
that the Turks in residence had already satisfied the
market for cloth and thus he, Chapman, could not get a
72good price for his. The irony of this competition was 
that the cloth with which the English merchants were com­
peting was English cloth which had been bought in England 
by Venetians, transported by sea to the ports of the 
Levant and then carried inland by Turks and Armenians.
70 M&C, 401. 71 M&C, 401. 72 M&C, 408-9
This competition was evident from the very beginning.
As pointed out above when Anthony Jenkinson was in Bukhara
in 1558, he found there English cloth which had been brought
from Persia and at Astrakhan he was told by merchants of
Shemakha that they could buy kerseys in their own country
73for as good a price as he offered. Arthur Edwards re­
ported that Armenian merchants traded with the Venetians 
at Aleppo exchanging raw silk for kerseys. ^  He said that 
to break the competition offered by these merchants the 
English had to be prepared to receive a 100 mules lading 
a year and pay for it in one-third money, and the rest 
in cloth and kerseys.^ A further source of competition 
is brought to light in the Company's instructions to their 
agents in 1567. They gave order, at that time, that ker­
seys were not to be sold in Russia because it had been
reported that the Russians carry them into Persia for 
76resale. Edwards also suggested that some of this com­
petition might be met if the Company made greater use of 
ready money. In 1566 he suggested that some bullion be 
sent to be coined in Persia, for it would please the 
prince and be profitable to the Company.^ He then went
73 M&C, 89, 98. 74 M&C, 396, 397.
75 M&C, 410. He did not specify the nature of the lading
76 M&C, 221-2. 77 M&C, 400.
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on to report that the Turks ’'bring great store of silver 
to be coyned...and having monie in readiness at the time 
of the yeere, they buy silke the better cheape, when men 
bring it first to be solde"^ The only other reference 
to ready money came from Lawrence Chapman in 1569 when 
he reported that because of Ormuz being closed and spices 
difficult to obtain they could be had for ready money 
only.^  The factors in Persia did not dwell on this 
point to any great extent but it is clear from casual 
remarks of theirs that while the Persian were willing 
to barter and did present some demand for English goods, 
they would have preferred payment in ready money and 
would give better prices for such.
Nevertheless, perhaps the most revealing fact about 
this Anglo-Persian trade - a fact which goes far to ex­
plain the desire for its continuance - is the difference 
between sales and purchase prices of the commodities in­
volved. A detailed analysis of price structures is not 
possible because there are not enough examples given.
But what is given does enable one to see the enormous 
potential of profits in this trade. For example clove 
and cinnamon which cost about 3s4<Vlb. in Persia^ sold
78 M&C, 401. 79 M&C, 414. 80 M&C, 396.
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for 6s - 6s6^/lb* in London and A n t w e r p m a c e  at 
3s4d - 4s2d/lb. in Persia^ sold for about 11s/lb. in
O O  , O A  J
Antwerp; nutmeg at 2s6a/lb. in Persia was 3®6 -
_  o r
8s/lb. in London; for pepper and ginger the two
prices were so close that it is questionable if they
were profitable. More telling than these differences
were those for the English commodities. Kerseys which
averaged between 25s and 35s a piece in London, going up
to 50s or 60s for fine ones,^^ sold for no less than 70s
ft 7
and as high as 90s each in Persia; tin which cost about
88
£3 to £4 a hundred in England sold for £5.16® to £7.10®
89
in Persia. There must also be added to these prices 
the English customs payments and freight charges.
Given these figures alone, the Persian trade should 
have been profitable. That it was so appears to have 
been the case, but so little was said on the subject and 
that so vague, it is often difficult to know. Every ad­
venture was so beset by misadventure and dishonesty on
81 PRO:SPO Eliz. 91 f. 170; SPD Suppl. 13, f. 122, 130, 143.
82 M&C, 396, 414.
83 PROJSPD Suppl. 13, f. 122.
84 M&C, 391-2. 85 PR0:SPD Eliz. 91 f. 170.
86 Some examples are in PR0:I1CA Libels 47, no. 450;
48, no. 12; Court of Requests Proceedings 127/16;
and BM: Cot ton Mss. Nero BIV, f. 241v-242.
87 M&C, 388.
88 George R. Lewis, The Stannaries, pp. 276-77.
89 M&C, 391-2.
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the part of local officials and merchants that the English
felt themselves fortunate to come out with their initial
investment. But they do seem to have done at least this.
Jenkinson, after his return from Bukhara wrote that
11. • .although our journey hath bene so miser­
able, dangerous, and chargeable with losses, 
charges and expenses, as my penne is not able 
to expresse the same; yet shall wee bee able 
to satisfie the worshipfull companies mindes, 
as touching the discoverie of the Caspian Sea 
with the trade of merchandise to bee had in 
such landes and the countreyes as bee there­
about adjacent, and have brought of wares and 
commodities of those countries able to anser 
the principal with prof ite...1,90
The account of the 2nd voyage suggests that a profit was
made on the principal. The author of the account, Richard
Chenie, wrote that, initially, the merchants started out
91with £1000 of the Company's money. Later in the report
he wrote that in addition to the goods being returned
home out of Persia, £1000 in debts still had to be col- 
92lected. Whether or not a profit was made depends upon
what value of English goods was carried into Persia; of
this nothing was said. If the value was less than that
of those sent out then there was a profit. The report's
conclusion that the Persian trade "...is a voyage to be 
93followed" suggests that it was worthwhile. The accounts
90 M&C, 108.
92 M&C, 380.
91 M&C, 378.
93 M&C, 381.
of the 3rd and 4th voyages, though they are the fullest 
in detail, say nothing that enables one to make a judg­
ment about their profitability. The 5th voyage nearly 
ended in disaster as the result of an attack upon its 
train by Cossacks who stole all the goods. However, 
with the help of Russians from Astrakhan, the English 
were able to recover some of what they lost. According 
to the account £5000 was recovered out of £30-40,000
QA
worth of goods originally in hand. ^ Nevertheless, it 
was possible for them to report afterwards that the Com­
pany “notwithstanding all misfortunes, lost nothing of 
their principall adventure, but only the interest and
gaine that might have risen by the use of theire stoeke
95in the meane time". The most explicit statement on 
profit refers to the final adventure and comes from 
Bemadino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in London.
He wrote to Philip II that the expedition which returned
from Persia in October, 1581, even though it lost two-
96thirds of its merchandise realized a profit of 6%.
One might wonder how Mendoza knew this; however, Prof. 
Willan accepts the statement and uses it to show how 
small a profit was earned; 2% a year for the three years 
of the expedition.^ This cannot be disputed but it fails
94 M&C, 429-30. 95 M&C, 431.
96 Cal. SP Spanish, 1580-86, p. 367.
97 Willan, Russia Company, p. 155.
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to consider that this profit was made after the loss 
of a portion of the goods. The portion lost, however, 
was probably a good bit less than two-thirds. Mendoza 
was given to exaggerating the exploits of the English 
when he wanted to alarm Philip II into taking action 
against them. Furthermore, the account of the voyage,
though it mentions the loss of goods, gives no sense that
98such a large portion was lost. There is, nevertheless, 
the clear implication of the possibility of a much greater 
profit. The extent of this possihLlity is made clearer in 
the example from the 5th adventure cited above. This 
suggests that the initial outlay was £5000 and that from 
this there had been realized goods and money to the value 
of 6 to 8 times that amount. Even granting a degree of 
exaggeration in these figures they give an indication 
of a very profitable trade.
It was a trade that had the seeds of success in 
it. These were recognized by the English merchants on 
the scene who knew what steps had to be taken to insure 
that they took root and grew into a successful enter­
prise. They were also optimistic that in time this 
would happen. From a present day vantage point one is 
inclined to agree, though perhaps with somewhat less
98 M&C, 459 and passim.
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optimism, that barring the intervention of any further 
obstacle the English would eventually have set up one 
or more permanent factories somewhere in Persia, But 
a further obstacle did intervene; one before which the 
English merchants were virtually helpless and which 
finally brought the Muscovy Company#s Persian trade to 
an end. This was the state of political relations between 
the English and the Russians on the one hand and between 
the Persians and the Ottomans on the other.
Political relations of one kind or another were 
always a problem for the English in Persia. Their first 
order of business had been to establish friendly relat­
ions with Shah Tahmasp and secure from him a written 
privilege regulating the conditions upon which they 
would be allowed to trade. Anthony Jenkinson failed to 
do this, not because the Shah was uninterested or unwil­
ling, but because four days before he arrived at the
Shah*s court in Kazvin, a Turkish ambassador had arrived
99to conclude a treaty of peace with the Persians. In 
response to the complaints of Turkish merchants present 
there, the ambassador persuaded the Shah not to favor 
the English.Jenkinson did, however, receive a pri-
99 M&C, 142. 100 M&C, 144.
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vilege from Abdullah Khan, the ruler of Shirvan, appar­
ently at the instance of the Shah, who was desirous of 
opening trade with the English but who had to bend be­
fore the Turkish p r e s s u r e * T h i s  privilege was the 
basis of the second voyage into Persia and it was not
until June 1566 that Arthur Edwards received a general
102privilege from Shah Tahmasp which was renewed and 
appended in 1568.^^ On both of these occasions Edwards 
reported that after receiving the privilege the attitude 
of the Persian merchants and officials completely changed* 
Where before they would have little to do with the English 
or treated them with contempt and dishonesty, afterwards 
they treated them with great favor and friendship and 
expressed great willingness to do business with them.*^
It is evident that as time passed stable relations with 
the Shah became more certain* These did not always ex­
tend to all parts of Persia, however, and the English 
sometimes had to seek reconfirmation of their position 
by means of a letter from the Shah, to overcome the ob- 
stinancy of a local official* It seems likely that in 
time this would all have been regularized.
What interferred more seriously with this trade
101 M&C, 150.
103 M&C, 416-20.
102 M&C, 395.
104 M&C, 395 and 417
were those political relations which could prevent the 
English from gaining access to Persia. These included 
both Anglo-Russian and Ottoman-Russian relations* The 
difficulty with the overland route, from a political 
point of view, was that it subjected the English mer­
chants to the will and activities of the ruler of each 
territory through which they had to pass* Anthony Jenkin­
son, for example, had to petition the Czar for a special
license to make overland journeys into Asia in 1557^5
10 6and again in 1561 when starting out on the first 
Persian voyage* On the latter occasion, however, the 
Czar refused him permission for reasons not made entirely 
clear* It was not until the spring of 1562 that he re­
ceived the passport and then only as a result of the 
intercession of Osep Nepea, the former Russian envoy to 
England. The members of the 2nd and 3rd voyages also, 
presumably, had to obtain special license to travel through 
Russia, though nothing is said on the matter in the ac­
counts. It was not until September 1567 that Ivan IV
embodied in the Muscovy Company's charter the explicit
108privilege Co make use of this route.
This did not mean that the Czar would not create
105 M&C, 41.
107 M&C, 122-4.
106 M&C, 124.
108 Willem, Russia Company, p.89.
further difficulties if he so chose. Unfortunately for 
the English merchants, Ivan IV was most anxious to con­
clude a mutual defense pact with Queen Elizabeth. She, 
however, was most anxious to avoid any such commitments 
while at the same time continuing to benefit from friendly 
commercial relations with the Russians. Ivan would have 
none of this, and in retaliation, revoked all of the 
Muscovy Company's privileges in October 1570. These were 
not restored for another two y e a r s . T h e s e  difficulties 
between the two rulers had their repercussions on the mer­
chants returning from the 5th Persian voyage. The Czar 
let it be known that no cooperation was to be extended 
to the English. This news reached Geoffrey Ducket in 
Persia who wrote from Shemakha, in April, 1572, that he 
was delaying the dispatch of goods out of Persia because 
he had received news of a proclamation forbidding anyone 
from selling ships or ships' stores to the English. 
Political events had delayed this same expedition at its 
start when a Turkish army had beseiged Astrakhan during 
the time the English were preparing for their journey 
into Persia, m  The unexpected strength of the city,
109 Ibid., pp. 112-28, where there is a detailed dis­
cussion of these negotiations.
110 PRO:Colonial Office, General Series 1, no. 4.
111 M&C, 424.
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the coming of winter and a Russian army combined to 
discourage the Turks who lifted the siege after six 
weeks, thus permitting the English to continue on their 
way.
This northward reach of the Sultan's power was
part of the overall Ottoman policy to dominate the Steppe
1 1 0
region north of the Caspian and Black Seas. A It was a 
continuation of this policy which blocked the last of 
the Anglo-Persian expeditions at its entrance to Persia. 
When the small group of English merchants arrived in Shir- 
van in the summer of 1580 they discovered that the province 
had been conquered by an Ottoman army and was under the 
rule of a Turkish military commander. The disposition of 
all trade was under his control and, though he was willing 
to trade, he was willing to do so only on his own terms. 
Though these terms, according to the account, were "...not 
with equitie in all points..." they also were "...not ex­
treme ill".^^ The latter is evident from the reported 
profit made by the expedition. Despite these problems 
the English intended that several factors remain in Baku
after the main party returned to Russia with the Company's 
115goods. This did not come to pass, though the Turkish
112 Halil Inalcik, The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian 
Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal. 1^48, p. 50.
113 M&C, 46l. ITS See supra p.??# 115 M&C, 460.
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commander had agreed to it. The reasons for this failure, 
so far as can be determined from the account, were the 
injury of one of the factors and the loss of a small 
boat and a chest of m o n e y . T h e  account is confusing 
and vague on the change of plan.
This is an important issue because it was the first 
time a decision to leave factors behind had been made and 
it was the absence of permanent factors that was consid­
ered to be one of the chief obstacles to a successful 
trade in Persia. It is possible the Company had finally 
decided to take steps to establish a permanent organi­
zation in Persia. Whether or not this setback alone 
would have brought the trade to a halt is not known.
It is known that two of the merchants who were supposed 
to have remained in Persia, and a third Englishman, did
remain initetrakhan to sell the remainder of the Company's 
117goods. The Company might have seen fit to send them 
back to Persia the next spring; even though the Persian 
trade would then have been complicated by the necessity 
to establish formal relations with the Turks. Any such 
thoughts became pointless, however, because two weeks 
before the members of the expedition reached London on
116 M&C, 457-9.
117 M&C, 472. There is no indication of when they 
finally left Astrakhan for England.
107
11825 September 1581 the grant of letters patent to an 
other group of London merchants marked the fruition of 
efforts to establish exclusive, commercial relations 
with the Ottoman Bnpire.
118 HScC, 474.
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CHAPTER III 
THE ORIGINS OF THE TURKEY COMPANY
Thought about other approaches to Asia was not 
entirely neglected while the Persian trade continued. 
The failure of Jenkinson to reach Cathay inspired at 
least one person to suggest that the effort to reach 
the East be continued along another route* In Novem­
ber 1566, Thomas Champneys wrote to Queen Elizabeth 
from Naples stating he had met a man well acquainted 
with the East and in view of Jenkinson's failure he 
thought it would be to the realm's advantage if she 
would send this man to establish contact in her name.
He gave no further information than this, so it is not 
possible to evaluate the seriousness of Champney's con­
tact. At the same time he also wrote to William Cecil 
requesting that he urge the Queen to reply quickly to 
his letter so he could report back to his contact. 
However, no reply is known to exist.^ A more inter­
esting and informative letter was printed by Hakluyt 
dated February 1569.^ In this letter Gaspar Campion,
1. The letter to the Queen is in PMC: Cal. Salis Mss. I, 
pp. 340-1 and that to Cecil in FRO:SPD Eliz, 41 no. 2 
Champney wrote another letter to Cecil in October 1566 
(Cal.SPF, 1566-68) from which it seems he was in Naples 
on government service, evidently to gather intelligence.
2. Hakluyt V, 111-17.
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writing to Michael Lok, urged that at the expense of 
some merchants he be sent to secure a safe conduct 
from the Turks to trade in Chios* Campion went into 
some detail about the state of this trade in the past 
and said he had lived in Chios for over 20 years and 
was well acquainted with conditions there. According 
to him the inhabitants of the island were so desirous 
of English trade they would be willing to help pay the 
necessary charges attendant upon getting the safe con­
duct. As in the case of Champneyfe letter no reply to 
this one is known to exist, and probably no action was 
taken on it. Michael Lok was perhaps not the ideal per­
son to whom such an appeal should be addressed. At the
time, he was involved in the affairs of the Muscovy
3
Company and became its London agent in 1571. Further­
more, a few years later he was actually urging the con-
4
tinuation of the Persian trade. In view of this he 
does not seem a likely person to have actively supported 
a return to the Levant trade.
The first step toward this return was taken by two 
merchants of London, Edward Osborne and Richard Stapers.
The only authority providing information about this step
3* Willan, Russia Company, p. 287.
4. PRO:SPF General Series 134, 8 May 1575.
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is Richard Hakluyt. In the Principal Navigations he 
printed a short account of a journey undertaken by two 
men, John Wight and Joseph Clements, who were sent to 
Constantinople in about 1575 by Osborne and Stapers 
for the purpose of procuring a safe conduct for their 
factor, William Harbome. They succeeded in this, ac­
cording to the account, after remaining there eighteen 
months."* Hakluyt has an extremely good record for 
reliability and no evidence is known which throws doubt 
on this ©rent. It has been repeated, without question 
or comment, by Epstein, Rowland, and Wood.^ Yet taken 
alone, the incident is puzzling. Nothing is immediately 
apparent to explain why it required a year and a half in 
Constantinople to procure this safe conduct. There is, 
furthermore, the question why a safe conduct was needed 
in the first place. Other Europeans had been in contin­
uous residence at the Turkish court for more than a 
generation. The capitulations of 1536 between Suleiman 
I and Francis I gave the protection of the French flag 
to all Christians coming to the Turkish dominions. Also,
5 Hakluyt V, 168/
6 Mordecau, Epstein, The English Levant Company. 1908, 
p. 9; A. L. Rowland, "England and Turkey: The Rise of 
Diplomatic and Commercial Relations", in Studies in 
English Commerce and Exploration in the Reign of 
Elizabeth. 1924. p. 8; A. C. Wood, A History of the 
Levant Company. 1935, pp. 7-8.
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when Harbome did travel to the Sultan1 s court he carried 
a royal letter* Though this did not give him ambassa­
dorial status, it would give him a certain degree of 
diplomatic immunity as a nuncio* Furthermore, according 
to Hakluyt^ account, before Harborne, who traveled over­
land to Constantinople, left Poland, he felt it necessary 
to dress himself like a Turk and to seek the favor of the 
Turkish ambassador to Poland and join his company which 
was about to return home.^ All of this seems excessive 
if Harborne already had a safe conduct from the Sultan*
No historian has raised these doubts, however; all have 
been content to accept a literal interpretation based 
solely on Hakluyt*s own words:
"therefore about the yeere 1575 the fore­
said R* W. marchants at their charges and 
expenses sent John Wight and Joseph Clements 
by the way of Poland to Constantinople, where 
the said Joseph remained 18 monethes to pro­
cure a safe conduct from the grand Signior, 
for M* William Harborne, then factor for Sir 
Edward Osborne, to have free accesse into his 
Highnes dominions, and obtained the same.11®
There are at least two points of criticism that 
can be raised about this statement with respect to its 
Literal interpretation* First, the term "safe conduct" 
usually is taken to mean simply an assurance that the 
person possessing it may pass through a territory or
7 Hakluyt V, 168* 8 Ibid*, 168*
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in to it and out again without being subject to any 
hindrance from the governing authority. This is the 
meaning that has been attached to the above (>safe con­
duct1 procured for Harborne. But the term is used in 
other places as well with an additional meaning. In 
the account of the Bark Aucher the question comes up
of acquiring a safe conduct from the Turks so the ship
9
can trade to Chios. In 1569, Gaspar Campion, in his
letter to Michael Lok, speaks of the “procurement of
a safe conduct from the great Turke, for a trade to
Chio1*.^ In both these cases the sense of “safe conduct1
is that of a license to trade. The privilege granted to
Anthony Jenkinson in 1553 is entitled by Hakluyt “The
safeconduct or privilege.. . thus equating the safe
conduct with the privilege and lending a broader meaning
to the term. The texts of this privilege as well as that
12of the privilege granted by Murad III in June 1580 both 
support this broader interpretation. They contain within 
them both a grant of privilege for the purpose of trade 
and a grant of freedom from molestation.
The second point to be made about Hakluyt*s account 
concerns the statement that the “safe conduct1* was speci-
9 Ibid., 72
11 Ibid., 109.
10 Ibid., 111.
12 Ibid., 169-71
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fically for Harborne to have free access to the Turkish
dominions# This would seem to undermine the broader
interpretation given above# In support it can be
pointed out that the account of the renewing of the
Levant trade was put together many years after the
events# It was not included in the 1589 edition of
13the Principal Navigations but was gathered in the 
1590's when Hakluyt was preparing the second edition. 
Further, it is not a first-hand account but was written, 
in his own words, from information gathered from members 
of the Levant Company. At the time that was done it was 
then more than fifteen years since the events had taken 
place and much had happened in the interval. In retro­
spect, one can surmise, it would be the embassy of Har- 
bome which would stand out. It was he who established 
formal commercial and political relations between Eng­
land and Turkey and thus it would not be surprising if 
certain events preceeding his mission were remembered 
as having been intended only to facilitate it.
If then one looks at the expedition of Wight and 
Clements to Turkey in a broader context and as only one 
of several related events, it takes on a new meaning.
13 A facsimile of this edition was published by the 
Cambridge University Press, 2 vols., 1965, for the 
Hakluyt Society.
11*
The door to this approach had been closed to historians 
of the Levant trade by two tacit assumptions on their 
parts. First, it has been assumed that from the be­
ginning the intention of the Turkey merchants was to 
carry on their trade by the sea route alone because 
in the end this is what they did do. Second, it has 
been assumed that the revival of the Levant trade took
place independently of the Muscovy Company's Persian 
14trade. If these assumptions are not made then other 
possibilities can be considered; possibilities that grow 
from the fact that in the mid-1570's the whole question 
of how to continue the Persian trade was under examination.
It was pointed out earlier that one of the problems 
facing the Persian trade was its dependence on the good 
will of the rulers of the territories which intervened 
between England and Persia. The withdrawal of this good 
will by Ivan IV must have given pause for thought. The 
Muscovy Company certainly could not think seriously of 
setting up any sort of permanent organization in Persia 
if its access to the country was not secure. Thus it 
would have been natural for the Company to consider the
14 Willan, Russian Company, p. 154, does make the point 
that the Turkey Company's trade might have been in­
strumental in bringing this Persian trade to an end 
if other events had not intervened first.
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possibility of finding an alternative route to Persia.
In theory there were four other approaches; from the 
south through the Persian Gulf, from the northeast 
through lands east of Muscovy, from the northwest from 
a Baltic port and through Poland, and from the west 
through the Mediterranean and Syria. The first of these 
routes meant sailing through waters claimed by the Portu­
guese as their exclusive preserve* In the mid-1570*s 
England was on friendly terms with Portugal and thus 
not yet ready to challenge her monopoly* There is no 
evidence that any thought was given at that time to at­
tempting this route. The other three routes were all 
seriously considered and tried, with the last finally 
becoming the basis of the English Levant trade.
The attempt to realise these three routes was under­
taken by two groups of merchants. The route from the 
northeast by the Muscovy Company and the routes from the 
west by those who eventually formed the Turkey Company*
The overlapping membership in these two groups and the 
timing of events which followed one after the other make 
it possible to reconstruct a fairly detailed, overall 
plan of action, into which all the known facts fit and 
which had the object of finding a viable commercial route 
to Persia. However, there is no evidence independent of
mthose events, which serves to corroborate that such a 
plan ever existed. Each group of merchants must have 
known what the other was doing and both had basically 
the same end in view. But there is no positive evidence 
that they had joined forces before the inception of the 
Turkey Company. It is entirely possible that initially 
they worked independently of each other. The Muscovy 
Company certainly did not have to do otherwise because 
it held a monopoly of all activity toward the northeast. 
Once, however, that route proved inaccessible^€& the mem­
bers of the company who wished to pursue the objective 
by another means could no longer do so as Muscovy Com­
pany merchants. They would have to work alone or join 
with the group that was already actively working to 
establish trade along a different route.
It was this other group - Osborne and Stapers - 
which initiated the voyage of Clements and Wight dis­
cussed above.^ The precise authority under which these 
agents acted is unknown, but it is highly probable that 
they were acting solely for the merchants and not for 
the crown. It is less certain, but still very probable, 
that their mission had nothing to do with paving the way
15 It is not known if Osborne and Stapers had yet been 
joined by other merchants.
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for William Harborne, though it may have contributed to
this, in effect. In the broader context of a general
desire to insure access to Persia, the aim of these two
men could very likely have been to secure a license to
1 6pass through Ottoman territory to Persia. The English
merchants had received trading privileges from the Shah
in 1566 and 1568^ which were still in force. Thus it
was only necessary to gain permission from the Sultan to
have free access to Persia. There is nothing to indicate
that this permission was ever granted. For the Sultan to
permit the English to pass back and forth through Turkey
to trade with Persia would have been in direct opposition
to the interests of Turkish merchants. One thing which
the English had learned from their earlier experience in
Persia was the extent to which they were in competition
with Turkish merchants dealing in their own English goods.
The desire to protect his own merchants would weigh with
the Sultan in considering any English request to have
access to Persia. This was a situation the English had
faced once before when the Shah of Persia denied them
18access to India in order to protect the trade of
16 See supra Chap. II, p.^V for the possibility that 
Jenkinson tried this in 1553.
17 M&C, 395 and 416-20.
18 M&C, 117; see also supra Chap. Il, p. 7-9,
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Persian merchants. The Sultan had a further reason to
deny such a request. In the 1560fs the English learned
that one of Shah Tahmasp's interests in establishing
commercial relations with them was to gain relief from
19dependence on Turkish merchants. Turkish diplomatic
pressure prevented a successful negotiation between the
20English and Persians at that time. The situation had 
not changed significantly and the Sultan was not any more 
likely now to permit the Persians an economic advantage 
by facilitating commercial relations between them and 
the English. An attempt to gain access to Persia through 
Turkey under the circumstances described above could 
easily explain the need to remain in Constantinople for 
eighteen months. The procuring of a simple safe conduct 
does not explain that length of stay. It is not stated 
anywheretfien Clements and Wight returned to England but 
if their stay in Turkey of eighteen months is accepted 
they could not have returned much before the end of 1576. 
There is evidence that at about the same time the above 
events were taking place the Muscovy Company was thinking 
seriously about the possibility of reaching China and 
Persia by the northeast route. This evidence consists
19 M&C, 150.
20 M&C, 144.
of two anonymous memoranda which delve into the whole
problem of the Persian trade. One of them dates from
late 1576 or early 1577 and the other from the first 
21half of 1 5 7 9 . In discussing the route the suggestion
is made that two persons be sent;
■'...with order to discover passage by Sea 
to Cathaia from St. Nicholas in Russia and 
to discover the nations not only rounde 
aboute the Caspian sea, but also suche as 
adioyne to the greate River of Obbe and this 
to this speciall ende that we may passe up 
Eastwarde from St. Nicholas with our commo­
dities , and passe to Cathaia by sea, or that 
we may finde out by the Obb a vent or other­
wise som passage to the Caspian side or to 
the borders of Persia without setting foote 
in the domenyons of the Russian and this 
lease he might quarrel with us and staie 
our passage to Persia when our vente of 
kerseis in Asia hanges only on the coorse 
and not anyway e l s . * ' 2 2
The other memorandum recognises the possibility that this
21 PRO:SPD Eliz. 223 nos. 52 and 53. These documents 
have been dated 1589 by the Calendar, however, it is 
clear from internal evidence that they were written 
before that and at two different times. From refer­
ences to Persian affairs in the earlier and shorter 
one /no. 53/ it can be dated from sometime between 
May 1576 and November 1577; probably closer to the 
latter date. The other document /no. 52/ seems to 
have been written during the first half of 1579. It 
contains a heading on one page with the date ,,1589tl; 
however, the 11811 is clearly written over a ,,7" and 
in a different ink, both of which indicate that the 
change was made at a later date. Internal evidence 
suggests not only the 1579 date but also the earlier 
part of the year. Prof. Willan gives #l 1579 or 1580" 
for both documents (Russia Company), p. 148 n. 1).
22 PRO:SPD Eliz. 223 no. 53.
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right of passage could become a problem in the East as
well and states that 1 ...if it appere that the dominions
of any prince lie betweene Persia and the portable places
of the Ob which prince is not in legue with the Sophie,
23then may the embassador be an occacion of a league...
The atempt to realise this plan was carried out 
simultaneously with the last of the overland Persian 
voyages* In Hay 1580 Arthur Pet and Charles Jackson 
sailed from Harwich with the intent of finding this 
Northeast Passage* Their instructions from the Muscovy 
Company were that they should first try to find the sea 
passage to Cathay, but should this be impossible, even 
after passing the mouth of the Ob, they should return 
to that river and sail up it'as far as they can.^
Though the Company was interested in discovering the Ob, 
their primary objective was still to find that elusive 
all-water route to eastern Asia* As it turned out Pet 
and Jackman failed to sail beyond the entrance to the 
Kara Sea. The Company, however, attacked this problem 
on two fronts at once* A year before Pet and Jackman 
sailed the members of the 6th Persian voyage departed 
from Gravesend* No doubt the Company expected that one
23 PR0:SPD Eliz. 223 no* 52.
24 Hakluyt III, 251-8.
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of these expeditions, at least, would be successful* 
With the failure of both, the Company, or members of 
the Company, if they wished to continue this trade, 
would have to look outside the confines set by their 
monopoly*
It has been seen that an attempt to reach this 
objective, by a route outside the limits of the Russia 
Company's monopoly, had already been undertaken by an­
other group of merchants* The question that arises is 
when these two groups joined forces* The only names 
of merchants associated with the origins of the Turkey 
Company were Edward Osborne and Richard Stapers. The 
charter of that company names two additional merchants, 
Thomas Smythe, the customer, and William Barret. Os­
borne is known to have been a member of the Muscovy 
Company in 1584 but how far back his membership goes 
is not known* Smythe was probably a charter member of
that company. The first complete list of the Turkey
25Company's membership, dated 1583, contains the names 
of twelve merchants, nine of whom were also members of 
the Muscovy Company. There is also evidence that the 
Muscovy Company, acting in its corporate capacity, in-
25 BM:Cotton Mss. Nero BVIII, f. 53
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2 6vested in the Turkey Company. Though it is not known 
when the association between these Muscovy merchants 
and the Turkey trade began it is unlikely that Osborne 
and Stapers proceeded very far without some assurance 
that if they should succeed in procuring the necessary 
privileges they would then receive the necessary finan­
cial backing. To try to define too closely the connection 
between the Muscovy Company and the first tentative steps 
which led to the Turkey Company would be hazardous in the 
present state of knowledge about the activities of the 
merchants invo1ved•
The failure of Wight and Clements to achieve what 
very likely was their objective did not mean that the 
Sultan would be unwilling to permit the English to carry 
on trade in Turkey, itself, or any other Ottoman terri­
tory. To do this meant either of two things for the 
English; that they trade under the protection of the 
.French flag or that they attempt to establish themselves 
as an independent nation at the Porte. The former was 
easy enough and had been done by the English in the past. 
The latter course was not so simple. It meant establish-
26 This question is taken up in Chapter IV. Detailed 
references for the activities of the merchants men­
tioned in the text are given in the Biographical 
Appendix•
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ing diplomatic relations with the Porte and negotiating 
for a separate set of commercial privileges. The de­
cision to do this meant that the crown would henceforth 
have to play an active role. Before considering the mo­
tives and activities of the government in the beginnings 
of this trade it is necessary first to take up one other 
problem. There is evidence that the merchants who ulti­
mately followed the Mediterranean route to the Levant 
experimented first with a route which would take them 
by sea to a Baltic port and then overland through central 
Europe to Constantinople.
It was pointed out above that there were two pos­
sible approaches to Persia and Turkey from the West; one 
by sea and the other overland from a Baltic port. The 
possibility that the latter may initially have been con­
sidered by the merchants has not been explored by earlier 
students of the Levant trade. The first point that must 
be made with respect to this is that nothing in all the 
various privileges received by the merchants restricted 
them to any particular route. Both the first and second 
set of privileges granted by Murad III specifically per­
mitted the merchants to enter his territory by sea or land^?
27 Hakluyt V, 170 and 185.
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and likewise the letters patent of 1581 prohibited all
persons, except those specified, from trading to the
28dominions of the Grand Seignior by sea or by land.
Thus the choice of a route was left open to the mer­
chants. However, the text of this patent by its con­
tinued and casual reference to ships, mariners and sea­
faring suggests that it was assumed the trade would be 
conducted by sea. It granted freedom and authority to 
traffic in all "...Seas, rivers, ports, regions, terri­
tories, dominions, coastes and places...1 to which they 
might come in pursuing the trade '‘...with their ships,
29barks, pinesses and other vessels..." In general 
where the patent lay down rules and regulations for the 
merchants to follow they were placed in the context of 
a seagoing trade.^0
Two questions are raised by this emphasis on the 
trade by sea, Did the merchants actually consider the 
overland route, and, if so, when did they abandon the 
idea? There are several pieces of evidence which, when 
taken together, present a reasonable case for an affirmative 
answer to the first question. The most telling is a 
list of names contained in a document endorsed "The
28 Ibid., 185. 29 Ibid., 196.
30 Ibid., 196-7 and 199.
names and particular taxe of the Marchants tradinge to 
the East c o u n t r e s " I n  this list is the name William 
Barret who later was included in the Turkey Company 
charter and who was that company's first agent in 
Aleppo. Though it is not certain it is very possible 
that he was already connected with Osborne and Stapers 
at the time the list was compiled. Also in this list 
is the entry "William Harborne per Mr. alderman Osborne". 
Neither Barret nor Harborne are known to have been mer­
chants in their own right nor are they known to have 
ever had their names connected with any other trading 
company, except, of course, the Turkey Company. Har­
borne, is known, however, to have acted as factor for 
both Osborne and Staper in Spain in 1575.*^ The most 
likely explanation for the entry of Harborne*s name in 
the above manner is that the list was made up after he 
left for Constantinople in July 1578. There would seem 
to have been little reason for entering his name at all, 
if he was to be in Turkey, unless his sponsors were in­
tending to trade there using the overland route. With
31 PROiSPD Eliz. 127 no. 73. The calendar dates it "about 
1578". It has no contemporary date but it contains 
seventeen names which do not appear in the Eastland 
Company charter of 17 August 1579 /PRO:SPD Eliz 131 
no. 70/ suggesting that it preceeded the charter.
32 See Biographical Appendix.
Harborne a recognised "Marchant tradinge the East contres1 
Osborne and Stapers would have the convenience of sending 
goods directly from London all the way to the Levant in 
his name and perhaps Barret's as well if it was intended 
initially to send him to Aleppo* For reasons taken up 
below, they probably never did this* They are known, 
however, to have shipped cloth, conyskins, indigo, and 
tin to Hamburg in 1578,^ the same year Harborne travel­
led to Constantinople. In fact, Harborne travelled by 
way of Hamburg and possibly accompanied these goods.
They also laded £1000 worth of cloths and kerseys in 
two ships for Danzig in November or December 1579.^
It is not known if any of the above goods were intended 
for Turkey. It is known, with respect to their Hamburg 
trade that they were not Merchant Adventurers. The trade 
to Danzig may simply have been part of Osborne and Stapers1 
Eastland trade. Both of them and George Same, later a 
Turkey merchant, were named in the Eastland Company's 
charter of 1579^ and were the only Eastland merchants 
who were also members of the Turkey Company. Two of 
them, Bame and Osborne, were also members of the Russia
33 BM:Harl. Mss. 167 f. 75, 91-93v.
34 BM:Lans. 29 no. 54.
35 Harborne and Barret were not named in the charter.
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This interlocking membership of men who were all 
so prominent in companies with potentially overlapping 
trade routes suggests something more than coincidence.
But it does not rule out coincidence. The membership 
of the three men in the Eastland Company need not be 
explained by any prior plan of theirs to trade overland 
to Turkey. It is only natural to expect the same mer­
chants to find their way into companies which monopolize 
closely related trades. However, the trade of all three, 
as recorded in the Port Books, was predominantly with 
France and Spain and there is no record of any of them
trading at any port north of Antwerp prior to the period 
37in question. It is reasonable, then, to suggest that 
the interest of these merchants in the Eastland trade, 
coming when it did, was related to the problem of gaining 
access to Persia.
Further evidence of a plan to use a route other 
than the Mediterranean comes from a report written in 
May 1532 by the Spanish ambassador, Bemadino de Mendoza,
36 Bame was one of the governors of the Russia Company 
in 1580. See Biographical Appendix.
37 The Muscovy trade of Barnes, which may date back to 
well before this period, would not show up in the 
record since that company traded in a joint stock.
addressed to Philip 11.^ Mendoza was very interested
\
in English activity vis-a-vis Turkey and began reporting
O Q
on it to King Philip as early as September 1579,^  Ac­
cording to Mendoza's dispatch of 1582, the English had 
negotiated with the Sultan for permission to transport 
goods from "Azov by the Don and Pont Euxine" to Constan­
tinople. The plan was to bring the goods out of Persia 
by way of the Caspian Sea and up the Volga River to the 
point where it comes within about seven miles of the Don 
River, and from thence to carry them overland the short 
distance, down the Don and across the Black Sea to Tur­
key. Mendoza's analysis of the reasoning behind this 
plan was that the English wished to avoid "...having to 
pass as at present, by Italy". He went on to say that 
the Sultan, aware that this diversion of the trade from 
Italy would hurt the king of Spain, granted the English 
privileges to trade in Turkey but, realizing the poten­
tial benefit to him in the Don-Volga route and wj&ishing 
to exploit it himself, remained silent on that part of 
the English request.
This is an intriguing report with a central truth
38 Cal SP Spanish, 1580-86, p. 366.
39 Cal SP Spanish, 1568-79, p. 699.
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in it, but a close analysis suggests that Mendoza could 
not have been very well informed about circumstances 
around the Caspian Sea, It was pointed out above that 
one of the main motives of the Muscovy merchants in the 
1570's was to avoid passing through the Czar's terri­
tories, But the entire course of the Volga was within 
his jurisdiction. If Mendoza was aware of this fact, 
his failure to consider it may be explained by his ig­
norance of the English desire to circumvent Muscovy, It 
may also be explained by the Muscovy Company's last Persian 
expedition from 1579 to 1581, which made use of the Volga- 
Caspian route. A further point, which throws some doubt 
on the detailed accuracy of this report, is its geographi­
cal shortcomings. A glance at the map will show that if 
one were in Persia, even as far north as Tiflis, and 
wished to go to Constantinople, the trip by way of the 
Don-Volga route would be nearly a thousand miles longer 
than that by a route which carried one directly east 
across the Black Sea from Batum or Trebizond. If one 
were further south, in Tabriz, Kashan, Esfahan, or 
Shiraz, all centers for this trade, then the Don-Volga 
route would be even further removed from practicality. 
Mendoza might have been unaware of this geography, but 
certainly the English, who had been trading in Persia
130
for twenty years, were not. The one case which appears 
to have been intended as an exploration of the way back 
from Persia to England testifies to this. On his second 
voyage to western Asia, John Newberry traveled as far as 
Ormuz and returned overland by way of Persia north to 
Yerevan; then, rather than continuing on to the Caspian,
40he turned west passing through Turkey to Constantinople.
His return from Constantinople provides a piece of evi­
dence which helps support the contention that the English 
were interested in the overland route from a Baltic port. 
From Constantinople he traveled north by way of the Black 
Sea and the Danube River, then through Poland to Danzig 
and then by ship to England. The knowledge he gained 
on this journey through eastern Europe might be most 
instructive in helping to understand why this route was 
not used. Purchas, however, did not consider it worth 
printing and cut off the narrative when Newberry entered 
Poland with no more than the statement that f,His journey 
thorow Poland to Dantzik and comming to Hull by Sea is 
omitted11.^* Nhat remains of Mendoza*s report, then, is 
only that there was in the air some plan to try to reach 
Persia and Turkey without passing through Russia or through
40 Purchas VIII, 450-81
41 Ibid., 481.
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the Mediterranean. This could be either the northern 
route to the east of Persia or the overland route from 
the Baltic.
The failure in 1580 of Pet and Jackman to find the 
Northeast Passage meant that for all practical purposes 
there was no northern route. The reasons for not using 
the Baltic-overland route, however, are not clear. There 
is no simple case of failure here. Harborne, in 1578, 
traveled to Constantinople overland from Hamburg, and 
Newberry managed to return overland to Danzig in 1582.
In general this was a main route into central and eastern 
Europe. But, given the present state of the evidence, it 
cannot be known why the English did not generally use it 
for access to Constantinople.
The question of when this plan was given up, or
better, when the Mediterranean route was finally decided
upon, produces conflicting answers. Osborne and Stapers*
trade to Danzig and Newberry's voyage suggest that the
plan may have still been alive in 1580 and perhaps in 
42early 1582. But in conflict with this is the fact
42 Newberry's instructions at the beginning of his voy­
age are not known, so it cannot be said whether or 
not he intended all along to take the route through 
Poland. If there were to be a change or addition to 
his instructions the logical place for him to receive 
it was in Constantinople (he did not pass through
13a.
that Newberry's outward journey was by way of the Medi­
terranean sea route in an English merchant ship and with
him traveled William Barret, who was to become the first
43agent in Aleppo for the Turkey merchants. It would 
seem from this that the decision had been made. One 
possible explanation of this conflict is that the mer­
chants had not yet made a final decision and before doing 
so wished to try the overland route traveling northward. 
The same factor which facilitated the southward journey - 
river travel - could easily make the northward journey 
impractical.^ A more serious objection to this plan 
still being alive in 1582 or even in 1580 is the existence 
of a memorandum by Sir Francis Walsingham entitled " A 
Consideration of the trade into Turkey".^ In this
Aleppo on his return where he arrived 1 March 1582
and departed 4 April. /Purchas VIII, 476/ But Har­
borne. who had been in tEat city, had probably re­
turned to England by then (he left England to return 
to Turkey in November 1582) and it is not known what 
other Englishman may have been there at the time who 
might have communicated with Newberry.
43 Purchas VIII, 451.
44 The letters from English merchants in Persia, printed 
by Hakluyt and Purchas, contain a number of obser­
vations about the practice in travelling south of 
sailing down the Euphrates River but the necessity, 
in travelling north, of walking along its banks.
45 Printed by Epstein, op. cit., pp. 245-51 from the 
mss. copy in PR0:3PD Sliz 144 no. 70. Another copy 
of this is in BM:Cotton Mss. Nero BXI f. 280. Both 
of these are written in a clerk's hand.
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paper Walsingham concerns himself with the non-commercial 
aspects of this trade such as diplomacy and security.
But he assumes throughout that the trade will be con­
ducted by sea through the Mediterranean and makes no 
mention of overland trade. Thus at the time this memo­
randum was first written it would seem that Walsingham, 
at least, and perhaps the government, in general, were 
not considering and may never have considered, the use 
of the Baltic overland route. The date of the document 
is, thus, of particular importance with respect to this 
problem.
The British Museum copy of this memorandum has no 
date but the one in the Public Record Office has a cover 
page with the above title on it and under that the date 
111580" all in a sixteenth century hand. On the basis 
of this Epstein and all others who have mentioned the 
document have accepted that it was written in that year. 
Internal evidence, however, contradicts this date. Wal­
singham, not surprisingly, is mainly concerned with 
"surety" for the trade. With respect to one aspect of 
this he recommends that there be made "choice of some 
apt man to be sent with her majesty's letters unto the 
Turks to procure an ample safe conduct, who is always 
to remain there at tie charge of the merchants, as agent
134
to impeach the indirect practices of the said ambassa­
dors, /Venetian and French/ whose repair thither is to 
be handled rather by land than by sea...11 It was ex­
actly this plan that was actually carried out. Harborne 
left England in July 1578 and traveled overland from 
Hamburg to Constantinople. It is illogical to accept 
that Walsingham worked out this plan of action a year 
and a half after it was initiated. It must be concluded 
that the memorandum dates from several months before July 
1578, at the latest. This being so, it must also be ac­
cepted that as early as that no plan for overland trade 
was being considered; at least not by the government.
This does not preclude the possibility that the merchants 
continued to explore the viability of the overland route. 
However, they were no longer entirely free agents once 
the government began to take an active interest in the 
Turkey trade.
If a choice were open between the use of two routes 
it can easily be understood why the English government 
would support the sea route rather than the land route. 
From the crown's point of view the great contribution of 
foreign trade, outside the economic sphere, was its role 
as a training ground for mariners and a supplier of large
135*
ships suitable for use in the navy should the need arise. 
But, it was long distance maritime trade that made the 
greatest contribution in this respect, for it was these 
trades that used the largest ships. Consequently, the 
crown was always anxious to encourage them. The merchants 
were well aware of this fact and continually appealed to 
it when seeking support from the government for one reason 
or another. Thus it is easy enough to see why Walsingham 
might urge the use of the Mediterranean route rather than 
any other and why his 11 Consideration11 was so concerned 
with 11 surety11 at sea.
It would be interesting to know if the government’s 
entry into the affairs of the Levant was by its own in­
itiative or by petition from the merchants. The decision 
of the English to try to establish their right to trade 
in Ottoman territories under the protection of their 
own flag, rather than under the French flag, meant 
establishing diplomatic relations with the Sultan and 
negotiating a separate treaty of privileges. This could 
only be done in the Queen’s name and thus it became a 
matter of foreign policy to be determined by the Queen 
and her councillors. But there still remains the question 
of where the initiative lay. In face of the evidence - 
or rather lack of it - the best that can be suggested
13 L
is that the government was probably brought into the mat­
ter when the merchants realised they would have to nego­
tiate with the Sultan to establish themselves at the 
Porte. This would require that they petition Queen 
Elizabeth for a letter of recommendation, at the least, 
and thus raise the whole question of Anglo-Turkish re­
lations. It would be a case, then, of the flag following 
the trade.
Howeverj it may have happened^ it would, neverthe­
less, remain that the political needs of the merchants 
must fit in with the Queen's foreign policy, or^ at least, 
not represent a position contrary to that foreign policy. 
It would, of course, facilitate matters if fulfillment 
of the merchant's requirements also meant fulfillment of 
the Queen's requirements. The problem of political re­
lations between Islam and Christendom need not detain 
the student of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations, for 
while it was always in the air and while the Christian 
seems to have felt sincerely that cooperation and al­
liance with the Islamic world was somehow unchristian 
this never prevented such alliances coming into being 
when it suited both parties. The more pertinent question 
is why Elizabeth felt the need to establish political 
relations with the Porte; or rather, what conditions
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prevailed, other than economic, that might have made 
representation at Constantinople seem desirable. Writers 
on this subject have seen it in terms of the war with 
Spain in the 1530's and have emphasized the Queen's 
policy of trying to persuade the Sultan to attack Spain 
from the rear. However, there was no war with Spain 
when Harborne left for Constantinople in 1578. There 
was not even the prospect of the union of the Spanish 
and Portuguese crowns; for King Sebastian did not die 
at Alcazar until August of that year. Nevertheless, it 
can be reasonably argued that it was the affairs of Spain 
that provided the political climate for the first Eli­
zabethan diplomatic contact with the Ottoman empire.
A recent historian of the Ilabsburgs, Dr. John Lynch, 
has made two pertinent observations which help to place 
the whole matter in context. Speaking of Philip 11 he 
says that "Gradually after Lepanto, and more urgently 
from 1578, when truces with the Turk became regular..." 
Philip began "...turning Spain unreservedly from the 
Mediterranean to the Atlantic, in order to face the 
greatest danger which threatened him and to prepare
A C
for the day of reckoning with his enemies on the north".
46 John Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs. 1964, vol. 1, 
pp. 302-3.
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The argument here is that Philip II was disengaging 
himself from his wars in the Mediterranean in order 
to concentrate all his resources on protecting his 
Atlantic empire from the French and English* With re­
spect to Elizabeth's policy he says that she "was not 
averse from a political understanding with the Turk, 
especially in 1580" for it "♦••would be a means of 
striking at Spain without actually declaring war".^
Lynch does not bring Elizabeth's policy back to 1578.
This can be explained in part, by the fact that English 
policy was not very clear before that time. Queen Eliza­
beth was a very cautious ruler and it would be surpris­
ing to find her committing herself all at once to any 
policy, no less one as potentially unpopular as would 
be an alliance with the Turk. If, however, she could 
make her initial contact under the aegis of establish­
ing commercial relations it would permit her to test 
the climate before taking a further step. Such evidence 
as survives lends itself to this interpretation. The 
instructions William Harborne carried from Osborne and 
Stapers are unknown as are those from the Queen. But 
that he did carry a letter from her addressed to Murad 
III, is attested to by Jacques de Germigny, the French
47 Ibid., pp. 234*5.
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ambassador to the Porte, In a dispatch to the French 
king dated March 1580 he reported that Harborne had 
arrived some eighteen months earlier with a letter from 
the English queen in which she expressed a desire for 
peace between herself and the Porte and the privilege 
of commercial traffic for all her subjects.^ If Ger- 
migny's knowledge of this letter was accurate and Eliza­
beth actually specified in her first letter that she 
wished a general privilege for all her subjects then 
Harborne would seem to have placed the interests of 
his employers above the instructions of his queen.
The Sultan's grant in March 1579 was not general in its
coverage but gave license specifically to Harborne and
49"two other merchants", obviously Osborne and Stapers.
It seems unlikely that at this juncture these merchants 
would do anything to jeopardise their standing with the 
crown. It is more likely that Germigny did not know 
the contents of Harborne's letter. He did not know of 
the Sultan's first reply to Elizabeth of March 1579."^
48 Ernest Charriere, ed., Negotiations de la France 
dans le Levant, 3 vols., 1848-60; vol. Ill, p. 884.
49 HakluytTv, 176.
50 Carriere, III, p. 884. The most detailed account 
of these early negotiations is an A. L. Homiker, 
"William Harborne and the beginnings of Anglo- 
Turkish diplomatic and commercial relations",
J. of Mod. Hist. , 1942, pp. 289-316. Homiker
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What is more likely is that Harborne carried a letter 
which expressed no more than friendship and goodwill 
for the Sultan on the part of Elizabeth and commended 
the bearer to him. This appears to be the case, judging 
from Murad IIIfs letter of March 1579 where he says that 
there ,fhath come unto us in the name of your most ex- 
celent Regall Majestie, commending unto us from you all
SIkindnesse, curtesie and friendly offices on your part...*'. A
Elizabeth's reply in October of the same year adds to the
impression that her first letter did not say anything
about trade. She stated that the Sultan's grant "...was
given to a fewe of our Subjects, and at their onely re-
52quest without any intercession of ours...".
This same letter from the Queen made it perfectly 
clear that whatever Harborne's instructions may have 
been, he had not acted in concert with the queen's view 
of the relations that ought to exist between her sub­
jects and a foreign prince. She explicitly requested
then that the privileges be made general for all her 
53subjects. To have failed to gain this point would
was the first writer on this subject to make use of 
Germigny's dispatches printed by Charriere. He ac­
cepts Germigny's statement that Elizabeth asked for 
a general privilege in her first letter.
51 Hakluyt V, 169. 52 Ibid., 176. 53 Ibid.
have left her in an embarrassing and unsatisfactory 
position. It would have created a situation where the 
crown's authority vis-a-vis its own subjects was limited 
by a foreign ruler. For if Osborne, Stapers and com­
pany held a monopoly of their trade from Murad III then 
Elizabeth could neither insist that more of her subjects 
be included nor could she withdraw the monopoly from 
those who held it. That the relation between sover­
eign and subjects was probably the crown's main consider 
ation and that it intended to permit some form of limi­
tation to those who would follow this trade rather than 
open it to all Englishmen is attested to by a letter 
addressed to Harborne by Secretary Thomas Wilson and 
sent with Elizabeth's first reply to Murad III. Wilson 
wrote that "...hir majesty's desire is that the graunt 
hereafter may be given universall to all merchants to 
trade thither which graunt beying assented unto, it is 
reason that those who were the principall dealers hither 
to should have the chiefest preheminence thereafter1'.^ 
Thus it was intended that Osborne and Stapers have their 
monopoly but that they have it from the English Queen
54 BM:Cotton Mss. Nero BXI, f. 178. This letter, a 
copy of the original, has escaped the notice of 
previous writers on this subject.
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and not from the Ottoman Sultan.
Murad III evidently had no objections to Eliza­
beth's request and in June 1580, in a letter addressed 
to the Queen, he extended the license, previously granted 
to Harborne, to all Englishmen. This new license was 
accompanied with a set of 22 articles which gave a
reasonably precise definition of the English merchants^
55position in the Ottoman dominions. The articles have 
little to say about commercial matters but rather are 
concerned mainly with the Englishman's security in his 
person and goods. In general they do not prescribe 
what the English shall do or not do but rather what 
shall or shall not be done to or for them by the Sultan's 
subjects. The articles are designed not so much to regu­
late English activity as to regulate Turkish activity 
in order to protect the English. Only three of the ar­
ticles explicitly give the English positive rights; the 
general license to trade freely, the right to appoint 
consuls, and the right to settle disputes among them­
selves without reference to Turkish courts. Other than 
that the articles provided that if any Englishman was 
captured he was to be immediately released, that any
55 Hakluyt V, 183-89
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goods recovered from a wrecked ship were to be restored, 
that no Englishman would be arrested for another man's 
debt or crime, that if a slave was found to be English 
he would be released, and that the Turkish navy was 
not to molest English merchant ships. Upon the death 
of an Englishman his goods were to be disposed of ac­
cording to his will and testament or according to the 
judgment of the English consul. One interesting item 
was that Englishmen were explicitly excused from pay­
ing any personal taxes. The privileges end with the 
usual proviso in such documents that all of the offi­
cials of the Ottoman government were to observe and 
honor the provisions stated.
It would seem then that the matter was settled.
But this was not the case because behind the explicit 
issue of commercial relations lay the implicit issue 
of an alliance between Elizabeth and Murad III. Eliza­
beth was content to put this off as long as possible and 
to make no greater commitment than was necessary. Murad 
III, on the other hand, was more insistent on this point. 
Some of this difference between the two rulers comes 
through in their correspondence. There are two levels 
at which the whole communication took place. One at 
the highest level, between Elizabeth and Murad, in which
14M
the matter of an alliance is treated with polite aloof­
ness. Another, at a lower level, between lesser per­
sonages, in which the matter is stated in more pointed 
terms.
In his first letter to Elizabeth, in which the 
first privileges were granted to Osborne and Stapers,
Murad said nothing of an alliance, limiting himself to
the usual extravagant praise and expressions of friend-
56ship. However, on the same occasion the dragoman, 
Mustapha Bey, also wrote to Elizabeth, In his letter 
he gave himself much of the credit for the English suc­
cess so far and for initiating the idea of an alliance.
It is most likely that he couched his letter in these 
personal terms so that if rejected it would be he and 
not the Sultan who was being refused. He wrote that 
"...I think it will not be alien to you to have an 
alliance with our emperor, who can aid you against all 
the enemies of your religionfl. ^  The Queen answered 
Mustapha Bey's letter in October but remained silent 
on the matter of an alliance.^ However, in her letter 
of the same date to Murad, asking for a general privilege,
56 Hakluyt V, 169.
57 Gal. SP Foreign, 1578-9, p. 454.
58 Cal. SP Foreign, 1579-80, p. 77.
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she avoided direct confrontation with the issue by 
saying that f,...at this time wee doe extend© our good 
minde unto your highnesse...meaning to yield a much 
more large and plentiful testification of our thanke- 
fulnesse, when time convenient shall fall out...11.^
The full import of her meaning comes out in the letter 
cited above written by Secretary Wilson to Harborne in 
which he said 1 If anie thing be said unto you for an 
amitie or legue to be concluded you may say that after 
the traffique is agreed uppon, the same may after come 
in consultation. But except you bee asked and earnest- 
lie called uppon, doe not entermeddle touching the
rr\
amitie, but rather stand as ignorant what to say,,ou 
Thus while the English government did not reject an 
alliance with the Ottoman government it did seek to put 
it off as long as possible.
Murad III, in the document granting the general 
privilege of June 1580, outwardly assumed that the al­
liance had been agreed upon. '’...As wee have entred 
into amitie, and most holy legue with the most excel­
lent kings and princes our confederates...so also we 
have contracted an inviolable amitie, peace and league
-59 Hakluyt V, 175.
<60 BM:Cotton Mss. Nero BXI, f. 178.
with the aforesaid Queen.**^ 1 As on the previous occasion 
Mustapha Bey wrote a separate letter to Elizabeth in 
which he stated more clearly the true situation. In 
speaking of the privilege just granted he said that it 
was **a privilege which other Princes have been unable 
to obtain without an envoy and great charge. I pray
your Majesty to send an envoy to secure the confirmation
fOof a solemn treaty**. Sometime during the next six 
months the Queen had a change of mind for in January 
1581 she wrote to Murad III, this time promising that 
an envoy would be sent.^3 She gave as an excuse for 
not previously sending one that **Princes hostile towards 
us11 have caused 1 tumult in our realm, with the minds of 
certain conspirators excited towards civil strife1*, and 
promised that as soon as the trouble is quieted **we will 
salute your Majesty with the same embassy, as is meet, 
in testimony of love and kindness**. Wo reason is given 
for her change of mind but is is explicable in view of 
two occurances preceeding it. First, by September 1580,
61 Hakluyt V, 185.
62 Cal. SP Foreign, 1583 & Add., p. 718.
63 Bodleian: Tanner Mss. 79, f. 159 This is listed as
a draft copy of the letter. There is no copy in any
of the State Paper collections. That the letter was
actually sent is known from references to it made by 
the English merchants and by Turkish officials.
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Philip 11 had successfully occupied Portugal creating 
considerable alarm in England by his sudden acquisition
64
of strength. Second, in December of the same year, 
Arthur Pet returned to London from the Northeast Passage 
voyage to report failure. Thus, that avenue to Asia was 
closed leaving only the possibility of contact by way of 
the Ottoman Empire. The pressure of these events may 
have prompted Elizabeth's promise to send an envoy, but 
it was to be nearly three years before the promise was 
fulfilled.
At about the same time this letter was written an­
other incident took place, in the Mediterranean, which 
made clear the need for formal relations with the Porte 
if trade was to be carried on. In about January 1581, 
the Bark Rowe of Newcastle, /no. 64/ Peter Baker, master, 
arrived at Chios under the guise of being a French ship 
with a French crew and carrying a French license. hh.en 
the Turkish customs officials suspected that they were 
actually dealing with Englishmen they attempted to de­
tain them. According to the testimony in the Admiralty 
Court it was bribery that secured their release. Ac­
cording to Harborne, as he said in a letter to Burghley,
64 R. B. Wernham, England Before the Armada, 1966, pp. 
356-7.
it was his bringing forth the charter of privileges 
which secured their release*^ Whichever way it hap­
pened the ship and crew were released. The Bark Rowe 
then shaped a return course, but when off the Island 
of Sapiento, a Turkish protectorate, it attacked and 
robbed two Greek ships, When report of this incident 
reached the Turkish authorities they commanded Harborne 
to give surety for satisfaction of the loss claimed by 
the Greeks and forbade him to leave Constantinople before 
trial with the Greeks to settle their claim. Harborne 
appealed unsuccessfully to a number of Turkish officials 
and even accepted the intercession of the French ambassa­
dor to be released from his obligation to the Greeks,
The basis of his appeal was the article in the charter 
that no Englishman would be held accountable for crimes
65 Part of this incident was told in the High Court of 
Admiralty by a member of the crew. (PRO:HCA Exams 
24, ff. 158-9) There is not enough testimony given 
there to determine why it became a court case. The 
most important part of the story comes from a letter 
written by Harborne to Burghley, dated at Pera on
9 June 1581. (BMiHarl. Mss. 6993, no. 2) This let­
ter has been overlooked by previous historians of the 
Levant trade. It is the earliest one known from Har­
borne and the only one known dating from before he 
became ambassador. Aside from the flattery addressed 
to Burghley, the letter confines itself entirely to 
an account of this incident. It is also an eminent 
example of the tortuous use of parenthetical phrases.
66committed by another Englishman. The validity of 
this claim was denied by the Turkish officials. Final­
ly he gained an audience with the Grand Vizier, who, 
according to Harborne*s letter, told him that:
Mat the comming of thie Queene hir Magesties 
Imbassator, promised to be sent by hir last 
letter, the articles of your preveledge 
shall be confirmed amd moste faythfullie 
observed, whoe with the frenche above otheres 
shall be most deare to my Master and his, In 
the meanse time not culpable of this crime 
obiected to the/e/» Inioye thie libertie 
under the french protexion, for noe man what 
soe ever shall harme the.1*
Harborne, thus, was released from his responsibility
for the piracy of the Bark Rowe but was informed that
so long as there was no ambassador there would be no
effective charter of privileges.
News of this incident did not first reach England 
in this letter to Burghley but rather in an earlier one 
Harborne had written to which he refers. He also said 
that he had recently been ordered to return home. The 
purpose of this letter seems to have been to flatter 
Burghley by personally informing him of what had hap­
pened. Three days after Harborne, in Fera, wrote his 
letter, Osborne and Stapers, in London, wrote to tfalsing-
66 Hakluyt V, 187, article 12.
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ham expressing the fear that this incident might pro­
voke the confiscation of their merchandise, then in
Turkey, and suggested that those who set out the voyage
67be called upon to put up surety for the stolen goods.
The affair was evidently considered to be quite serious 
for two weeks later the Queen wrote again to Murad apolo­
gising for the unauthorized actions of some of her sub-
68jects and asking that the privileges not be withdrawn.
This episode must have brought home to Elizabeth the 
need for a fully accredited ambassador if there was to 
be any security in the trade. Nevertheless, it was more 
than a year before Harborne1s commission was signed.
During the interval between the incident of the 
Bark Rowe and the appointment of Harborne as ambassador 
letters patent were issued by the Queen, dated 11 Sept­
ember 1581, granting a monopoly of English trade with 
the Turkish dominions to Edward Osborne, Richard Stapers, 
Thomas Smythe, William Barret, and other persons to be
69named by them, the total membership not to exceed twelve. ^
67 PRO:SPD Eliz. 149, no. 40. This may explain why the
incident became a case in the High Court of Admiralty. 
The testimony there was given in August.
68 Hakluyt V, 189-91.
69 Hakluyt V, pp. 192-202. Hakluyt gave the fourth name
listed as "Garret11 and thus initiated an error which 
has been perpetuated faithfully by all the historians
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Though the company formed under the authority of these 
letters patent came to be known as the Turkey Company 
no name was prescribed in the document* Furthermore, 
the company was given neither corporate status nor a 
particular financial organization by the provisions of 
the patent. The members of the company were granted a 
monopoly of the trade to the dominions of the Grand 
Seigneur to last for seven years, the right to assemble 
from time to time to make laws governing their trade, the 
right to license other English subjects to trade within 
the area of the monopoly, and the right to petition for 
a renewal of the patent at the end of the seven year 
period. The crown on its part provided that violators 
of the monopoly would be subject to forfeiture of their 
goods and imprisonment, that the government would not 
interfere in the activities of the company headed by 
Osborne nor would it make any grants contrary to the 
provisions of these letters patent. Aside from appoint­
ing Edward Osborne the first governor to be succeeded, 
if he should die, by Richard Stapers, the crown reserved
of the Turkey trade. No 1 William Garret'1 who was liv­
ing in 1581, has turned up in the records. However, 
in the Privy Seal Warrant authorizing the patent en­
rollment and in the Patent Roll itself the name is 
clearly William Barret. (PRO:Chancery, Privy Seal 
Warrants, bundle 1374 and Patent Roll 24 Eliz. pt. 13).
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for itself the right to appoint two persons of its own 
choosing to be members of the company and the right to 
abrogate the patent upon one year's notice if it should 
be in the crown's interest to do so. In addition the crown 
required from the company that it give notice to the Lord 
Admiral of the departure of its ships within fifteen days 
of their setting sail, that the Master of the Ordnance be 
permitted to take stock of their ordnance, powder, and 
munition both before the departure and after the return 
of their ships, and, finally, that the company import and 
export goods of sufficient value to pay customs to the 
Queen totaling £500 per year.
Fourteen months after issuing these letters patent, 
seventeen months after apologizing for the incident of 
the Bark Rowe, and twenty-two months after promising the 
Sultan to send an envoy to him Queen Elizabeth signed the 
commission appointing William Harborne her ambassador to 
the Porte.^ There is not enough known about related 
events during this period to permit any clear explanation 
for this delay. Especially after the reports following 
in the wake of the Bark Rowe which indicated that without 
an official representative in Turkey the English merchants
70 Hakluyt V, 222-4.
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were effectively without their charter of privileges. 
There was some discussion during that time about who 
was to pay for the customary present to the Sultan and 
his officials and who was to pay the charges of the 
Queen's agent. But it does not seem likely that this 
problem alone could have caused much delay; the mer­
chants were not really in a position to be adamant about 
this, even after they received their royal patent. It 
says nothing, one way or the other, about who was to be 
responsible for the costs of maintaining diplomatic re­
lations with the Ottoman government, but without these 
there could be no trade, thus the merchants had no real 
choice.
Whatever the cause of the delay it was not until 
20 November 1582 that the Queen signed Harborne's com­
mission. Six days before that the Susan of London.
/no. 106/ Richard Parsons, master, departed from Black- 
wall bound for Constantinople. Adverse winds caused an 
eight week delay, however, and it was 14 January before 
she was able to put into the Isle of Wight. There 
William Harborne and his party boarded her and on the
19th she finally got away. Nine weeks later she put into
71Constantinople. The arrival of the Susan was reported 
71 Hakluyt V, 243-58.
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to the Doge and Senate of Venice by their ambassador,
Giovanni Morosini. He was quite indignant that when
the Susan passed the Seraglio Point it set off a great
noise of artillery (34 pieces according to Hakluyt*s
account): the indignation arising not from the fact that
the English thus saluted the Sultan but that it was Good
Friday and all the Christians in the city were celebrating 
72mass. At the end of April the English ambassador was 
presented to Murad III to perform the customary ceremony 
of kissing the Sultan*s hand, and thus began England*s 
first formal diplomatic representation in Asia.
72 Cal. SP Venetian, 1581-91, p.152
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TURKEY COMPANY
The story of the Elizabethan sea trade to the 
Levant begins with Hakluyt's observation that it 
"•••was utterly discontinued, in maner quite forgot- 
gen, as if it had never bene, for the space of 20 
yeres and more".* This generalization has been ac­
cepted by all historians of the Levant but a close 
examination of it here is not amiss and may serve to 
throw some light on patterns of Mediterranean trade.
The previous historians of this trade have accepted
2Hakluyt at his word* A more detailed examination 
of the records has been made by Prof. T. S. Willan 
who searched the Port Books for London and the out- 
ports, the records of the High Court of Admiralty, 
the Acts of the Privy Council and the various col­
lections of state papers. None of these sources re­
vealed to him any English ships trading to the Levant
1 Hakluyt V, 168.
2 Epstein, op, cit,, p, 8; Rowland, op, cit., p. 3; and 
Wood, op. cit,, p, 3, Rowland states, with respect
to Hakluyt'8 generalization, "That this should be liter­
ally true seems difficult to believe yet a painstaking 
search has revealed nothing to contradict Hakluyt's 
statement." Unfortunately, Rowland gives no indication 
of where he took pains to search and thus one cannot 
rely entirely on his conclusion.
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in the 1560*8 and 15709s.^  Willan states that some 
Anglo-Mediterranean trade was carried on by foreign 
merchants using foreign ships and he notes ten such 
sailings between 1562 and 1569.^  Further confirmation 
of this small North-South maritime trade comes from 
the Belgian historian Wilfrid Brulez who cites, from 
the Antwerp archives, a declaration made by some Italian 
merchants in 1556 to the effect that they send few, if 
any kerseys from England to Italy by sea.^
The earliest record of an English ship in the 
Mediterranean during Queen Elizabeth1 s reign is the 
Harry of London which unladed at London from Civita 
Vecchia in August 1572* /l/^  The next voyage found
/2/ is noted in the most important record for English 
ships in the Mediterranean during the sixteenth cen-
3 T.S. Willan, r,Some Aspects of English Trade with the 
Levant in the 16th Century91, E.H.R.« vol. IXX, 1955, 
p. 400.
4 Ibid., p. 401-2.
5 Wilfrid Brulez, uLes routes commerciales dvAngleterre 
en Italie au 16e siecle19 in Studi in onore de Amani- 
tore Fanfani. 1962, vol. IV, p. 126 n. lo. In general 
Brulez maintains that the only merchandise which tra­
velled by sea was that of greater bulk and lower value.
6 Henceforth, throughout this work, numbers in square 
brackets following the mention of a ship or voyage 
are a reference to its entry in the Shipping List 
(Appendix C). Sources for the voyage will be found 
there and thus will not be given with the text.
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tury. This is a record of the ships of all nations which
entered the Tuscan port of Leghorn during the second half
7of the century. Thirty-six English ships are recorded 
entering that port during the 1570's. In addition Eng­
lish sources reveal another twenty English ships clear­
ing to or entering from Marseilles, Genoa, Leghorn,
Civita Vecchio, Naples, and Messina. £See Appendix Cf 
These figures should actually be larger for neither the 
Leghorn nor the English records are complete. Though 
Prof. Willan noted the work of MM. Braudel and Romano 
and cited several of the voyages from the English sources 
mentioned above he did not count these as Levant voyages.
No doubt this is correct at first glance; certain­
ly it would be stretching geographical terminology to 
include the Western Mediterranean in the Levant. But 
looking further, it can be seen that for a number of
7 This record was first examined and analyzed by Profs.
F. Braudel and R. Romano and their conclusions printed 
in Navires et Merchandises & l1 entree du Port del Li- 
vome 1951. However, this work, though
very valuable, gives only statistical summaries of the 
shipping recorded in the Leghorn documents; thus leav­
ing it impossible to identify individual English ships. 
However, a grant from the Central Research Fund of the 
University of London and the generous advice and assi­
stance of Dr. A. A. Ruddock of Birkbeck College, have 
made it possible to obtain a complete microfilm of these 
Leghorn records. Using this microfilm the particular 
English ships entering Leghorn have been identified.
15*
voyages the ports of the Western Mediterranean were not 
terminal points* Only three such voyages have been iden- 
tified in the 15709s all going to Zante* /nos* 17, 25 
and 28/ But it can be seen from the Shipping List that 
during subsequent years there were many others, some 
going further than Zante, and further information might 
reveal that there were even more than the above three 
during the 1570's* In general, it seems to have been 
the case that for many Levant voyages a first port of 
call in the Western Mediterranean was not simply a con­
venient place to re-victual but served as an integral 
part of a trade pattern* There are several contemporary 
statements which support this generalization* Hakluyt 
printed a letter dated February 1569, addressed to 
William Winter by Jasper Campion* The letter urged 
Winter to back a trading voyage to Chios and in dis­
cussing the requirements of the voyage stated that the 
ship that goes must go to Genoa or Leghorn fl***and from 
thence she must make her money to buy wines, by exchange 
to Candia, for there both the custom and exchange are 
reasonable: and not do as the Mathew Gonson and other 
ships did in time past, who made sale of there wares 
at Messina for the lading of their wines, and payed 
for turning their white money into golde after foure
15?
and five in the hundreth and also did hazzard the losse
Q
of shippe and goods by carrying away their money1w.
Campion is referring here to the Levant trade of the 
first half of the sixteenth century but the advisability 
of making a call at an Italian port was reaffirmed in 
June 1577m A memorandum of that date, proposing a voy­
age to Alexandria and Constantinople, suggested that 
the ship call at Messina and Mtake in such goods as 
may avayle in freight for Alexandria, etc*H In 1578 
another memorandum made reference to this pattern of 
trade when it stated that “The shippes which arrived 
at Lygorno***, which carrye herrings and cloth for 
which there shall never want ladinge whether it be to 
go tin to Zante for currants, as last yere, or to lade 
allom****1^  To judge from the available evidence the 
pattern described above prevailed for the Venice trade 
rather than the Turkey trade* In fact, no ships have 
been found during the 1580’s which called at an Italian 
port before going on to a Turkish port* This may, of 
course, simply be a result of incomplete information*^
8 Hakluyt V, 117. 9 P80:SP0 Eliz* 114 no. 44.
10 .BM: Lans. 26 no* 18* This document seems to have been 
written by Horatio Pallavicino at the time he was ne­
gotiating for a monopoly of the alum trade*
11 The Venice Company's trading pattern is covered in 
greater detail in pp. ffc
uo
The earliest English ship known that went beyond 
the Western Mediterranean was the Flying Hart /6/ which 
put into Southampton from Venice in February 1574* The 
only lader of the ship named was a merchant of London 
but he was not one who later had any connection with 
the organized Levant trade* The next ship found east 
of Italy is the Merchant Royal QJJ which called at Leg­
horn in January 1576 and then went on to Zante and Gandia* 
This ship was sent out by some of the merchants who later
formed the Venice Company and by their claim it was their
12first venture into the Venice trade* Record has been 
found of only five more English ships east of Italy in 
the 1570's* Two of them traded in the Venetian dominions 
Ip os* 28 and 54/*^  and two of them entered Turkish ports 
[52 and 55/* It was one of the latter, the Prudence of 
London [52/ which departed London in 1579, and was the
first English ship of which a record survives to enter
a Turkish port during Elizabeth's reign* There may have 
been earlier ones whose records have vanished*
The evidence, as it now stands, supports Hakluyt's 
generalization in the main* Nothing has been found which 
detracts from Prof* WilIan's conclusions about the lapse
12 PRO:SPD Eliz* 232 no* 3*
13 Another ship, the Jonas /no* 25/ intended to go to
Zante but evidently never made it that far*
mof English trade to the Mediterranean. He did not men* 
tion the Flying Hart in 1573 nor the Merchant Royal in 
1575 however the presence of these two ships in the 
Mediterranean does not undermine the generalization.
The above remarks concerning the desirability of ships 
calling at a west Mediterranean port before going further 
east suggests that there could have been any further num­
ber of ships in the Levant during the 1570 ,s. There were 
a large number of English ships that unladed at Leghorn 
and there is no substantive reason to argue that some 
of them did not continue eastward. It is unlikely that 
English sources will reveal any more such voyages. Con­
firmation of them, if they existed, will have to come 
from sources similar to the Leghorn records, in other 
Mediterranean ports. Uhtil, and if, such confirmation 
is found it will have to be accepted that the English 
Levant trade did lapse after 1550 and that it was not 
revived until the late 1570*s at the earliest.
There is little doubt that the difficulties in the 
Muscovy Company1 s Persian trade acted as a stimulus to 
this revival. But it must also be accepted that this 
was not the only stimulus. Ten of the twelve Turkey 
merchants were members of the Spanish Company of 1577 
and it is probable that increasing hostility between
Spain and England which caused increasing difficulties 
in the Anglo-Spanish trade provided a reason for some 
merchants to redirect their interests to the Levant.
This connection cannot be spelled out in the present 
state of knowledge about Elizabethan Anglo-Spanish trade. 
It will require a great deal of research in both English 
and Spanish archives into the details of commercial 
transactions in Spain» before a positive case can be 
made that it was the impossibility of continuing to do 
business in Spain that drove certain merchants to do 
business elsewhere. There is nothing in any of the do­
cumentation on the Turkey trade which suggests that the 
Turkey merchants were at all inspired by the above con­
siderations. They must have been acutely aware that 
Spain was implacably hostile to their Mediterranean 
trade and would and did do as much as possible to de­
stroy it but this is not the same as saying that the 
English extended their interests into the Levant because 
they could no longer function in Spain. Such evidence 
as there is suggests that even while the Turkey mer­
chants were trading in the Levant they continued to 
trade with Spain, though probably on a lesser scale 
than before. A record of Iberian trade for the year 
1584 indicates that even then Anglo-Spanish trade was
It 3
14still substantial. The whole question of the exact 
influence of Anglo-Spanish trade on the renewal of the 
Turkey trade must remain open for the present.
There is similarly a lack of evidence about the 
actual formation of the Turkey Company itself. In the 
case of most chartered trading companies there are to 
be found a number of preliminary documents in the form 
of petitions and memoranda which help explain exactly 
how the company came into existence. For the Turkey 
Company, however, the first evidence of a chartered 
company is the charter, itself, inscribed on the Patent 
Polls. There are two explanations for this lack of 
preliminary documentation aside from the possibility 
that it has all simply perished with time. First, is 
that there was no opposition or counter claim on the 
part of other merchants to the ambitions of Osborne,
Stapers and their associates. Much of the preliminary 
documentation referred to above resulted from such 
opposition or from the conflicting claims of other 
merchants. Second, is that Osborne and Stapers did
14 £M: Lans. 41 ff. 108-168v.
15 Chapters V and VI make use of such preliminary materials 
for the Venice and Levant Companies.
16 See supra, p. 150 for references and details of this 
patent.
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not originally intend to apply to the Queen for a pri­
vilege of monopoly* Rather they intended to rely on 
the Sultan9s letter of March 1579 which gave trading 
privileges only to themselves* ^  When, at Queen Eliza­
beth *8 request, the Sultan extended this privilege to 
all Englishmen in June 1580*® Osborne and Stapers were 
forced to seek their exclusive privilege from their own 
government* Secretary Wilsons letter to William Harbome 
in October 1579 made it clear that the crown did not in­
tend to dispute a grant of monopoly and thus acquiring
19it would be a routine matter. * One might expect in 
such circumstances that there would be at least a for­
mal petition or some suggestions from the merchants 
about what provisions they wanted the charter of pri­
vileges to contain* There is one document containing 
two short sentences each of which contains a proposed 
provision for the letters patent* One requests that 
the merchants be required to pay no more than £500 per 
year in customs both inward and outward and the other 
requests that the members be allowed to re-export 
goods without being charged double customs*^  It is
17 Hakluyt V, 169-71. 18 Ibid., 183-89.
19 See Supra p.141 for the relevant passage in Wilson9s letter*
20 BM: Lans. 34 no. 64* The letters patent, when issued, 
required the Turkey merchants to pay no less than £500 
customs per year and was silent on the matter of re­
exports •
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possible these two suggestions were the only ones speci­
fically emphasized* Most of the provisions of the let­
ters patent were fairly routine and did not differ 
materially from other grants of trade monopolies except 
for the details of names and places*
Some of what seems to have been a lack of communi­
cation between the merchants and the government may be 
explained by taking a closer look at the merchants them­
selves* It is probable that those merchants who were 
the members of the Turkey Company were in closer perso­
nal contact with government circles than the usual group 
of merchants and thus discussions that ordinarily took 
place by way of the written word took place, in this 
instance, by word of mouth* Furthermore, the members 
of the Turkey Company were a very interesting group in
themselves and it is worthwhile to offer a few generali-
21zations about them. The letters patent stated that 
the company might have as many as twelve members but 
named only four* The only complete list of the twelve 
members is in a petition written sometime in 1584* The 
twelve names, in the order listed are: Sir Edward Os-
21 Each of the members has a separate entry in the bio­
graphical appendix where the sources for specific 
facts are cited*
borne, George Barnes, Richard Martin, Martin Calthorpe, 
John Harte, William Masham, John Spencer, Thomas Saythe, 
Richard May, Richard Saltonstall, Richard Stapers and 
Henry Hewitt*^
Three of the twelve company members, Stay the, May, 
and Hewitt, never held any office in the city of London 
government* Of the remainder, all were aldermen, six of 
them during the 1580's; eight were sheriffs of London, 
six of them during the 1580's; three were Lord Mayors 
of London, Osborne in 1583-4, Barnes in 1586-7, and 
Calthorpe in 1588-9,^ ; and finally, Osborne, Barnes, 
Saltonstall and Harte, served as members of Parliament, 
the first three during the 1580’s* The membership of 
the Turkey Company thus represented a considerable con­
centration of power and influence within the City of 
London and they must have found it not difficult to 
communicate informally with members of the government*
22 BM: Cotton Mss* Nero BVIII, f* 53* The petition is 
undated but it lists Osborne as ,fSir Edward Osborne,
Lord Maior of London11* He was knighted on 2 February 
1584 (DNB) and his mayoralty ended November 1584 thus 
placing the petition between those two dates* Osborne,
,Stapers and Staythe were named in the patent along with 
William Barret who had since died in Turkey* See supra, 
p*I5£> for further information on Barret*
23 Calthorpe died during his mayoralty and his unexpired 
term was filled out by Richard Martin another member 
of the Company*
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The government, for its part, especially Burleigh and 
Walsingham, probably were familiar with most of these 
men and requests coming from them would be received in 
a different spirit than such coming from persons less 
well known* Close contact between the government and 
the Turkey Company members was furthered by the fact 
that two of the latter were actually government offi­
cials themselves* Richard Martin was a warden of the 
mint : from 1572 and master from 1581* As such he was 
in constant communication with Burleigh and well known 
to him* Thomas Smythe was farmer of the customs inward 
for London throughout the life of the Turkey Company and
was thus in constant touch with the government with re-
24spect to many mercantile matters* A personal contact
24 There is an interesting communication from Burleigh to 
Smythe which concerned the former's fee as Lord Trea­
surer* This was £365 per year and was evidently paid 
to him by a tally drawn on the London customs receipts* 
It was thus Thomas Smythe, as customer, who was respons­
ible for seeing that Burleigh received his pay when it 
was due* There is a short note extant, from Burleigh 
to Smythe, in which the Lord Treasurer thanks the 
Customer for offering to pay £100 of this fee before 
it was due, which was Michelmas, and is sending his
servant along to collect the same from Smythe* The 
note is dated 16 August 1581, just under four weeks 
before the date of the Turkey Company's letters patent* 
This note is in PRO:Exchequer, Privy Seal Warrants for 
Issue, 124, pt* 4 no* 36* There are several receipts 
in the same place, signed by Burleigh, which indicate 
that he ordinarily received his Lord Treasurer's fee in 
two equal installments, one at the Annunciation of Our 
Lady and the other at Michelmas*
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between the Company and the government was George Barnes 
whose sister, Anne, had been Sir Francis Walsingham1 s 
first wife. Barnes is also known to have imported 
goods from Russia in partnership with Walsingham.
As a group, the twelve Turkey merchants were men 
who seem to have reached a high point in their careers.
In age they ranged from their late 40's to their early 
60fs. They held a number of official positions as in­
dicated above and all were quite wealthy. This latter 
point is always very difficult to judge about sixteenth 
century merchants. In the present case the judgment has 
been made on the basis of their assessment for the sub­
sidy and the general details of their activities 
The assessments for the Turkey merchants in 1582 ranged
from £90 to £300 and averaged £216. A comparison with
26the Venice merchants and a perusal of the subsidy 
rolls in general indicates that these assessments are 
well above the average. There is no way of knowing 
what these assessments meant in terms of real wealth; 
they are useful only for comparative purposes.
The commercial activities of these twelve merchants
25 The subsidy assessments used are set out in Appendix 
A, Table VI.
26 See infra p. <3-4,1,
support the generalization that they were all well to 
do merchants* Almost all of them were engaged in several 
commercial activities other than the Turkey trade* Ten 
of them were members of the Spanish Company and six of 
these were assistants of that company as well* Nine of 
the Turkey merchants were members of the Muscovy Company, 
three of them governors during the 1580's* Three members 
belonged to the Eastland Company and one to the Barbary 
Company* There is evidence several others traded to 
Morocco before the formation of the Barbary Company 
and a number of them also traded to France* Finally, 
three of the Turkey merchants and possibly a fourth were 
Merchant Adventurers* One of those three, Richard Sal- 
tonstall, was governor of that company. Some of them 
also engaged in non-mercantile business affairs* Three 
were investors in the Mineral and Battery Works Company 
and one also in the Company of Mines Royal* As a group 
these twelve showed very little interest in privateering 
or in the enterprises of such persons as Frobisher and 
Brake* George Barnes made moderate investments in 
privateering and a few others may also have done so* 
Barnes and Smythe both were interested in Edward Fenton's 
voyage of 1582 and Smythe invested in Gilbert's venture 
of 1578* Other than this there is no positive evidence
that these Turkey merchants interested themselves in 
what can, at best, be called quasi-commercial ventures* 
It was these twelve merchants who constituted the 
Turkey Company and received letters patent dated 11 
September 1581 to run for seven years* But, by its 
own admission, the Company did not begin its shipping 
until September 1582 and ended it in September 1587*^ 
Thus it took the Company a year to prepare its first 
shipping and its last shipping was sent out a year be­
fore the expiration of the patent* The Company itself 
gave no explanation for this attenuation of its trade* 
The initial delay of a year can easily be e2q>lained by 
the necessity to wait for William Harbome's commission* 
This was not signed until November 1582* In the same 
month the Pruetenoe of London set out for Constantinople 
and was evidently the first English ship to voyage to 
Turkey under the new patent* It is also possible the
delay was due to a shortage of ready money* This was
28met by a loan from the Queen in August 1582* Ending 
the trade a year early is not so easily explained but 
was probably related, in part, to the war with Spain 
and to the export depression of 1586-7*
27 FRO:SPD Eliz 233 no. 13.
28 See infra p.rtf for details on tills loan*
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During the five years they conducted the trade
29the Turkey merchants, by their own account, used 19 
ships which made 27 voyages to the Mediterranean. They 
traded to nearly all the major ports under the rule of 
the Sultan: Algiers, Tripoly, Alexandria and Cairo in
North Africa; Petras in Greece; Tripoly in §yria; the 
island of Chios and Constantinople. Inland from the 
Mediterranean they frequented Aleppo, MAngorie* (Ankara), 
Baghdad and Basra. The export commodities of their trade 
were few; kerseys, broadcloth, tin, pewter and black cony- 
skins. Their imports covered a whole range of commodities. 
The most valuable were raw silk and the various spices and 
drugs. Manufactured goods were mainly a variety of tex­
tiles, carpets and quilts. Bulky commodities of lesser 
value were cotton wool and yam, galls, currants and 
olive oil. The latter two commodities were purchased 
by the Turkey Company in Petras since the other sources 
of them were all in the Venetain dominions. The remain­
der of the Companyfs imports were purchased mainly in 
Aleppo which was the market place for goods which came 
from all parts of eastern Turkey, Persia, India and the 
spice islands. Though the Company did attempt to pur­
29 PRO:SPD Eliz 233 no. 13.
chase directly in other places there is no evidence that 
any of them became important and some of them were aban­
doned altogether before 1588.
The organization of the Turkey Company was that of 
a joint-stock trading company. As such it was a trading 
body itself, in contrast to a regulated company, in which 
trade was conducted by individual merchants. Thus the 
Company issued instructions to its agents in the Mediter­
ranean with respect to the details of commodities to buy, 
prices in London, markets that should be explored, mar­
kets that should be abandoned, and, in general, all the 
detailed instructions involved in the overall direction 
of the trade. These instructions were issued in the 
name of the Company and replies were directed to the 
Company as a whole. Lack of documentation makes it 
impossible to penetrate into the generality of the 
Company to learn how it was organized and how decisions 
were reached. Who actually ran the Turkey Company is 
not known. One can presume that Edward Osborne and 
Richard Stapers were the two most active members and 
in general they spoke for the Company. Letters from
the Company were signed by Osborne in the name of the 
30Company and the Company^  imports were entered in the 
30 An example of one such letter is in Hakluyt V, 268.
customs house under the name 11 Edward Osborne, Richard
31Stapers 6c Co." Letters from the Company's agents were 
addressed to "Edward Osborne and Company", Beyond these 
clues there is no evidence bearing on the decision mak­
ing process in the Turkey Company,
The Company's overseas organization is clearer 
though lack of detail precludes precise statements.
There were two organizations actually, one diplomatic 
and one commercial. In general they were separate con­
sisting of two groups of personnel. The diplomatic or­
ganization was centralized with the ambassador, William 
Harbome, its focal point in Constantinople and consuls, 
appointed by him, situated at various strategic places 
around the periphery of the Ottoman Einpire, On 24 April 
1583, the day after his formal reception by the Sultan, 
Harbome appointed Harvey Hillers consul for the English 
nation in Alexandria and Cairo and in June he appointed 
Richard Foster consul in Aleppo, Tripoly and all other 
parts of Syria,^  By March 1585 John Tipton had been
appointed consul for Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoiy in
34 33Africa, At Petras William Revet was consul in 1585
31 See Appendix B,
32 Hakluyt V, 259, 33 Ibid,, 260.
34 Ibid,, 279, 35 Foster, Sanderson, p.
1OfLand Philip Grimes in April 1586 • The main function of
the consuls was to represent and protect the interests 
of the Company's resident factors. In particular it 
was the consul's business to see to it that the provi­
sions of the Sultan's charter of privileges were honored 
by the local political authority. This consular organi­
zation was directed by the ambassador, William Harbome, 
who was responsible to the English government rather than 
to the Company. The major part of his activities were 
concerned with representing the interests of his govern­
ment at the Turkish court and toward preventing the re­
presentatives of other European powers from undermining 
the position of English merchants in the Ottoman terri­
tories. In these matters he was answerable to Sir Francis 
Walsingham and nearly all of Harbome's surviving corre-
07spondence concerns itself with these matters• '
Alongside this consular organization was the Turkey 
Company's commercial organization which was directed by 
the Company from London. It consisted of the several
36 Hakluyt VI, 40. Grimes later became a son-in-law to 
Richard Stapers.
37 It is to be found in PRO:SPF Turkey, vol. 1 and is cal­
endared. There are detailed accounts of Harbome's 
diplomatic activity in H. G. Rawlinson, "The Embassy
of William Harbome19, Tr. of the Royal H.S». 4th Series, 
vol. V, 1922 and A. L. Homiker, WilliamHarbome and 
the beginning of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic and commer­
cial relations", in J. of Mod. Hist.. vol. XIV, 1942.
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factors whose function it was to conduct the normal com­
mercial activities of the Turkey Company* One, at least, 
of these agents was present before the consular organi­
zation came into existence* This was William Barrett
38who arrived in Aleppo in 1581 and who was replaced in
39June 1584 by Anthony Bate* Under the authority of the
Company John Eldred, William Shales and two others were
sent as agents to Baghdad and Basra in the summer of 
401583 and at about the same time James Towerson was
sent to Ankara in central Turkey* ^ The latter died
sometime before 25 October 1586 and was supposed to
have been replaced by John Eldred, but whether or not
Eldred actually went to Ankara is not known*^ At no
one of these latter places was there a consul* William
Shales was sent to Egypt, after returning from Baghdad
and Basra, where he was joined by John Sanderson in 
43October 1585* It is nowhere made clear who the fac­
tors were in Petras and Algiers, Tripoly, and Tunis*
When Lawrence Aldersey visited Petras in April 1586 he ,
found there beside the consul, Ralph Ashley and John 
44Dor ring ton* These men may have been the Company's
38 Purchas VIII, 450 . 39 Hakluyt VI, 9.
40 Locke, 48* See note 52 for this reference in full*
41 BM:Lans. 241 f. 393* 42 Foster, Sanderson* p. 136.
43 Foster, Sanderson* p*xiii* 44 Hakluyt VI, 40*
factors* Ashley was included as a member of the Levant
45Company in 1592 and may have been serving his appren­
ticeship in 1586* There is no mention of v&o served the 
Company in Algiers, Tripoly and Tunis. John Tipton, who 
was appointed consul in 1585, had been in Algiers since 
about 1580^ and may have served in both capacities.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
Company’s trade to those parts of Africa was very exten­
sive and it may not have been felt worthwhile to maintain 
a separate consul and factor there.
It would probably be a mistake to carry the idea 
of separate diplomatic and commercial organizations too 
far. Though there were generally different individuals 
carrying out the separate functions, all the diplomatic 
appointees were originally merchants, including the am­
bassador. The reason for the formality of separate per­
sonnel was that the Ottoman government was unwilling to 
deal officially with anyone who did not derive formal 
authority from the English government. This became 
clear in the case of Harbome and the Bark Rowe which
was instrumental in the appointment of an English ambas- 
47sador. Another instance of the need for an official
45 Ibid., 76.
47 See supra p.-W?.
46 Wood, op. cit., p. 15 n.
representative was in 1584 when Edward Barton, Harborne1s 
secretary, had to go to Tripoly in Barbary from Constan­
tinople, in order to secure the release of the Company's 
ship, the Jesus 1139/ which had been confiscated by the 
local authorities* The point of Barton's visit was that 
the assertion of privilege based on the Sultan's charter 
of 1580 could not officially be conveyed by just any 
Englishman who happened to be present but had to come 
from an official spokesman for. the English government*
It was probably as an aftermath of the case of the Jesus 
that John Tipton was appointed consul in that area. In 
the case of Tipton it is probable that he continued to 
function as a merchant after becoming consul but this is 
not clear* In fact, while it is clear that there were 
individuals who had the primary purpose of acting as 
official representatives of the English and there were 
different individuals who had the primary purpose of acting 
as factors for the Turkey Company, it is not clear to what 
extent these persons kept their functions separate from 
each other* There is no evidence that those who were 
not consuls ever were involved in diplomatic business*
This was undoubtedly because the Turkish officials would 
only deal at that level with official representatives*
On the other hand it is probable that the consular per-
r t f
sonnel, did not give up all their mercantile activity 
upon their appointment. Though the consuls may have 
continued to function in commercial affairs, these were 
nevertheless supervised from London by the Company, it­
self, which communicated directly with its factors to 
issue them instructions. There was no chief factor who 
directed the Company's commercial activities upon in­
structions from London as there was an ambassador t&o 
stood between the consuls and the English government.
The Company communicated directly with its factors when­
ever possible. There are very few surviving letters 
which bear on the commercial affairs of the Company 
during the 1580's. But these support the above generali­
zations.^
It is clear from the start that though the English 
had received privileges enabling them to trade with the 
Ottoman Empire they had not lost interest in the attempt 
to reach out closer to the source of eastern goods. The 
Turkey merchants sent out two expeditions to explore 
several routes and following that had, for a time, a 
factor at Baghdad and Basra on the eastern border of 
Ottoman territory. The first of these exploratory ex-
48 These few letters have been printed, in whole or in 
part, in Foster, Sanderson. pp. 130-39.
03?
peditions was that of John Newberry from September 1580,
when he departed from London, to August 1582, when he
49returned there* During the course of this voyage 
Newberry travelled to Aleppo, then south to Baghdad,
Basra and Ormuz, from there north to Shiraz, Hispahan, 
and Tabriz in Persia and then west overland through
Turkey to Constantinople from where he returned to
50England overland by way of Poland and Danzig* This 
expedition of Newberry's is one of the less noted and 
understood English travels into Asia* The reason is 
largely that the account itself lacks any clear narra­
tive or any traveller's descriptions of places or in­
cidents along the way* Instead it consists of a series 
of notes containing the names of towns and cities visited 
and the time required to travel from one to the next, a 
brief statement on the commodities available for purchase 
at each town often with their prices, freight charges for 
goods between towns and the tolls and customs charged 
along the way* It is evident that Newberry was explor­
ing the practicability of conducting a trade along all
49 Purchas VIII, pp* 450-81* Newberry had made an earlier 
voyage to Aleppo and Jerusalem in 1579 (Purchas VIII, 
449-50) but the account of it is so brief that it is 
impossible to determine if its purpose was more than
a pilgrimage*
50 See supra p*l3d> for some comments on the latter stages 
of this voyage*
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or part of the route he followed* He was undoubtedly 
trying to determine not only the nature and prices of 
goods along the way but also the total cost of the 
transportation of such goods* On the basis of infor­
mation of this sort Os borne, S tapers and Company could 
decide whether or not it was worth trying to push their 
own trade routes beyond Aleppo or if they should simply 
be content to buy and sell goods there and let others 
worry about their transport* The main determining fac­
tor would be if the cost of goods at some point east of 
Aleppo or Constantinople plus the cost of their carriage 
by Englishmen would be less than the cost of the same 
goods bought at Aleppo or Constantinople* The nature 
of Newberry's notes makes it impossible to reconstruct 
these total costs* He quoted prices and weights in terms 
of a myriad of local currencies, measures and weights 
and gave no equivalents that would enable one to trans­
late his information into known currencies and measures*^
51 A narrative account of this expedition is in Foster, 
England's Quest for Eastern Trade* pp* 79-89. Foster 
saw no purpose to the voyage other than for Newberry 
to satisfy his curiosity. Foster felt that the ac­
count represents Newberry's rough notes which he never 
had a chance to amplify* He states that had Newberry 
been writing for publication or for friends at home 
he would have given fuller descriptions and "would 
at the same time have omitted trivial details of the
1 U
The exact conclusions that the merchants in England drew 
from Newberry's information are not known but seven months 
after his return he departed again under the auspices of 
the Turkey Company, this time in company with Ralph Fitch 
and others for the purpose of exploring the possibility 
of extending their trade routes beyond Ormuz into India, 
itself, and perhaps even beyond that* At the same time 
the Turkey Company intended to explore the possibility 
of also conducting a trade from Baghdad and Basra which 
were within the Ottoman dominion at that time* There is 
no evidence that the English made any further attempt, 
until many years later, to trade directly with Persia 
proper* It is possible that one of Newberry's purposes 
was to determine whether or not it would be possible to 
do so without passing through Ottoman territories* This 
being impossible the Company settled on what were Persian 
cities, now under Ottoman rule*
When Fitch and Newberry travelled out on their way 
to India they were accompanied by John Eldred, William 
Shales and several other servants of the Turkey Company* 
They carried with them £2000 worth of kerseys, cloth, tin
prices of commodities19 • Such a remark would seen to 
indicate a frame of reference in which commercial mo­
tivations have no place* The "trivial detail" was the 
very reason for the voyage*
and other goods, more than half of which was left in 
Baghdad with two factors, William Skinner and Ralph 
Allen, to be sold* The remainder, £764 worth, was car­
ried to Basra and divided so that £400 worth was carried 
by Fitch and Newberry "for the Indies" and the remainder 
stayed with Eldred and Shales*^  Fitch and Newberry's 
adventures in India is one of the better known episodes
in English travel literature and has been recounted a
53number of times*
Their purpose, of course, was to explore the possi­
bilities of trade with India and lands beyond* The only 
immediate effect the voyage could have had on the Turkey 
Company was to point out to it that the way to India 
through Ormuz was closed because of Portuguese hostility*
It seems that Newberry intended to return to Aleppo through
northern India and Persia in order to urge a new expedition
54to India; this time by sea around Africa* He died some-
52 J. Courtenay Locke, The First Englishmen in India* 
1930, pp* 48-9* Knowledge of the Turkey Company's 
agents' first experience in Baghdad, Basra, Ormuz 
and India all comes from a few accounts and letters 
printed by Hakluyt and Purchas* These have all been 
brought together in one volume and edited by Locke* 
For convenience they will be cited from that volume*
53 One of the best secondary accounts is that in Foster, 
op* cit*, chaps* VIII and IX*
54 Foster, op* cit*, pp* 98-99*
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where along the route and so it can never be known what 
the Company's reactions to his information would have 
been* Fitch continued on to explore further the markets 
of eastern India with the planned expectation that within 
two years time he would meet Newberry in "Bengala" re­
turning aboard an English ship* When Newberry did not 
appear Fitch proceeded further east reaching finally as 
far as Malacca* On his outward journey Fitch crossed 
India by a roundabout overland route but on his return 
he traversed by ship nearly the entire coast of the 
Indian peninsular* The only account of Fitch's travels 
was written by himself after his return and it is not 
very informative on commercial matters* What notes he 
may have taken along the way are unknown* There is 
nothing from his hand comparable to the notes Newberry 
took down during his second voyage* Thus there are no 
clues to what reports and advice Fitch may have given 
the Company when he finally returned to England in 1591* 
it can be presumed, however, that it was his report which 
was responsible for the inclusion of India in the Levant 
Company's charter of 1592*
Those who remained behind in Baghdad and Basra 
when Fitch and Newberry continued on to Ormuz and India, 
had the purpose of exploring local market conditions*
Their reports were not hopeful, either from Baghdad or 
Basra. In English goods, the merchants had with them
kerseys, cloth, tin and some others, unspecified. In
55July 1583 Eldred complained ^  that in two weeks time they 
had been unable to sell anything and probably would not 
be able to do so until winter because the market was al­
ready flooded with kerseys and tin. These, he said, had 
been bought at Aleppo from William Barrett, presumably 
by local merchants, and were goods that had arrived on 
the Company's ship, the Snmanuel of London £no. 112/.
Here, clearly, was a case of poor coordination between 
the Company's regular trade and its exploratory ventures• 
The prices offered for English goods were no higher in 
Baghdad than in Aleppo, according to Eldred, but he had 
hope that the situation would improve. ^  By November of 
the same year Eldred and Shales were in Basra at the head 
of the Persian gulf, where the situation was no better. 
Basra, it turned out, was no market at all but only a 
transhipment point for goods passing from Ormuz to Baghdad. 
In face of their inability to sell anything they decided 
to carry their goods into Persia. But just before they 
were to depart two Venetians arrived from Ormuz with a
55 Locke, 48. 56 Ibid., 49. 57 Ibid., 63.
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variety of spices* The latter were in need of money 
because they had taken up 109000 ducats ~ probably in 
Ormuz - to be repaid in Basra and found when they ar~ 
rived in Basra that the market was poor and their 
creditors would not let them take up the same sum to 
be repaid in Baghdad* They thus offered to deal with
58Eldred and Shales for half money and half commodities*
In January the latter reported that they had delivered 
to the Venetians 2000 ducats in goods and 2830 ducats 
in money in exchange for cinnamon, nutmeg, ginger, cloves, 
and some other commodities* The money they took up at 
15% to be repaid in Baghdad, with an interest charge of 
4% per month for the time they remained in Basra* It is 
not so stated but presumably they expected to repay the 
2830 ducats from the sale of the Company's goods that 
had been left in Baghdad with William Skinner and Ralph 
Allen*
It is clear from the reports that it was important 
to have ready money available in order to take advantage 
of any market situation* As early as May 1583, when he 
was still in Aleppo, Newberry, writing to Leonard Poore, 
advised that u***there should come in every ship the
58 Ibid., 64
mfourth part of her Cargason in money, which would help
egto put away our commodities at a very good price**. In 
Baghdad, in July, Newberry wrote again to Poore, this 
time in face of the poor market in Baghdad, suggesting 
that the portion of money be increased “...With half 
money and half commodity may be bought here the best 
sort of spices and other commodities that are brought 
from the Indies• ••**• In another letter, written at 
the same time he concluded that 1 •• .without money there 
is no great profit made**.^
It is not certain from the record of this trade 
that has survived what the Company decided to do. It 
probably gave up the idea of basing factors at Basra.
They would only be useful if a trade was being conducted 
from Ormuz. But after learning of the arrest of Fitch 
and Newberry and the general hostility of the Portuguese, 
the English must have given up that idea altogether. There 
is evidence that the Company continued to trade at Baghdad 
for a few years. After his return to England, John Eldred 
prepared an account for Hakluyt, in which he stated that
he had made three voyages between Aleppo and Baghdad and
62had spent a total of two years there.
59 Ibid., 42.
61 Ibid., 50.
60 Ibid., 52.
62 Ibid., 45, 47.
mThe Turkey Company did not limit itself to investi­
gating trade to the east but also turned attention to 
Egypt, The information about the trade there comes 
mainly from letters written by John Sanderson and William 
Shales, Sanderson had been sent out to Turkey in 1584 
and spent a year serving Harborne, then in October 1585 
he was sent to Alexandria to act as assistant to the 
factor there, William Shales.^  Whether or not Shales 
was already in Alexandria when Sanderson arrived or 
whether they went together is nowhere indicated. Shales 
was last known to be in Basra in January 1584 with John
63 Sir William Foster, The Travels of John Sanderson in 
the Levant, 1584-1602, 1931, p. xlii. This volume 
is based on a manuscript in the British Museum, Lans- 
downe 241, which consists of a large collection of 
Sanderson's correspondence plus miscellaneous items 
ranging from autobiographical to a list of the tare 
of barrels used in shipping goods, Foster edited 
this volume for the Hakluyt Society and was thus 
primarily interested in it as a travel document, 
though he did print a number of letters that con­
tain mainly commercial information. However, many 
of the letters Foster included he did not print in 
their entirety; and, in general, the material he om­
itted was information of commercial interest. Further­
more, he did not print all of the letters. There are 
a total of 421 letters in the manuscript volume, in 
addition to the miscellaneous material, and Foster 
printed all or part of only 150 of these. There are 
relatively few letters from the 1580's and Foster 
printed these in their entirety, though he did leave 
out some miscellaneous lists of prices and quantities. 
The bulk of Sanderson's letters date from the period 
1599 to 1602.
1U
64Eldred, thus could easily have been in Alexandria 
some time before Sanderson's arrival. Sanderson stated 
in his own account of his travels that the William and 
John £no. 168/ was supposed to have come to Alexandria 
when he and Shales were there but that the consul at 
Petras, William Revet, sent it to Tripoly in Syria in­
stead. ^  The result was that the two factors had almost 
no goods to trade while in Egypt except some that were 
sent to them from Aleppo. Why this change of plan took 
place is not told. The incident suggests, however, that 
the two men were sent to Egypt to initiate the Turkey 
Company's trade there. By October 1586 they had received 
instructions to leave Egypt and finally departed in March 
1587.
In a long letter addressed to the Turkey Company 
in October 1586, Shales and Sanderson assessed the si- 
tuation for trade in Egypt.00 The essential problems 
presented there were not very different from those faced 
by the English merchants in Persia some years earlier.
It was important that a factor be present throughout 
the year to take advantage of the best times for buying 
and selling. This point evidently did not have to be
64 Locke, 64.
66 Ibid., pp. 131-36.
65 Foster, Sanderson, p.3.
urged on the Company and it is implicit in the descript­
ions Shales and Sanderson give of the market* What they 
do urge upon the Company quite explicitly is the neces­
sity to trade with both goods and money* wIt is requi­
site that heare yf we trade, the con try be f tarnished 
with money and goods in such sort that we may waite as 
well the time of imployments as for sales*n The problem 
was that prices varied with the coming of caravans and 
ships* When the caravans arrived with spices, the 
greatest quantity of which was pepper, prices fell and 
when ships arrived in Alexandria, with merchants wanting 
to buy, prices rose* The technique used by the Venetians 
was to have several ships arrive with goods and money in 
July, August, and September when caravans were getting 
ready to leave for Mecca and the demand for European 
goods was high* After the caravans left in early Octo­
ber the proceeds of sales were invested in spices and 
other goods to be returned to Europe* If prices turned 
unfavorable then the Venetians bought and sold in small 
quantities n* • .with commoditie of the time***11* Then 
either at the end of October or in early April another 
ship arrived to lade the returns of the sales and pur­
chases* If a ship arrived after the end of September 
it was required to remain for its lading until early
±<*0
spring* On the other hand, merchants of Marseilles, 
Florence, Sicily, Genoa, and Ragusa arrived in Egypt 
bringing almost all ready money and bought at the price 
they found* This was, in part, because their charter 
parties permitted them to remain in port for only a 
certain number of days. Also, probably, because they 
did not maintain a permanent establishment in Egypt* 
Sanderson and Shales mentioned that the Venetians, who 
seem to have been the chief European merchants in Alex­
andria and Cairo, kept three or four factors there*
The two Englishmen recommended to the Turkey 
Company that it follow the procedure used by the Vene­
tians* The ships should arrive in August or September 
and order should be given to Constantinople or Aleppo 
that the Company agents there send money to Egypt so the 
lading may be ready when the ships arrive* They pointed 
out also that if the English ships bring such goods as 
amber, quicksilver and vermilion, which are most suit­
able for the caravans travelling to Mecca, the profits 
to be made would more than compensate the cost of having 
the ships remain in port for two months* If, however, 
English goods are brought, the best course is for the 
ships to depart without a return lading, the goods then 
sold during the winter and lading be made ready for the
JLS1
next ship which arrives* This plan raises the question 
of the employment of English ships in the Mediterranean 
while they wait for return cargoes* In general they 
made the rounds of the main ports in which there were 
English factors, carrying goods either for themselves 
or for others* One example of this is seen in the in­
structions for the Royal Exchange sometime in the 1590*8 
which went from London to Zante to Scanderoon, back to 
Zante and Petras, then back to Scanderoon for its final 
lading for England.^
The Turkey Company decided not to pursue its trade 
in Egypt and by 25 October Sanderson and Shales had re­
ceived orders to sell all their goods and depart for 
Tripoly in Syria* This was evidently the result of a 
decision made by the Company to contract all its opera­
tions and concentrate on the trade at Aleppo* In June
1586 the Company wrote to the Aleppo factors instructing
68them to give up the operations in Baghdad and Basra* 
Furthermore, it stated, it intended to send only a small 
quantity of goods in November or December - £2000 to 
£3000 worth at the most* Its reasoning was that M***this
67 See appendix B* This question is taken up in greater 
detail in Chap* V pp* Afc9^*
68 Foster, Sanderson * pp* 130-31*
mperyllous time we will not bare so great adventure, but 
will retier home our stocke so fast as we can*.*1 The 
Hperyllous times1 probably referred to the hostilities 
between England and Spain and the depression of 1586-7 
but whether or not the Company meant literally that it 
intended to liquidate its trade in western Asia seems 
unlikely* Not long after this it petitioned for a re­
newal and broadening of its monopoly which does not sug-
69gest a desire to withdraw from the trade. Possibly 
the members were just being pessimistic. William Har- 
borne, at the end of his term as ambassador, also indul­
ged in this pessimism. In February 1589 he wrote to 
Walsingham to the effect that some of the Turkey mer­
chants were so discouraged about the expenses of the 
trade that they were considering giving it up.^ It 
is possible, however, that Harborne was trying to alarm 
the government into renewing the monopoly on terms de­
sired by the Turkey merchants. On the other hand there 
is some evidence that the Company was having its finan­
cial difficulties, though these were probably not suffi­
cient to cause its withdrawal from the trade.
The finances of sixteenth century mercantile
69 See Chap. VI for greater detail on this petition.
70 Cal SP For., 1589, pp. 112-3. See also Chap. VI.
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enterprises present questions which generally produce 
very little in the way of answers* Knowledge of the 
details of investment are dependent on the survival of 
company records and for the Turkey Company, as with 
most other such companies of the period, no such re­
cords have survived* Some generalizations can be 
hazarded on the basis of indirect evidence and on re­
marks made for other purposes* The company was organized 
on a joint-stock basis during the life of its letters 
patent* But it must be stated at the outset that 
there is no knowledge whatever of how much of that joint- 
stock was contributed by each member of the company, nor
if further calls for funds were made upon the members,
errnor if the stock was continuous ^ nog if it was wound 
up at the end of each voyage* The absence of any hint 
whatever, that the stock was periodically wound up sug­
gests that it was probably continuous until the monopoly 
ran out in September 1589; though even then there is
nothing in the record to indicate how it was finally 
72distributed* Sources of its capital are equally un-
71 The issue of when this type of organization was 
given up is discussed in detail in Chapter VI*
72 However, John Sanderson remarked that the lading 
of the Hercules * in 1588, was worth over £70,000 
and that Martin Calthorpe, his master, "had 5000 li* 
wourth for his part"* (Foster, Sanderson, p* 6*)
known; however, businessmen of the standing and breadth 
of activity of the Turkey merchants can be assumed to 
have had some capital of their own. As merchants they 
most probably had stocks of goods and some of than owned 
or had an interest in merchant ships.
There is evidence that the Muscovy Company, as a 
company, invested in the Turkey Company. The petition 
mentioned above which lists the twelve Turkey merchants 
sets off two of the names with the designation f4for the 
Muscovie company11?^® This cannot simply be a means of 
identifying members of that company since nine of the 
twelve Turkey merchants were also Muscovy merchants and 
only two are so identified. The governor of the Muscovy 
Company, George Barnes, is in the list of Turkey mer­
chants but is not so identified. It must be concluded 
that these two, Richard May and Richard Saltonstall, 
represented the Muscovy Company as a company and that 
the other Muscovy merchants simply represented them­
selves. This being so it can further be concluded that 
the reason for this was that the Muscovy Company inves­
ted in this new trade and appointed two of its members 
to represent its own interests# In view of the time,
72a BM:Cotton, Nero BVIII, f. 53.
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money, and effort the Muscovy Company had put into its 
own Persian trade it is not surprising it would wish 
to have a hand in exploiting the same trade which now 
intended to follow a different route* There is no 
further evidence on this point and no indication of 
how much of the total capital may have been supplied 
by the Muscovy Company*
One of the most difficult business needs to meet 
in the sixteenth century was that for ready money* The 
Turkey Company solved this problem initially by borrow­
ing a large sum from the Queen* Though Elizabeth did 
give financial support to certain ventures of exploration 
and discovery she was not inclined to lend money for 
purely commercial purposes* The loan to the members 
of the Turkey Company is the only such loan of which 
any record has been found and it actually came about 
as a means for the Queen to avoid repaying money she 
owed to some of these same merchants* On 11 September 
1581, the same day the Turkey Company1 s letters patent 
were issued, the Earl of Leicester, in the name of the 
Queen, signed receipts for a total of £5000 received
73from nine merchants to be repaid in three months time*
73 BM:Lans* 31 nos* 14-23*
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This money was to be for the use of Don Antonio of 
Portugal. Half of the sum borrowed was lent by Richard 
Martin, Martin Calthorpe, John Harte, and John Spencer, 
all members of the Turkey Company. The other half was 
lent by five other merchants not known to be associated 
with the Company. Sometime before the end of the fol- 
lowing year Richard Martin, in the name of the Turkey 
merchants, petitioned the crown for the loan of 10,000
74lbs. weight of silver bullion to maintain their trade.
The loan was authorized by an Exchequer Warrant for 
Issue, on 31 August 1582.^ This warrant has a long 
text which explains in some detail how this loan came 
to be approved. When Leicester borrowed the original 
£5000 the crown put up a large and valuable diamond as 
security. The time for repayment came and past without 
repayment being made. Apparently the terms of the 
£5000 loan were such that this meant the diamond would 
be automatically forfeited. Elizabeth, however, was 
unwilling to sacrifice it and instead accepted an offer 
from the merchants that they forgive her the £5000 and 
the diamond and all interest which should have accrued 
in exchange for which she would lend them the 10,000 lbs.
74 PR0:SPD Eliz. 235 no. 12.
75 PRO:Exchequer Warrants for Issue, 124 pt. 4 no. 44.
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weight of silver bullion to be repaid in five equal, 
annual installments. The bullion was paid out of the 
Exchequer on 9 September 1582 in ingots and valued at 
£3.3S2 7/8d per pound weight, or a total value of 
£31,619.15®10d.76 The money was duly repaid as pre­
scribed in five equal installments of 2000 lbs. weight 
at the opening of each Michelmas Term beginning in 1583. 
The last payment was received on 2 October 1587.^  No­
where in the official recording of these transactions 
is the Turkey Company mentioned. It must be assumed, 
however, that the loan was used for the furtherance of 
its trade, the petition from Richard Martin states that
76 PRO:Exchequer, Tellers Roll, 140. The bullion more 
than likely came from that which was brought back 
by Francis Drake after his circumnavigation. There 
is a document (PROsSPD Eliz. 144 no. 60) dated Decem­
ber 1580, certifying the amount of bullion brought 
into the Tower by Drake. It came to 22,899 lbs. and
5 1/2 ozs. of silver and 101 lbs 10 ozs. of gold.
The certificate was signed by Drake and Richard Mar­
tin, the latter obviously in his capacity as an of­
ficial of the mint. Martin's personal knowledge of 
this bullion may have been the original inspiration 
for the Turkey Company's request for a loan, which 
was submitted by Martin in the Company's name. In 
the end the loan was a very good business deal for 
the Queen. She lent to her own subjects a sum of 
money which was not hers, it having been stolen from 
the Spanish, and on which she earned an interest 
(£5000) of nearly 16%.
77 The first four of these payments are recorded in 
PRO:Exchequer, Tellers Rolls 142, 143, 144, and 145. 
The last is to be found in PRO:Exchequer, Receipt 
Book 1842.
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it was for that purpose and makes reference to the £5000 • 
Furthermore, the money was not issued from the Exchequer 
to the nine members who had lent the original £5000, but 
to Edward Osborne, George Barnes, Richard Martin, Martin 
Calthorpe, John Harte, and Customer Thomas any the* All 
six of them were members of the Turkey Company but only 
Martin, Calthorpe and Harte had contributed to the £5000* 
It must be assumed also that the merchants had to satisfy 
the contributors to the £5000 who were not members of the 
Turkey Company. It is conceivable, though there is no 
evidence on the point, that the latter became hidden in­
vestors in the Company.
It was probably the Company^  success with the 
above loan that prompted it, on two subsequent occasions, 
to petition the crown for further loans though there is 
no evidence to suggest that either of them was ever 
granted. Sometime during the mayorality of Edward Os­
borne (1583-4) the Company petitioned the crown for the
loan of 2000 lbs. weight of silver to be repaid in equal
78portions in six annual installments. At the rate cal­
culated for the first loan in 1582 this would have come 
to £6323.19s2d. In addition the Company also said it
78 BM:Cotton Mss. Nero BVIII f. 53.
would give to the Queen £3000 in spices, Turkey carpets,
quilts and other goods at the end of three years or at
the rate of £500 per year* In either case it represents
what amounts to a substantial interest on the loan* The
request for a loan in the terms stated would seem to re*
present something more than simply the need for more
capital* The Company was net lacking 2000 lbs* weight
of silver or its equivalent in coined money for it did
79make its annual payment on the loan of 1582* Further­
more, the Company could not have been lacking in goods - 
or did not expect to be lacking in goods - for it offered 
to pay an extraordinarily high interest in the form of 
goods* What it might have been lacking was ready money* 
Certainly the offer to pay interest in the form of goods 
rather than money suggests a shortage of cash rather than 
a lack of capital* There is no record of the payment of 
the above sum out of the Exchequer, thus from negative 
evidence it must be concluded that the loan was not gran­
ted* There is one piece of evidence which throws a slight 
doubt on this conclusion* In February 1585 the Company 
again petitioned for a loan of 10,000 lbs* in weight of
79 It is, of course, very possible that this 2000 lbs* 
of silver was to be used for the annual payment on 
the loan of 1582*
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80silver bullion. It can be argued that it would hardly
have done so if it had been refused one-fifth that amount
only a year or so earlier. This, however, is supposition
only. The second request for a loan is real enough. It
was addressed to Lord Burleigh and signed by ten of the
81twelve Turkey merchants. It gives very little infor­
mation; only that the loan was to be for "certayn yeares 
for the better mayntenance of our Trade..•tl. Again there 
is no evidence that it was granted.
The observation that the Company was not lacking in 
goods with which to make an interest payment to the Queen 
and the Company^  general concern about money payments 
raises the issue of the balance in this trade. It has 
been thought to be unfavorably balanced for England*®^  
and what little evidence can be brought to bear on the 
question confirms this view. Appendix B contains the 
inward ladings of four Turkey Company ships. Two of 
these came from Petras and carried mainly currants.
80 BM:Lans. 43 f. 176.
81 Richard Saltonstall and Henry Hewitt did not sign 
it.
82 T. S. Willan, HSome Aspects of English Trade with 
the Levant in the Sixteenth Century11, EHR, vol. IXX 
1955, p. 410 and Ralph Davis, "England and the Medi­
terranean, 1570-1670", Essays in the Economic and 
Social History of Tudor and Stuart England, ed. by 
F.J. Fisher, 1961, p. 124.
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The other two came from Tripoly in Syria and contained 
what was most likely a more typical cargo of the Turkey 
trade* The valuations given for these cargoes are of­
ficial ones based on the Book of Rates* The real value 
of the imports varies from commodity to commodity and 
from time to time with price changes. In the case at 
hand the real value was very much higher than the rated 
value* John Sanderson claimed that the cargo of the 
Hercules 1^90/ was worth more than £70,000*®^  John 
Eldred remarked that the Hercules * on this occasion,
'•was the richest ship of English merchants goods that
84ever was knowen to come into this realme'1* Sanderson's 
accuracy cannot be completely tested; however, some mea­
sure of the value of the Hercules• cargo can be made*
In June 1586 the Company sent its agents in Aleppo a
85list of prices then current in London* At those 1586 
prices, the same commodities on board the Hercules in 
1588 were worth £47,022* This excludes the various 
textiles, drugs and miscellaneous items in the cargo 
for which no prices are known* Thus the cargo was cer­
tainly worth a good deal more than its rated value and 
possibly as much as Sanderson claimed* Similarly, this
83 Foster, Sanderson* p* 6* 84 Hakluyt VI, 9*
85 Foster, Sanderson* p* 131n*
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is the case with the Toby of London £ 191/, whose cargo, 
excluding several items whose prices again are not known, 
was worth £19,153 at the June 1586 prices; over three 
time its rated value* It is worth noting that most of 
the known value of the two cargoes was accounted for by 
a few items - indigo, galls, silk, cotton, wool, and nut­
meg* This may have been a peculiarity of those particu­
lar cargoes, but the lading of the Royal Exchange [315/ 
tends to confirm this pattern* No comparable prices are 
known for 1596 and there is no justification for using 
the 1586 prices* In terms of bulk alone, however, the 
five commodities listed above appear in greater quanti­
ties than any other item except currants* Furthermore, 
in 1588 the import of commodities from Turkey was the 
result of the single decision of the Turkey Company; 
in 1596 the imports were the result of the independent 
decisions of a number of merchants* That the overall 
proportion of imports for certain commodities should 
be similar in both cases suggests that market demand 
was the operating factor and probably represented the 
general pattern of imports to be found tin til the advent 
of the East India Company*
A commodity not considered above is currants which 
were also imported by the Turkey Company* The greatest
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quantity of that commodity, however, was imported by the 
Venice Company* The Turkey Company's source was Petras 
from where it imported about 170 tons in 1588 compared 
to the 600 tons imported by the Venice merchants* In 
terms of value currants represented a relatively small 
portion of the total imports of the Turkey Company* They 
were rated at 30s the hundredweight which over a period 
of several years seems to have been a fair average of 
their real price which ranged from 25s to 35s per hundred­
weight* Thus the rated values of the ships from Petras 
are not so far removed from their real values as to be 
unusable*
It will be seen from the above remarks and from 
the ladings of the ships in Appendix B that the cargoes 
from Tripoly were far more valuable per ton of lading 
than those from Petras* The 95 tons of lading on board 
the Gift of God £196/ from Petras was worth about £4000 
while the 120 tons of lading on board the Toby from 
Tripoly was worth over £20,000* The lading of the Toby 
represents a more typical cargo from §yria than does the 
Hercules in terms of value* In 1596 the Royal Exchange* 
in from Scanderoon, had a cargo whose rated value, ex­
cluding currants, was £ll,6S3*168lld* Thus, by the same 
reasoning applied to the Toby's cargo the real value of
3iOq
it was certainly in excess of £20,000. In July 1594,
the Ascension of London /no. 277/ unladed from Scande-
roon, Constantinople, and Zante with a cargo officially
86rated at about £28,000. In the same month the Consent
/no. 281/ unladed from Scanderoon with a cargo offici-
87ally rated in excess of £10,000. The real values of 
the last two ships would have been considerably greater 
than their rated values, though any trough estimate is 
complicated by the fact that after 1592 the Levant ships 
from Syria were more likely to have stopped at one of 
the Venetian ports for currants. While the above fig­
ures are certainly somewhat vague they do contain enough 
consistency to indicate that the Inward cargoes of a 
ship in the Turkey trade was very likely to be worth 
at least £20,000 and not unlikely to be worth as much 
as £30,000. Those cargoes which were predominantly of 
currants, by contrast, were probably never worth much 
more than £5000.
The problem of English exports in the Turkey trade 
is even more difficult for there is less information 
with which to work. There are only two years in which
86 PROzExchequer Warrants for Issue, 127. It paid petty 
customs inward of about £1400.
87 PROzExchequer Warrants for Issue, 132. It paid petty 
customs inward of about £500.
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surviving Fort Books entries for exports to the Levant 
are known - 1598-99 and 1604-05#®® These will be taken 
up in Chapter VII but there is no evidence to suggest 
that in the 1580,s exports to the Levant were not pri­
marily kerseys, some braodcloths, conyskins, and tin# 
Table III gives some figures for the export of kerseys 
by the Levant Company but they are all from 1590,s#
The most explicit statement of the value of cargoes 
arriving in Turkey comes from William Harborne, though 
his remarks are confined to the ships arriving at Con­
stantinople and Chios# After his return from Turkey 
he became involved in a difference with the Company 
over the amount of money owed to him and in justi­
fying himself wrote out the benefits of his services 
to both the Company and the Realm# Among these ser­
vices was a reduction in customs at Constantinople and 
Chios from 5% to 3%^  There are several copies of his 
various claims in which he gives estimates of how much
88 PROzExchequer, Port Book 10/11# This Port Book has 
been misplaced by the Public Record Office and thus 
could not be consulted# Fortunately, some years ago, 
it was consulted by Prof# Willan who printed the to­
tals of goods exported by the Levant Company in ”As- 
pects of English Trade with the Levant in the Six­
teenth Century”, EHR, 1955, p. 409. The Port Book 
is only for tonnage and poundage and thus does not 
show cloth exports.
the Company saved by virtue of this reduction in customs.
In only one of these documents, however, does he give
detailed figures of the saving on the cargoes of dif- 
89ferent ships. The figures he gave were the actual
amounts which represented 2% of the rated value of the
goods for customs purposes. Using these an idea of the
total values of the cargoes can be gained. Fortunately
Harbome also listed the savings with the names of the
90ships which were:
Ship Value of Cargo
1582 The Susan /no. 106/ £ 6,475
1583/4 The Charity /nos. 116 6c 145/ 18,900 (together)
1585 The Toby /no. 166/ 11,675
1587 The Hercules /no. 190/ 1.525
--------------------------------------- £ $ 8 , 5 75
These five voyages, one each year, are the only ones 
found going to Constantinople. It seems to have been 
the pattern that only one ship per year went to that 
city or Chios though this can be positively affirmed 
for only one year. In March 1584 the Venetian ambas­
sador in Constantinople, Giovanni Morosini, wrote to
89 Bodleian:Tanner 77 ff. 1 seq.. Other copies of 
his claims are in BM:Lans 57 no. 23 and 241 f. 115.
90 Harbome gave his figures in acques, a small Tur­
kish coin which the English called aspers. These 
were rated at 60 per ducat. The ducat was gener­
ally rated at 5s and sometimes at 6S8 • The lower 
figure is used above.
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Venice that during the past year the English had sent
91only one ship to that city. /no. 116/" Furthermore,
it also cannot be asserted positively that the cargo
on which customs was paid in Constantinople or Chios
was the entire cargo of the vessel. Though, to judge
from the calculated values it probably was. In March
1585 Morosini remarked that an English ship had arrived
/no. 14£/ with a cargo of cloth, tin and other goods and
that 11 the Turks are glad, for the city is almost without
92cloth for clothing11 • If there was such a shortage in 
the city the ship was probably able to unlade complete­
ly and Harbome1 s figure refers to the entire cargo. 
Likewise, in March 1586, the Venetian ambassador repor­
ted that the English ship which entered Constantinople
93with a cargo had sailed away in ballast. /no. 16g/ 
Bearing these reservations in mind it can be seen that 
during the first four years of the trade the value of 
the cargoes sent to Constantinople increased from about 
£6500 to about £11,500 with an average for the four 
ships of £9262. The low value for the Hercules in 1587 
is a reflection and confirmation of the Company's state-
91 Cal. SP Ven. 1581-91, p. 84.
92 Ibid., p. 113. 93 Ibid., p. 146.
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ment in October 1586 that it intended to severely con-
94tract its exports•
In so far as the balance of imports and exports 
is concerned in the Turkey trade the above figures con­
firm that the balance was unfavourable for England.
The imports seem to have been worth somewhere between 
£20,000 and £30,000 per vessel returning from Turkey 
and between £4000 and £5000 per vessel returning from 
Petras with mainly currants. The exports to Constanti­
nople should be valued lower than the figures based on 
Harbome1 s notes because the values of the cargoes en­
tering Constantinople were based on their customs ratings 
at that city. These were undoubtedly higher than in 
England thus making the balance even more unfavorable. 
Cargoes destined for Aleppo probably were of greater 
value than those destined for Constantinople since the 
former was the chief market place for the Turkey trade.
It is uncertain what the situation was with respect to 
Petras. It was seen above that imports from there were 
much lower in value than from further east. Although 
the Gift of God and the Mayflower were entered in the 
Port Books as from Petras only /see Appendix B/ and
94 See supra p.-Wl-This is the same Hercules whose 
return cargo in March 1588 was so valuable.
they carried mainly currants, this is no assurance that 
they had not also been further east* They both carried 
some raw silk. If they had been east to Syria they no 
doubt carried a usual cargo to Tripoly. If not the 
question of the outward cargo is not so easily solved. 
Petras, like the Venetian islands, was not much of a 
market for English goods. The Venice merchants solved 
this problem by going first either to Venice or Leghorh. 
Venice was out of bounds for the Turkey Company but Leg­
horn was not. However, none of the evidence bearing on 
the routes followed by the Turkey Company's ships indi­
cates that any of them went to Leghorn before proceeding 
to Petras. The most likely explanation is that for the 
Turkey merchants, the currant trade served the purpose 
of filling the empty holds of ships that had been un­
able to find an adequate return cargo further east.
This point was only raised for the first time some 
years later when the Levant merchants were protesting 
the imposts laid on currants by the Venetians. They 
petitioned their own government sometime in late 1603, 
for some relief from these imposts on the grounds that 
currants were "...our chiefe ballasting homewarde"•^
95 PR0:SPD James I, 10 no. 23
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An answer to this petition, denying the need to give re­
lief to the Levant Company, did not deny the point made
f,
above but, in fact, affirmed that "the trade of the Ing- 
lishe marchants in Turkey was much holpen by the bene- 
fitt of the Comithes £sic/ of Zante and Zephalonia 
bought there in the places where they grewe for the 
ballasting of there shipps, and soe consequently for 
the ease of theire freights.♦.11. In the 1580's the 
Turkey merchants did not have access to Zante and Zep-
97halonia but Petras could easily serve the same purpose.
The existence of an unfavorable balance in the 
trade raises the question of how the Company met its 
foreign debts. There were three possible means by which 
this could be accomplished though the silence of the 
Company on this matter and the lack of records make it 
impossible to be more than suggestive. They were the 
export of bullion, the transfer of funds by exchange 
directly from London to the Levant, and the transfer 
of funds to the Levant raised in other branches of for­
eign trade by individual members of the Company. The
96 PR0:SPD James I, 10 no. 27.
97 The currants from Petras were considered inferior 
to those from the two Venetian islands. The maxi­
mum amount available from there was about 400 tons 
per year in the first years of the 17th century. 
(PRO;SPD James 1, 10 no. 26.)
first means was nominally illegal and though there is 
no doubt that merchants did carry coin out of the re- 
alme and probably the Turkey merchants were not inno­
cent of the practice, it is unlikely that sizeable de­
ficits arising from an entire branch of J&iglish trade 
were settled by illegal means. It was possible, of 
course, to secure the Queen's license to export bullion 
but no such license has turned up issued to the Turkey
go
merchants•
The second means would seem to be the most likely 
method used. The bill of exchange was the standard 
means by which merchants ordinarily transferred funds 
from one place to another and changed them from one cur­
rency to another. Prof. de Hoover, however, states that 
it was unlikely there was a bill market at Constantinople. 
This is confirmed by Prof. Braudel who states that the
98 The Russia Company received at least three such lic­
enses: the first in May 1582 for the export of 1000 
lbs. weight of bullion, (EM:Cotton, Vespasian C XIV, 
f. 420) another in June 1584 for 1500 lbs. weight of 
bullion, (BM:Salis. Mss., 13, f. 48) and the third 
in June 1588 for "1500 li. in bullion and dollers1*. 
(PRO:Signet Office Docquets, vol. 1. The distinc­
tion between weight and value is not clear in this 
entry.) Prof. Willan noted the first two of the 
above licenses but not the third in Russia Company, 
p. 187.
99 Raymond de Roover, Gresham on Foreign Exchange.
1949, p. 108.
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bill of exchange is rarely found going between the Christian 
and Islamic worlds and that between Venice and Constanti­
nople only very small sums were transferred by bill.
The last means is the one which seems, from a present 
vantage point, to have been the most likely used. The 
evidence, however, all pertains to the trade of the 1590's 
and will be considered in Chapter VII. It will suffice 
to point out here that, as seen above, most members of 
the Company had trading interests elsewhere. It thus 
would be quite easy for the Company to acquire any cre­
dits raised by such trade through bills of exchange and 
then buy the necessary coins to be shipped to the Levant.
A similar technique was used by the East India Company, 
though it called on the credits raised by its own re­
exports and returned its Spanish rivals to London to 
be placed aboard its own s h i p s . T h e  evidence of the 
of the Turkey Company's re-export trade is slight. No­
thing is said of it in the patent of 1581. A year or 
so later ii is assumed by the Company that there will
100 Fernand Braudel, La Mediterranee et le Monde Med­
iterranean \ l'Epoque de Phillipe II, 2 vols..
1966, vol. I, p. 4Z3.~ —
101 K. N. Chaudhuri, "The East India Company and the 
Export of Treasure in the Early Seventeenth Cen­
tury" , Econ. HR. vol. XVI, no. 1, 1963, pp. 31 ff.
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102be re-exports. In the patent of 1592 provision is 
made for re-exports to be free of a second customs pay­
ment. Thus there must have been some re-exports in the 
interim. But whether or not they were sufficient to 
finance a large part of the Turkey trade is not known.
It is tempting to try to estimate the total value
of the Turkey Company's trade during its five years of
operation. The Company, itself, stated that it had
103paid customs of £11,359.6s during that time. But 
because no breakdown of this sum was given it must be 
assumed that it included customs both inward and out­
ward. Thus no conversions can be made to quantities 
or total official values. An analysis of the Company's 
total shipping might help but the information known is 
not detailed enough for this purpose. The Company 
stated in 1590 that it had used 19 ships which made 
27 voyages during the five years from 1583 to 1588.*^
It also gave the names of these ships and how many voy­
ages each made but it did not state where or when each 
ship went. It has been possible to identify 19 of these 
voyages definitely and several others with less certainty.
102 PRO:SPF Turkey, 1 f. 15 and BMsLans. 34 no. 64.
103 PRO;SPD Eliz.233 no. 13.
104 PR0:SPD Eliz.233 no. 13.
In a number of instances it seems to have been the 
practice for the Turkey and Venice merchants to share 
a ship* This can be seen from the lading of the May­
flower /Appendix B/ which in addition to currants in 
the name of Osborne, Stapers 6c Company, had currants 
in the name of Edward Holmden and William Garraway, both 
members of the Venice Company. The only other evidence 
which indicates that the two companies may have shared 
the same vessels is that several ships put into both 
Venetian and Turkish ports* This in itself is not 
proof that they took in lading at the Venetian ports* 
Those Turkey Company voyages which are definitely iden­
tified are all listed in the Shipping List /Appendix C/* 
They are abstracted in Table V along with those which 
have not been definitely established* It can be seen 
that the voyages are fairly evenly distributed over the 
five years* Unless the voyages for which there is no 
definite record all took place about the same time it 
would seem that the Turkey Company sent out four or 
five ships a year* This number is just under what the 
Company stated it planned to send* On 20 July 1584, 
Edward Osborne wrote to the King of Algiers complain­
ing about depredations on English shipping and request­
ing further that the Algerians M.*.would suffer us to
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TABLE V
The Turkey Company's Shipping
1582
£106/ The Susan, 300 tons, Zante, Chios, Constantinople
£112/ The Emmanuel* 200 tons, Tripoly (Syria)
1583
£115/ The T i g e r 150 tons, Tripoly (Syria)
£116/ The Charity, 130 tons, Constantinople
1584
£139/ The Jesus* 100 tons, Tripoly (Africa)
£144/ The Merchant Royal, 300 tons, Petras
£145/ The Charity, 130 tons, Petras,Constantinople
2
The Elizabeth Stokes, 120 tons, Petras
The Solomon* 130 tons, ?
The Mary Martin % 130 tons, Petras
1585
£162/ The Mary Rose. 130 tons, Scandroon
£165/ The Merchant Royal, 300 tons, Petras
£166/ The Toby, 200 tons, Constantinople
£168/ The William & John* 120 tons, Tripoly (Syria)
1586
£175/ The Toby, 200 tons, Petras
£180/ The Tiger% 150 tons, Algiers, Tunis, Alexandria
£181/ The Golden Noble, 140 tons, Algiers
TABLE V cont.
1587
£190/ The Hercules, 250 tons, Petras, Chios, Tripoly (Syria)
Cons tantinople
£191/ The Toby, 200 tons, Tripoly (Syria)
£196/ The Gift of God, 100 tons, Petras 
£198/ The Mayflower, 160 tons, Petras
SUPPLEMENT
The Toby is listed as having made four voyages alto­
gether, Therefore her other one, which has not been found 
in the sources, must have been made sometime before 1585, 
Also listed is a second voyage of the Susan, a voyage of 
the Elizabeth Cocken of 120 tons, and a voyage of the Bark 
Burr of 120 tons, none of which have turned up in the re­
cords. There is a Bark Reynolds listed by the Company, 
which also has not turned up in the records. The same ship 
£78/ was sent out by Osborne and Stapers in 1581 to Constan­
tinople. But because of the early date of that voyage it is 
uncertain if it was made under the letters patent. Similar­
ly the Company's shipping list states the Gift of God made 
two voyages. The same ship returned from Tripoly in Janu­
ary 1590 £200/ but the late date of this makes it uncertain 
if this voyage was made during the life of the letters pa­
tent. The ship also made voyages to the Mediterranean in 
1582, 1583, and 1584 £95, 128, 152/ and anyone of these 
might have taken in a Turkey Company port.
TABLE V cont.
Notes:
1 The Company listed only one voyage of the Tiger but 
two have been found. The sources leave little doubt 
that both were under Company auspices.
2 These three ships appear in the Company's list of 
its shipping. The only record found of them is a 
document printed by Hakluyt (Vol. V, pp. 280-82) 
which is a list of English ships captured by vari­
ous North African men-of-war. The document is 
dated 30 March 1585 thus the voyages listed were 
made before that but how long before is not known. 
One of those in the list is the Jesus £139/ which 
was arrested at Tripoly in 1584. In that list also 
are the three ships named by the Company in its 
shipping list. The voyages may not all have been 
in the same year. It is not known what finally be­
came of these ships though the document does give 
the names of crew members who were released. The 
other ships in Hakluyt's list, six of them, must 
have preceeded the Turkey Company's charter. Some 
of them may have had nothing to do with Osborne and 
stapers.
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use our traffique with sixe ships yerely into Turkie 
unto the dominions of the Grand Signior in peace and
safetie.**"105#
There was English shipping to the territories 
included in the Turkey Company's patent before it was 
issued* Those early voyages which have been identified 
are listed in the Shipping List but there is no way of 
knowing how complete a list this represents* Only four 
voyages are definitely established with respect to time 
and place* Those of the Prudence of London in 1579 /52/, 
tlle Providence in 1579 /no* 55/, the Vlhite Hind in 1580 
{75/, and the Bark Reynolds in 1581^^ {7%J• addition
105 Hakluyt V, 270.
106 The Bark Reynolds* Mr* David Philly, was captured 
and the means to its release presents an interesting 
story* It was returning from Constantinople in May 
1582 when it was captured by some Maltese and taken 
to that island* There, evidently the crew came under 
the suspicion of the Inquisition* How and wherj/fche 
news of its capture reached England is not known but 
on 5 July Walsingham wrote to Cobham# English am­
bassador in France, to the effect that the Queen
had written to the French king asking that he send 
a letter to the Pope in favor of the release of the 
ship* He requested that Cobham do what he could to 
speed the dispatch of the King's letter* The speed 
was necessary, said Walsingham, not only for the 
sake of the ship, goods and crew but so that "the 
parties who are interested therein may understand 
by their speddy dispatch from thence that my re­
commendation had not been unfruitful toward you 
in their behalf•••" (Cal* SP For*, 1582, p. 136)
Two weeks later Cobham had seen the King, informed
0 1 ^
there are the six ships about which Osborne wrote to the 
King of Algiers* { s e e Table V Supplement/ There may 
have been others, record of which has not survived.
The Prudence. White Hind, and Bark Reynolds are known
him of the matter of the detained ship and in turn 
had received a promise that the King would take the 
matter into consideration and do what he could*
Two days after that the King addressed a letter to 
the Pope requesting that he order the Inquisition 
to release the ship and its crew. The King ex­
plained that not only was the detention an inter­
ruption of free trade but that if the Queen's re­
quest were granted "she might on other like occas­
ions show her recognition of any pleasure done her"* 
(Ibid*, p. 211) An Englishman, William Shute, was 
given the responsibility from the beginning for 
seeing to the necessary arrangements for the re­
lease of the ship and acting as a personal cour- 
rier for messages, written and verbal, between 
London, Paris, Rome, and Malta. In Paris he re­
ceived a safe conduct from the King which relieved 
him of possible subjection to the Inquisition* He 
arrived in Rome 14 August from where he reported to 
Cobham who reported to Walsingham (Ibid*, p* 321-2) 
that the French ambassador, M. de Foix, had had audi­
ence with the Pope, delivering to him the King's let­
ters and obtaining the Pope's letter, directed to the 
Grand Master and the Inquisition at Malta, to release 
the Bark Reynolds* Shute was told in Rome that in 
June the Pope had given order for the ship to be re­
leased and, in fact, that she had already departed 
on her voyage to England* Indeed, the Grand Master 
of Malta issued a safe conduct to the ship on 12 
July* (Hakluyt V, 217) But there was some doubt 
if it had actually been released and there was no 
news from Malta because of interrupted communica­
tions* Shute thus was to leave for the island on 
21 August* That is the last that is heard of the 
matter in the surviving record* When the ship was 
actually released and when it arrived in England 
are not known*
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to have been wholly or partially freighted by Osborne 
and Stapers. About the others nothing is known*
The total tonnage sent out by the Company, accord­
ing to its list was 4620 tons or an average of 924 tons
per year* It can be seen from the cargoes listed in 
Appendix B that the above quantity of cargo was probably 
not often realised* The cargoes from Syria were high in
value but relatively low in bulk thus the desire and need
to fill the holds with the currants of Petras* Evidently 
this was only done with those ships which had very small 
cargoes, such as the Gift of God and the Mayflower* It 
is interesting to note, apropos of the Company's claim 
that it maintained so many large ships, that only a 
little more than half of the 4620 tons of shipping was 
accounted for by ships of 160 tons burden and above*
Seven of the 19 ships were of that size and only five 
of them were 200 tons or larger. This need have had 
no effect oxjfche value of the trade for reasons given 
above but it does throw doubts on the Company's claims 
about its invaluable services to the Queen's navy* Ac­
tually the Venice Company used more large ships than 
did the Turkey Company* None of the above discussion 
of the Company's shipping makes it possible to arrive 
at an estimate of the total value of the trade* There
is enough detail about cargoes to arrive at some con­
clusions about voyages following particular routes*
But there is simply not enough known about each voyage 
listed to make possible the application of this detail 
in enough cases to estimate a total* For example the 
Merchant Royal of 300 tons burden £144/ is listed as 
having gone only to Petras* Did it actually lade 300 
tons of currants or did it also make port in other 
places? In the following year the same ship £165/ put 
into both Zante and Tripoly in Syria* How much of its 
cargo belonged to the Venice merchants? The Charity 
of 130 tons burden £145/ in 1585 put into both Petras 
and Constantinople* How was its cargo divided between 
currants and other commodities? Such problems are raised 
with most of the voyages listed and without the answers 
to them no meaningful estimate can be made of the Turkey 
Company's total trade* What does seem probable9 however, 
is that whatever this total trade was, it did not fill 
the holds of the Company's ships with goods from the 
Asian markets* The Company had to supplement its re­
gular cargoes with currants* This need raised the 
question of relations with the Venice Company which 
controlled the main source of currants* There is evi­
dence that from early on, the two companies, aside from
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sharing cargo space on the same ships, were attempting 
to make use of each others markets* This is especially 
true of the Turkey Company which tried to persuade the 
English government to extend its monopoly to include 
that of the Venice Company* Ultimately the two com­
panies combined to form the Levant Company* But be­
fore going into all the problems involved in the for­
mation of that company an examination of the Venice 
Company, itself, is in order*
0^3
CHAPTER V 
THE VENICE COMPANY
Venice is not Asia and the Venetian trade was not 
Asian trade; yet, in several respects, the histories of 
the Turkey and Venice Companies are inseparable. The 
Levant Company of 1591 was an amalgamation of the two 
earlier companies; many of the most important Levant 
merchants of the early 17th century had previously been 
members of the Venice Company; trade with the Venetian 
territories was to be a very important part of the total 
trade of the Levant Company; and, finally, the problem 
of impositions on imports from the Venetian Islands, 
which was confronted first by the Venice Company, was 
to be a cause of the revocation of the Levant Company's 
charter in 1599. Thus the history of the Venice Company 
cannot be ignored if one wishes to understand the Eliza­
bethan Levant trade.
The documentation that survives provides almost 
entirely an external history of the Venice Company. 
Knowledge of its internal history, other than that it 
was a regulated company and a few generalisations which 
will be taken up further on, is largely out of reach to 
the modem historian. This lack of knowledge is the 
case with all the regulated companies simply because
their internal history is the history of the activities 
of individual merchants rather than of the company it­
self and can only be known through these merchants1 priv­
ate papers - none of which survive. The external history 
of regulated companies, as well as joint stock companies, 
of the 16th century is largely the history of the relat­
ions between the particular company, the English govern­
ment, and the government of the territory to which the 
company traded. The evidence of such relations appears, 
to one degree or another, in the public records and is 
thus available to the historian. In the case of the 
Venice Company this record concerns itself with con­
flicting monopolies, diplomatic relations between Eng­
land and Venice, and, most important of all, the issue 
of impositions laid on English merchants1 imports into 
the Venetian dominions and retaliatory impositions laid 
on the Venetian merchants1 imports into England. ^
1 Very little has been written about the Venice Com­
pany. The most complete account is in Edward P.
Cheyney, A History of England from the Defeat of 
the Armada to the"Death of Elizabeth. 1 vols.. 1914; 
vol. I. pp. 3&5-89. Lipson in The Economic History 
of England. 3 vols., 1931, mentions the company in 
two paragraphs (vol. 2 p. 337). Rowland, op. cit., 
pp. 72, 74-75, gives more space but concerns him­
self exclusively with the union of the Venice and 
Turkey Companies. Foster, England's Quest, gives no serious
In April 1581 a group of English merchants who 
had been conducting a trade to Venice and the Venetian 
islands complained to the Privy Council that the Vene­
tians had recently placed new imposts upon currants 
and olive oil exported by Englishmen and upon kerseys, 
tin, and cloth imported by Englishmen, which imposts 
were detrimental to the traffic with those parts. In 
explanation for the Venetian action they offered that 
"All which© we suppose to be done by the practize and 
instigation of certaine Italion Merchant© now being. ••>i. 
The certain Italian to whom they referred was Acer bo 
Velutelli, a merchant of Lucca, resident in London.
They attributed to him provocation of the Venetians 
because in November 1575 he was granted, by letters 
patent, a monopoly of the import into England of all 
currants and olive oil coming from the dominions of the
attention to the subject. The two histories of the 
Levant Company also have very little to say about 
the Venice Company. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 20-24, 
gives a brief summary, much of it inaccurate and 
Wood, op. cit., pp. 18-19, devotes only two para­
graphs to the subject, based on Cheyney, Lipson, 
and Rowland. None of these accounts goes much be­
yond a superficial use of some of the State Papers 
Domestic of Elizabeth and James I. Cheyney, in his 
notes, cites every relevant document in those col­
lections and some in others but his text does not 
show that these were examined in detail.
2 PRO:SPD Eliz. 149 no. 58.
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Signoria of Venice. It was this patent, in the view 
of the English merchants, which led to the Venetian 
imposts of 1581.
The patent in question was dated 8 November 1575
q
but was effective from 15 October just preceeding. It 
begins with the statement that the currants and salad 
oil of Zante, Candia, ZephaIonia, and Petrasse are im­
ported only by strangers and in strangers1 bottoms; and 
that these currants and oil are "spente rather for wan- 
toness then for any neede'1. It then proceeds to provide 
that Acerbo Velutelli shall have the sole right to im­
port currants and salad oil into the realm of England 
for then years with the usual proviso that violators 
would be subject to forfeiture of their goods. It re­
quires of Velutelli that he pay alien customs and that 
he sell the currants and oil as a wholesaler only - 
not as a retailer. The patent expressly forbids cus­
tomers and other officers of English ports to permit 
entry of any such goods in any name other than Velu­
telli *s or his servants1, factors1, or assigns1; and, 
further requires the Treasurer and barons of the Ex­
chequer, upon Velutelli's request, to issue writs to port
3 PROsPat. Roll 17 Eliz. pt. I. This patent has nowhere 
been transcribed but there is a summary of it in EM:
Lans. 112 f. 156.
officials, commanding them not to make entry of currants 
and salad oil except in the name of Velutelli or his 
servants1, factors', and assigns'. It was almost as 
if the author of the patent was expecting some resi­
stance to its provisions. The patent concluded with 
the provision that if the grant should prove detrimen­
tal to the realm, then, effective^, from the time of 
notification, it would be void.
Though this patent conferred on its recipient a 
monopoly of the import of certain commodities there is 
nothing in it which creates a company or which even 
assumes that the recipient is going to engage in ac­
tive trade. It states simply that currants and olive 
oil are to be brought into England only in the name of 
Acerbo Velutelli. It gives the impression of being a 
simple grant of royal favor rather than of meeting the 
legitimate needs of a group of serious merchants. In 
this sense it bears closer resemblance to the licenses 
for the export of unfinished cloth granted to favored 
courtiers than it does to the letters patent which 
gave status to the leading mercj&antile trading companies 
It might well be asked why Queen Elizabeth was prompted 
to grant such a favor, to an alien merchant, at a time 
when English merchants, with the support of their govern
aa*
ment, were trying so hard to free their import and ex­
port trades from dependence on foreign merchants.
Two explanations stand out. The first is that 
the letters patent do represent a grant of royal favor, 
not to Acerbo Velutelli but to the Earl of Leicester.
There is no doubt that it was Leicester who prompted 
the grant initially and who supported it afterwards in
the Privy Council. Fifteen years later Leicester was
4
said to have been the means to this grant. Greater 
certainty on this comes from correspondence between 
the Venetian Senate and Giovanni Morosini, the Venetian 
ambassador in Paris, and between Morosini and an infor­
mant of his in London. In December 1575, immediately
upon learning of the grant to Velutelli, the Signory
5
instructed Morosini to do what he could about it.
Morosini's informant in London, Diogene Franceschini, 
wrote that it was the Earl of Leicester and Sir Francis 
Walsingham who opposed any effort to revoke the privi- 
lege. Morosini also approached, Dale, the English 
ambassador in Paris, to enlist his aid. He reported 
to Veftice that though Dale was apparently effusive in
4 PRO:SPD Eliz. 232 no. 33.
5 Cal. SP Ven., 1558-80, p. 542.
6 Ibid., p. 545. There is no other referance to Wal­
singham 's support of this patent.
£21/}
agreeing with Morosini that the privilege was unjust 
and to the detriment of both the Venetians and the 
English and he was certain that it would be revoked, 
he, nevertheless, excused himself from taking an active 
part in the issue for fear it might seem he was picking 
a quarrel with Leicester.^ In March, Franceschini, 
again wrote to Morosini that Leicester does all in his
o
power to sustain Velutelli's patent*
The second explanation is that the Queen was using
this grant as a diplomatic lever to pry from the Vene-
tians an official representative at her court* The
last Venetian ambassador left England on 5 July 1557
and from then until 1602 no Venetian was officially
o
accredited to Elizabeth's court. The Queen was greatly 
disappointed and irritated Iy this * feelings which pro­
bably stemmed from reasons of personal and national 
pride rather than from any dictates of foreign policy* 
Elizabeth's feeling was conveyed to Morosini by Ambas­
sador Dale in January 1576* According to the Venetian, 
Dale told him that the Queen was "much grieved" that no 
Venetian ambassador had been accredited to her and it 
was his opinion that when this was done the matter of
7 Ibid., p. 546, 8 Ibid., p. 547. 9 Ibid., vii
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Velutelli* s privilege would be more easily resolved.
This same condition for facilitating the revocation 
of the patent was repeated in Morosini*s letters to 
the Signory in February, April, June, and August.
Finally, in December, in the last letter mentioning 
Velutelli*s patent, Morosini wrote to the Signory that 
**if you do not take steps to please the Queen, the ne­
gotiation will go forward, and once the privilege ha& 
been established it will be useless to think of obtain­
ing its revocation1*.^
The evidence presented here does not support the 
suggestion that Queen Elizabeth made the grant to Vel­
utelli with the thought in mind beforehand that it would 
provide a means to force an ambassador from the Venetians. 
It is more likely that once the opposition became appar­
ent she decided to take advantage of it by not giving in 
without first receiving what she wanted. There is no 
known evidence on this particular point and thus it can 
only be speculative. It is certain, however, that Lei­
cester was instrumental in initiating the grant, that 
the Venetians objected to it, and that the Queen resisted 
their objections, in part, at least, in an effort to per­
suade Venice to accredit an ambassador to her court.
10 Ibid., p. 542.
11 Ibid., pp. 546, 548, 550, 551, and 552.
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Leicester's reasons for advocating Velutelli's 
monopoly are no where made explicit* He no doubt stood 
to make a profit from it but there is no extant evi­
dence bearing on any financial relation he may have 
had with Velutelli* The connection between the two 
men goes back at least as far as December 1569 when 
Leicester sent Velutelli to perform a service for the
12government with respect to another Italian in London.
In 1571 Velutelli wrote to Leicester asking for his aid 
in some commercial matters* Furthermore Velutelli had 
occasion to do a service for Leicester's nephew, Philip 
Sidney. Apparently Velutelli advanced about £160 to 
Sidney in 1572 when the latter was travelling over­
seas. Again in 1574 and 1575 he advanced a total of 
£784*10*8 for Sidney's use*^ What connection these 
facts may have had with Velutelli's letters patent is 
not known but they at least indicate that Leicester 
as well as members of his family were acquainted with 
him and had reason to feel some obligation to him.
Though the Earl of Leicester was able to block 
the revocation of Velutelli's patent he did not succeed
12 Cal. SP Span. 1568-79, p* 213.
13 HMC:Cal. De L'Isle and Dudley Mss., vol. 1, p. 247 
and p* 272.
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in preventing some alteration in its terms. The patent 
had been issued on 8 November and before the month was 
out the Court of Aldermen of the City of London appoin­
ted a committee of its members to look into the matter
and determine the validity of the patent and what harm
14to the city might grow from it. The outcome of this 
was a long paper containing 32 reasons why the grounds 
for granting the patent were unsound and why it would
15be "inconvenient and hurtful to the Realme of England". 
Armed with this the Aldermen then decided, on 10 Decem­
ber, to send a delegation to the Court "to solycite the 
case, and delyver notes to the Counsellors privately 
and after to the bodye of the Counsell".^ The Council 
evidently failed to act on the matter for on 5 June 1576 
the Aldermen again met and ordered another delegation to 
go to court to renew their suit to have Velutelli's let­
ters patent revoked. ^  Whether the Privy Council ever 
did anything about this matter is not made clear. Ac­
cording to the correspondence of Morosini, Leicester 
successfully blocked any action being taken by the
14 Corporation of London Record Office, Reportories of 
the Court of Alderman, vol. 19, f. 15: hereafter 
cited as Reportories.
15 BM:Lans. 112 no. 49. 16 Reportories, 19, f. 20.
17 Reportories, 19, f. 84.
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government* According to an account of this affair 
given by members of the Venice Company in May 1590 it
18was the Court of Aldermen that effected a compromise*
The Lord Mayor, Ambrose Nicholas, called the various 
merchants before the Court to present their cases and 
finally Velutelli agreed - by what persuasion is not 
said - he would exempt English merchants from the pro­
visions of his privilege and it would henceforth apply 
only to the foreign merchants importing currants and 
olive oil. In addition the English demanded that 
Velutelli import only in English bottoms during the 
next four years, that during the next year he sell 
currants and oil at fixed prices, and that he enter
into a bond for £3000 for thefcerformance of these pro- 
19visos. On the whole Velutelli agreed to these con­
ditions objecting only that there might be occasions 
when English bottoms were not available and also that
to fix his prices might damage his business if purchase
20prices were to rise above a reasonable level. There 
is no evidence which indicates to what extent these 
conditions were met in practice* English merchants, how-
18 PR0;SPD Eliz* 232 no* 33* There is nothing in the
Reportories on this phase of the affair*
19 BM: Add. 48020 f. 377v. 20 PROiSPD Eliz. 165 no. 59.
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ever, were exempted from the restriction of the patent.
Though there are no accounts clarifying the de­
tails of Velutelli's activities under the provisions 
of the letters patent, there seems to be no question 
that he did not, himself, actively import more than a 
small amount of currants and oil. If his critics are 
to be believed he never intended to engage in the trade, 
himself. Instead he compounded with the foreign mer­
chants - mainly Venetian - importing currants and oil, 
by way of raising an impost on their goods. In an ac­
count of these events written in 1590 this impost was
given as 2s to 2s6^ per hundredweight on currants with
21
no figure given for oil.
The Venetian merchants were not pleased with 
being required to pay an impost but there was nothing 
they could do about it by themselves. However, the 
Doge and Senate of the Venetian state were not power­
less and on 26 January 1581 promulgated a decree levying 
certain imposts on the imports and exports of all foreign 
merchants. These levies related only to the trade of 
Zante and Zephalonia and not to Venice, itself; further,
21 PROzSPD Eliz. 232 no. 33; another reference to Velu­
telli fs impost is in PRO:SPD Eliz. 165 no. 63, which 
dates from about 1583.
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they related only to those goods exported to or imported
from "the west partes" and not to and from Venice. The
new tax on exports amounted to 10 dcs. on a thousand
weight of currants and 6 dcs. on a butt of wine. On
imports from England the tax was 2 dcs. on a kersey,
7 dcs. on a broadcloth, 20 dcs. on a thousand weight
22of tin, and 30 dcs. on the same quantity of wool.
For purposes of persuading the English government 
to take action against Velutelli*s patent, the English 
merchants placed a narrow interpretation on these im­
positions, attributing them to a retaliation against 
the imposts raised by Velutelli. But as the event re- 
ceeded the explanation of its causes broadened. In 
about 1585 added to the above explanation was that 
"...this was done to cut awaie our Englishe navigacion
from thers which by our Industry was at that time greatly 
23increased". By 1590 the Venice Company in a summary 
of the matter made for the benefit of Lord Burghley 
was able to encompass several reasons in one brief ’ 
statement. "The cause of whie theis great ympositions 
weare levied as wee thincke was to cutt off and over- 
throwe our shipping and maryners which did at that tyme
22 BM:Add. 48126 f. 173; a copy in Italian, of the origi­
nal is on f. 191. When the English raised retaliatory 
imposts they rated the ducat at 5s.
23 PR0:SPD Eliz. 185 no. 51.
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not a little increase and their shipping decaye, of which 
their shipping thei have great care, of some showe thei 
had of Acerbo his license as also greved at the XXs per 
butt to my Lord of Lecester but that XXs a butt we paie 
as well as thei..."^ This is certainly the most balan­
ced and probably the most accurate statement of what lay 
behind the impositions of 1581. There can be little 
doubt that the Venetians were motivated by broader con­
siderations than Velutellifs patent. A fact which pro­
bably explains why the anullment of that patent failed 
to bring about a lifting of the impositions. The period 
around 1580 was a difficult one for Venice. The War of 
Cyprus and the Sack of Antwerp served to deplete the 
Venetian mercantile fleet and sever the overland route 
to northern markets. At the same time - and possibly 
for those reasons - the English began making direct 
voyages to the Venetian Islands for currants, oil, and 
wine, usually eliminating Venice, itself, from their 
route. The decree of 1581, then, was intended to serve 
the purpose of encouraging trade with Venice by penaliz­
ing those who went directly to and from the islands of 
Zante, Cephlonia, and Candia. No doubt its timing was 
influenced by Velutelli*s impositions. No doubt, also,
24 PR0:SPD Eliz. 233 no. 14.
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its timing was influenced by the fact that, in 1580,
14 English merchant ships descended upon the Venetian 
islands for trade; an event which must have brought 
home to the Venetians the size and seriousness of Eng­
lish competition. Though the levy of these impositions 
does not seem to have seriously affected English trade, 
the merchants involved, did their best to have the im­
post removed.
The decree of 1581 provoked an immediate reaction
from the English merchants which resulted finally in
the letters patent granted to the Venice Company. In
London the existence of the decree was known by at least
late spring 1581. At that time the merchants addressed
the Privy Council with a complaint about the deleterious
effect it would have on their trade. No specific action
was proposed by the merchants in the complaint; their
desire was "to grave the premises in your honourable
remembrince and so to informe the Queenes most excellent
Maiestie of the causes with your grave advices that con-
25venient remedy...maye be provided"• In September the
Queen wrote to the Doge requesting that he give consider-
25 BM:Add. 48126 f. 172. Another copy of this petition 
is in PR0:SPD Eliz. 149 no. 58 and is dated June 
1581.
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ation to several of her subjects whose goods were being 
held in the Venetian islands in lieu of their payment 
of the new imposts* The rationale for the request was 
that the merchants in question had initiated their voy­
ages and had committed their capital before they knew
about the decree, therefore they should not, on this
26occasion, be subject to its provisions* This letter
also offers the first evidence in the extant record of
any of the names of the English merchants involved in
this trade* It refers to Paul Banning, Edward Holmden,
•'and others of their company11 • A subsequent letter,
written a few months later, adds the name Richard Glas- 
9 7cock. ' All three of these merchants appear later as 
members of the Venice Company* There is no surviving 
evidence that suggests the Venetians ever gave to these 
merchants the considerations asked for by the Queen* 
However, in August 1582, after some further correspon­
dence on this point, the Venetians agreed that they 
would lift their impost of January 1581 if Elizabeth 
would revoke the impost that was being collected by Vel- 
lutelli. This was followed by a petition to the 
Council from the English merchants involved which re-
26 BM:Add. 48126 f. 175. 27 Ibid., f. 178.
28 Ibid., f. 203.
hearsed the history of these imposts and requested that
29Velutelli1s patent be revoked. Sometime between August 
and December 1582 this issue was again raised in a memo­
randum - probably submitted to Burghley - which, in 
addition to asking for the revocation of Velutelli*s 
patent, requested that the Queen grant to the English 
merchants involved a monopoly for six years of the im­
port of oil, currants, and wines coming from the dominions 
of the Signory of Venice. This request is followed by a 
recommendation that if the Venetians do not lift their 
impost and do not restore to the English merchants the 
impost money they had paid since January 1581, that then 
all foreign merchants be prohibited from importing cur-
30rants, wine, or oil coming from the Venetian territories. v 
At about the same time the above papers were written the 
English merchants also submitted another in which they 
not only asked for the revocation of Velutelli"s grant 
but gave reasons for their views. They referred back 
to the original letters patent in which one reason given 
for the grant was that the currants and oil brought into 
the realm represented a needless luxury. This the Eng-
29 PRO:SPD Eliz. 165 no. 163.
30 PR0:SPD Eliz. 165 nos. 60 and 61. These are essenti­
ally the same but with slightly different wordings.
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11 sh merchants denied. A more important argument was
that though the patent licensed Velutelli, alone, to
import these commodities he had not done so. Rather,
tinder the authority of his license he had placed an
impost on these commodities imported by other foreign
merchants. The argument goes on in terms of national
interest emphasizing that the license is detrimental
to the maintenance of large merchant ships and that it
encourages foreign merchants rather than English merchants.
Finally reference is made to the last decree from Venice,
which agreed to the mutual suspension of the imposts,
31urging that the Queen act on this.
.................................................. 3 0 .........................Velutelli answered these charges ** by saying that
his license did not inhibit English shipping but, in 
fact, 14 ships had been built for the trade by the Eng­
lish merchants since the license began. It is worth 
noting, apropos of this point, that the English, them­
selves, in one of their earlier complaints about Velu­
telli, listed the names and burdens of 14 ships they
33were then - April 1581 - using in the Venetian trade.
31 PRO:Spd Eliz. 165 no. 62.
32 Ibid., no. 64 and BM:Cotton Mss. Vespasian FIX ff. 
218v-221.
33 PRO:SPD Eliz. 149 no. 58.
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He also denied that he had not engaged in the trade him­
self and cited five ships he freighted for £ante during 
the first three years of his patent. However, by his
34own testimony only one of them returned with currants.
If these were the only ships Velutelli could cite as 
having been freighted by himself during the seven years 
of his patent then it would seem that the English mer­
chants had the better part of that point in the argument. 
There is no evidence aside from his own statement that 
Velutelli actually did import currants and oil in his 
own name. In response to the English argument that Velu­
telli (s patent encouraged foreign shipping at the expense 
of English, he stated that during the past three years
34 The only one of these ships which can be identified 
with any certainty is the Primrose which sailed in 
1577 and made the return with currants £28/ The 
other four, according to Velutelli, were all ships 
owned by John Hawkins. In the first year of the 
patent two ships went out. They learned at Naples 
that the currants had all been bought up by Vene­
tians and Greeks so they took a return cargo in 
alum on which Velutelli claimed he lost £500. In 
the second year two ships again went out laded with 
herring but one was wrecked near Dover and the,other 
did not continue the voyage. Velutelli claimed he 
lost £700 on that venture. That the second of these 
two ships should not continue the voyage seems strange 
and the statement raises some doubt about the accuracy 
of Velutelli's account. Perhaps the most interesting 
point made by him about these voyages was that in 1577 
Francis Drake was “appoynted by him /Hawkins/ for that 
voyadge11.
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only the English imported any currants and olive oil.
If this were so, one might wonder why they were so con­
cerned about Velutelli's license since it obviously did 
not interfere with their trade. There are two probable 
answers. One, clearly, is that the English merchants 
hoped that if Elizabeth called in Velutelli's license, 
and thus, in effect, lifted the imposition he was charg­
ing, the Venetians would lift their impositions of 
January 1581. The other reason, is that the English 
merchants wished to have a monopoly of the currant and 
oil trade for themselves and this was not possible while 
Velutelli's monopoly was still in force.
The Queen found favor with the position of her
own subjects and on 21 December 1582 issued an order
35calling in Velutelli's letters patent. The reason 
given for the revocation was that the Venetians had 
promised to revoke their new impost if Velutelli's lic­
ense were annulled. Probably a reference to the decree 
of August 1582. In this same order the Queen also re­
35 PRO:Spd Eliz. 155 no. 110. The day and month of 
the year are left blank in this copy leaving only 
"..•1582. In the XXVth yere of our Rejn". How­
ever, in the next year Velutelli wrote to Walsing- 
ham complaining that his license was revoked on
21 December 1582 but he was not notified until 
several months later. (Gal. SP For. 1583-4, p. 291.)
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stricted the trade with Venice to those English subjects 
who had been engaged in that trade. This restriction 
was to be effective for no more than four years. Vene­
tian subjects, however, were expressly permitted to 
trade freely, as they had done before Velutelli's patent, 
until such time as the action of the Venetian senate with 
respect to the new impost became known. This last pro­
viso would seem to have been by way of a gesture to the 
Venetians encouraging them to take favorable action on 
the matter. As compensation to Velutelli for the time 
remaining of his license the English merchants paid him 
£1000.36
On 17 April 1583, within four months of issuing
this order, the Queen replaced it, making some modifi-
37cations, with the more formal royal letters patent.
This patent deals with two related issues, a monopoly 
of trade to the Venetian territories and the question 
of Venetian merchants trading to England. It takes
36 This payment is referred to in BM:Add. 48126 f. 195; 
PR0:SPD Eliz. 177 no. 55, 185 no. 51, 232 no. 33 and 
229 no. 95. On the latter of these documents Burgh- 
ley noted in reference to Velutelli's patent that 
"Cordell bought the 2 yers remaining for which they 
playd to hym lmL ..."
37 PRQ:Pat. Roll 25 Eliz. pt. 2. Contemporary transcrip­
tions of it are in PR0:SPD Eliz. 160 no* 10 and BM: 
Cotton Mss. Vespasian FIX f. 259.
them up separately and deals with them in such a way as 
to make each independent of any changes in the circum­
stances surrounding the other. The patent first estab­
lishes a monopoly of English trade with the Venetian 
dominions in the name of Thomas Cordell and thirteen 
other merchants. The preamble gives as reasons for 
this action that those involved had invested consider­
able sums of money in ships and goods in order to main­
tain and continue the trade; that the ships used in this 
trade and the mariners who sail them are fit for the ser­
vice of the realm; that the trade returns many commodi­
ties useful to the commonwealth; and finally, that until 
the grantees began to follow this trade it was entirely 
in the hands of foreign merchants using foreign ships 
which was of no profit to the realm. Therefore for the 
relief and benefit of the merchants they are granted a 
monopoly of the trade by sea, both inward and outward, 
with the Venetian dominions to last for six years. All 
other English merchants were expressly forbidden to fol­
low this trade by sea unless it be ,fby and withe the 
expresse license consent and agreement of the saide 
Thomas Cordell & Co.11. The patent gave the merchants 
the right to assemble for the purpose of making laws 
and ordinances for the conduct of the trade providing
s m s
they did not violate English law and custom. They were 
not, however, incorporated nor were they given a company 
name. In the patent the £>urteen merchants are referred 
to simply as ,fThomas Cordell & Co.'1. In subsequent do­
cuments they are referred to, either by themselves or 
by others, by that name or as the "merchants trading 
the dominions of the Signoria of Venice" or the "companie 
trading Venice" or the "Venice merchants". The Desig­
nation "Venice Company" used by subsequent historians 
of this trade, seems not to have been used by contempo­
raries of it.
The second issue, that of the Venetian merchants 
trading to England, is introduced by what amounts to 
another preamble. This makes a simple and objective 
statement to the effect that over and above the usual 
customs, the Signoria of Venice had lately placed cer­
tain impositions, on English goods coming to their dom­
inions as well as on the goods carried from their dom­
inions by English subjects; and that these impositions 
are a hindrance to the trade and if some remedy is not 
taken it will be to the detriment of the Realm and of 
the merchants involved. It then goes on to rule that 
for these reasons the subjects of the Signoria of Venice, 
as well as all other strangers, will henceforth be pro­
hibited, during the term of six years, from bringing 
into the Realm, currants, oil or wine from the Venetian 
dominions "unless it be by and withe the licence and 
agreements of the saide Thomas Cordell 6c Co*11. How­
ever, the patent provides that this restriction will 
be lifted if the Venetian imposts are lifted and if 
the English merchants are recompensed for all impost 
money they have paid since January 1581.
The above policy concerning Venetian merchants 
represents a near reversal of that stated in the order 
calling in Velutelli's patent. In the former, the Vene­
tians were allowed to trade freely with England until 
such time as Venetian action with respect to the im­
posts became clear. Now, four months later, the Vene­
tians were expressly excluded from the trade with England. 
The implication is that some knowledge of Venetian action, 
following upon the August 1582 decree and unfavorable to 
the English cause, became known in England. However, no 
evidence of such knowledge or of such action has come to 
light* It is true that Venetian action was to be un­
favorable to the English but this was not known at the 
time the letters patent were issued. There is no record 
of any ships which might have arrived in the Mediterranean
after August 1582 and returned before April 1583 to make
<3.47
an unfavorable report with respect to the latest Venetian
decree* It is possible, of course, that such a ship or
ships did sail and there is no known record of it* It
is also possible that the timing of some of the ships
that are known was different than that recorded in the
Shipping List.
The decree of August 1582 was probably brought to
England by two Venetian ships which arrived at about 
38that time. In the November or January following the
date of the decree the English freighted several ships
for the Venetian islands with the expectation that no
39impost would be levied on their imports or exports.
The Venetian merchants in the meantime had petitioned
the Privy Council to release them from the impost charged
by Velutelli because the Senate had agreed to do the same
40for English merchants. The English government probably 
to avoid making a definite decision about a matter not 
yet clear, required the Venetians to enter bonds, pay­
able to Velutelli, which would become void if the Vene­
tians actually did lift the imposts. On 16 December 1582, 
a week before Velutelli's license was called in, the Coun­
cil ordered Customer Thomas Snythe, who held the bonds,
38 EM:Add. 48126 f. 214. 39 BM:Add. 48126 f. 205.
40 PR0:Spd Eliz. 146 no. 55.
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to alter them so that they were payable to the Venice
41Company merchants. When the Venice Company^ ships, 
which departed from England in November and January, 
arrived in the Venetian islands they found they would 
have to pay the impost despite the decree of 1582.
It is not known when these ships returned to Eng­
land with the report of their treatment by the Venetians. 
However, sometime in the middle or later part of 1583, 
the Venice merchants offered Burleigh and Walsingham 
a generous financial reward if they would use their
influence in obtaining a settlement with Venice favor-
42able to the English merchants. The terms of this
offer were three in number. If the Venetians lifted
their impost and repaid the money the English merchants
had so far been charged then they would pay rthis honor
and your worshipe1* 1000 marks. If the Venetians did
not do this then the Venice merchants were to charge
a similar impost on the goods recently arrived on three
43Venetian ships in which case they would pay one-third 
of the amount collected to **his honor and your worshipe11. 
Finally, **to have his honor and your worshipps lawfull 
favour...11 they agreed to pay to them one-third of all
41 EM:Add. 48126 f. 182. 42 EM:Add. 48126 f. 194.
43 A third ship had arrived about May 1583. (Ibid. f. 207.)
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profit they earned by virtue of their letters patent.
This last part seems unnecessarily generous. There is 
no evidence to indicate how this offer was received of 
even if it was received.
The Queen wrote to the Doge on 20 April 1584 to 
complain about the treatment her subjects had received 
even after the decree of August 1582.^ There is no 
reason to suppose this letter was the result of any 
extraordinary pressure from Burleigh or Walsingham which 
might have resulted from their acceptance of the Venice 
merchant's financial offer. In December the Doge re­
plied explaining that the fault lay with the governor 
of Zante who had collected the impost without further 
authority from himself. He further stated that the news 
of the letters patent of April 1583 excluding his mer­
chants from the trade led him to doubt the Queen's in­
tentions but with her last letter he is now assured that 
the Venetians will not be burdened greater than any other 
merchants. Consequently, the governors of the Venetian 
islands will be ordered that as soon as they are infor­
med that the impositions in England have been removed 
then the imposts in the islands will also be removed
44 Cal. SP For., 1583-4 p. 463.
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and the English will receive back the amount they paid
on merchandize brought to Zante before they had notice
of the decree of 1581 This letter was accompanied
by a copy of the order to the above effect directed to
46the governors of the Venetian islands. Elizabeth was 
not satisfied with this explanation and in reply, writ­
ten in March 1585,^ she stated that she had not taken 
ready money from the Venetian merchants but only re­
quired that they enter into bonds. She then reiterated 
that when the Venetian imposts have been removed and 
when the English have had returned to them all the impost 
money they have paid then the Venetian merchants in London 
will be discharged of their bonds.
This was the last of the correspondence between 
the Queen and the Doge during the life of the Venice 
Company. The positions of the two parties left the 
situation in a deadlock. The Doge offered to return 
the amount of impost paid before the English merchants 
had knowledge of the decree of January 1581. The Queen 
insisted that all impost money be repaid. This differ­
ence might have been negotiable; however, each party 
was willing to move on the matter only after receiving
45 Cal. SP For;, 1584-5, p. 163. 46 Ibid., p. 163
47 Ibid., p. 351.
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positive assurance that the other party had moved first* 
Thus the Venetian impost were not removed.^
Some years after these events the issue of im­
positions on currants again became a matter of public 
discussion and led to the revocation of the Levant 
Company's letters patent of 1592* The issue then was 
that the Levant Company was levying an imposition on 
all currants imported by non-members and that this was 
not authorized by the Company's letters patent. A pre­
cedent for such an imposition was set by the Venice Com­
pany sometime after it received its patent in April 1583. 
There is no official record of this imposition or of its 
authorization. However, there is sufficient unofficial 
reference to it to confirm that an imposition matching 
the one in the Venetian Islands was levied in England.
It came about, apparently, because the Venice Company 
asked the government to authorize it, though they did 
so indirectly. In late 1585 the Company complained to 
Burghley that the Venetians had not lifted their im­
positions as had been agreed in the previous correspon-
49dence between the Doge and the Queen. They stated
48 There is no evidence which indicates whether or 
not the Venetian merchants in London were finally 
required to forfeit their bonds.
49 PRO:SPD Eliz. 185 no. 51.
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that their letters patent provided that if the Signoria 
did not annull the late imposition then the English were 
to have a similar imposition upon the subjects and goods 
of the Venetian. They did not actually ask, in so many 
words, that such an imposition be imposed but simply 
asked that "your honour have tender consideration of 
us19. However, in case the point should escape his honor, 
they stated, at the end of the document, that in the 
time of Henry VII the Venetians had laid an impost on 
their wines to which that king replied by having an act 
passed in Parliament which levied an impost on wines 
imported to England by any strangers and which act was 
to remain in force until the Venetians lifted their 
impost.
The point that the letters patent provide for a 
levy of a retaliatory impost represents, at best, a con­
siderable stretching of the wording of the patent. The 
closest anything in the patent comes to such an idea is 
the statement that Thomas Cordell and Company could 
license those not of their company to import currants, 
wine or oil.^ Though there is evidence that the Com­
pany made use of this provision it was not the same
50 The act referred to is 7 Henry VII c. 7.
51 See supra pp. <2_W, <2^ ^*
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thing as an official retaliatory impost. In the finan­
cial offer made by the Company to Burghley and Walsing- 
ham, the second point concerned such an impost specifi­
cally on the goods in three Venetian ships. It would 
be so easy to stretch this, once accepted, to an impost 
on goods imported by Venetians in general. It is not 
unlikely that the financial offer mentioned above and 
the eventual levy of the desired impost were closely 
related.
Despite the lack of any official record of author­
ization of this impost there is no doubt that it was 
levied with the acquiesence of the government. In several 
memoranda written shortly after the expiration of the 
Venice Company*s charter there are accounts comparing 
the amount of customs and imposts paid by English and
Venetian merchants in both England and the Venetian
52territories. In one of these, dated Hay 1590, among
the duties paid by Venetian merchants in England is 30s
"for newe imposte Raysed by the Signoria of venis in
53anno 1580". In another and more detailed account 
written about the same time there again appears the 
above statement and in addition the statement that
52 PR0:SPD Eliz. 232 no. 33. 53 PR0:SPD Eliz. 229 no. 95.
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Venetians pay in England 50s on a thousand weight of 
currants 11 for ympost in Anno 1580 because they have 
raised the like uppon all straungers in their domyn- 
ions". At the end of this latter paper there is a sec­
tion reiterating that the Venetians also laid impost 
on certain imported English goods but that
"The Queenes Majestie hathe reised onlie 
the six duckats of a Butt of wine and tenne 
duckatts uppon a thowsand of currans by a 
licence graunted to Thomas Cordell and 
company for the tearme of six yeres expired 
the vi of Aprill Anno 1589 and hathe not 
raised anything uppon Straungers more then 
she ha the donne uppon her owne Subiects."
Evidently this memorandum on duties paid by Eng­
lish and Venetians was compiled for the benefit of 
Lord Burghley for it is covered with his written notes 
and comments* In his usual manner he condensed parts 
of it to its essentials among which, again, was the 30 
on a butt of wine which, in his words, was "for the new 
impost in recompence of the Venetian impost". Thus it 
is seen that not only were imposts collected from Vene­
tian merchants but they seem to have been collected 
under official auspices. Early in the reign of James 
I, when the currant trade was again at issue and more 
memoranda were directed to the government recounting 
its history, the remark was made in one of them that
ASS
the imposts of the 1580's were levied because "her
Majestie by the advise of her counsell did cause the
54Lord high treasurer of England to ympose.••" them.
This very likely was the case but there is no official 
record of it to be found.
The impost seems to have been first levied in 
1586. When attempting to persuade the government to 
permit the collection of this impost, the Venice mer­
chants submitted an account of the amounts they had al­
ready paid in the Venetian dominions.^ The last entry 
in this account is for the year 1585 and thus it pro­
bably was written sometime in the later part of the 
year at the earliest. At the end is the statement that 
the "Venetians have never paide any thinge for imposte 
sins her Majesties pattent granted unto\is..." A few 
years later an Italian addressed a long and detailed
56
paper to "Illustrissimo Signore", probably Burghley.
The paper, in Italian, is nine pages long and gives a 
list of the payments of the new impost, citing the date, 
the merchants who paid, the ship on which the goods ar­
rived, and the quantity of goods. The earliest date 
listed for payment of the impost to Thomas Cordell and
54 PRO:SPD James I 10 no. 27. 55 BM:Add. 48126 f. 197.
56 PROJSPD Eliz. 204 no. 55.
Company is early in 1586. The juxtaposition of the dates 
in these two papers would indicate that the compensatory 
impost was authorized either in late 1585 or early 1586* 
The Italian account only takes the payments through 
1587 so it is not known how long the Venice Company 
continued to collect the impost*
With these two accounts and other papers it can 
be determined how much the Venice merchants actually 
received from the impost paid by foreign merchants.
The Company, itself, in 1590, stated that during the 
six years of the letters patent it received £4641.10.0 
from the new impost.^ According to the Italian account 
Thomas Cordell and Company received £4034.3.4 from the 
new impost and, in addition, was owed £730*15 on bonds 
for currants and wine. Thus the two accounts are quite 
close and since the first wanted to show how little had 
been received and the second how much, their near agree­
ment probably represents a high degree of accuracy. It 
also suggests that no impost was collected in 1588 or
1589, which means simply that no foreign merchants
58imported currants or wine during those years. From
57 PR0;SPD Eliz. 223 no. 14.
58 The foreign merchants almost always imported these 
goods on foreign ships - mainly Venetian. In view
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the Italian memorandum the quantities on which the impost 
was collected can be worked out at 726 tons of currants 
and 897 butts of wine imported by foreign merchants.
These figures can be compared with the quantities 
on which the Venice merchants paid impost during the 
period 1582 to 1585. This can be calculated from the 
memorandum, cited above, submitted by the Venice Company. 
The total amount paid, according to that account, came 
to £12,526.10.0. Broken down this represented 2160 tons 
of currants from 1582 to 1584 and 1134 butts of wine in 
1584 and 1585. However, the quantities actually impor­
ted were higher, though exactly how much higher is an 
open question. One of the main purposes of the account 
submitted in Italian was to show the profits made by the 
Venice Company over and above the authorized imposts. 
Apparently one of the main methods of bypassing the 
Venetian impost was to lade the currants and wine in 
ports where the impost was not levied. According to 
the Italian account after the English merchants did this 
they brought the goods to England and sold them for the 
same prices as if they had paid the impost and thus were 
able to count the difference as profit. Such imposts as
of the state of Anglo-Spanish relations during those 
years it is not surprising that Italian shipping did 
not appear in England.
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were listed in this account came mainly from Venice - 
thus fulfilling, in part, the object of the Venetian 
impost - and also from Marseilles, Flushing, and Lis­
bon. From 1583 to 1586 the profit made in this manner 
amounted to £2431.10 which represented 69 butts of wine 
and 465 tons of currants. This same account also claimed 
that currants and wine were imported to other ports of 
England but it gave no figures for them.
In addition to the imposts accounted above the
Venice Company seems also to have collected an impost
from English merchants, not members of the company, who
imported currants. Only the briefest glimpse of this
can be seen for a few months in 1588 from a memorandum
59on which Burghley made some notes. Only four merchant^ 
names appear on it, Hugh Offley, alderman, John Hewnan, 
grocer, Nicholas Atkins, and John Harte, Lord Mayor and 
member of the Turkey Company. The first two were char­
ged 3S4^ per cwt. for currants, the third 5s per cwt. 
and with the last they compounded for 400 cwt. for 
£13.6.8 which would work out at 8^ per cwt. The total 
amount collected from these merchants was less than 
£100. There is no other evidence which throws any light
if
59 BM:Lans. 57 no. 1
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on whether or not this was the total extent of an im­
post levied on English merchants* A similar impost, 
which was instrumental in bringing the Levant Company^ 
charter to an end ten years later was not begun until 
1591.
There is little doubt that the Venice Company 
merchants took advantage of whatever opportunities 
arose to add to their profits. Nevertheless, there 
is also little doubt that, by far, the greatest part 
of their profit was earned through legitimate trade 
with the Venetian territories and that the impost they 
collected from foreign merchants was nothing more than 
compensation for what they considered unjust imposts 
collected from them by the Venetians. Finally, it 
seems clear that what they collected by way of compen­
sation, compensated only a small part of what they had 
paid out. In 1590 when they said they had collected 
£4641.10.4 by way of impost they also said they had
60paid out about £16,000 to the Venetians for the impost.
It was pointed out earlier that the internal func­
tioning of the Venice Company is almost entirely unknown. 
Not only are there no private papers extant but there
60 PR0:SPD Eliz. 233 no. 14
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are also not extant any papers bearing on the company1s 
regulations and officers. Nevertheless, using the 
known membership and some Port Book entries a few 
general remarks can be made about the company.
The membership of the Venice Company is listed in 
the letters patent - fourteen persons in all. They are 
in the order given in the patent: Thomas Cordell, Ed­
ward Holmden /sometimes Homeden/, Paul Banning, Richard 
Glascock, Robert Sadler, William Garraway /sometimes 
Garway/, Henry Anderson, Andrew Banning, Edward Lech- 
land, Henry Farrington, Thomas Dawkins, Edward Sadler, 
Richard Dassell, and Thomas Trowte.^ The patent did 
not specifically limit the number of persons in the 
company - as did the Turkey Company's patent - thus 
there is no certainty about whether or not the company 
took in new members. There is evidence suggesting that 
it did but these new members certainly never conducted 
a trade of any consequence. As a group the members of 
the Venice Company make an interesting contrast to those 
of the Turkey Company. Host of them were born in the 
late 1530'said early 1540*8 and were thus about half 
a generation younger and possessed considerably less
61 A brief summary of the commercial activities of each 
of these men is in the Biographical Appendix.
wealth than the Turkey merchants. It can be deduced 
from their biographical details that these Venice mer­
chants were not among the wealthiest London merchants. 
The real extent of a merchant's wealth is nearly impos­
sible to learn without private records; but that the 
Venice merchants were in a lower economic strata than 
the Turkey merchants is confirmed by an examination of 
their assessments for the subsidy in 1577 and 1582. 
^Table W_/ Only seven of the Venice merchants are 
listed in the London returns. They show a range of 
assessment from £50 to £120 with an average of £81.10. 
The Turkey merchants by contrast - all of whom are lis­
ted - range from £90 to £300 with an average of £216. 
The status of the Venice Company members as lesser 
merchants is further confirmed by examining their 
membership in other trading ventures. On the whole 
this was minimal. Cordell, Glascock, and Paul Banning 
were members of the Spanish Company of 1577, Anderson 
was a Muscovy merchant, Holmden and Farrington were 
Barbary merchants, and the remainder were members of 
no other company. No one of them was a member of more 
than one other trading company. One of the most evi­
dent characteristics of the Venice merchants was their 
involvement in privateering to a much greater extent
oltA.
than the Turkey merchants. At least half of them were 
promoters or investors in privateering ventures and 
Cordell and Banning are well known to have been two 
of the most active promoters of privateering during 
the 1580's and 1590's. These general characteristics 
of the Venice Company members suggest that they were 
men who had reached about halfway point on the ladder 
of their careers, in contrast to the Turkey merchants 
who were nearly all at the height of their careers.
This is brought home further by noting that no one of 
the Venice merchants held any position in the City of 
London government. It was not until about ten to fifteen 
years later - or about half a generation later - that 
they began to enter public affairs. By the early 17th 
century several of them had become leading figures in 
financial and city affairs.
Though the above generalizations about the Venice 
Company membership are informative and will stand up, 
it should be noted that the members were quite unequal 
in their status as active merchants in the trade. - Three 
of them, Thomas Dawkins, Richard Das sell, and Thomas 
Trowte were factors for three other members* Holmden, 
Cordell, and Paul Banning, respectively. Furthermore, 
Andrew Banning is known to have served his older brother
Paul at an earlier period and may still have acted as 
his second, though he did some importing in his own 
name. This may also be true of Edward and Robert 
Sadler. There is no record of Edward’s trade and he 
may have been a factor for Robert. Similarly there is 
no record of Edward Lechland's trade. Though the re* 
maining members are all known to have been active raer- 
chants the available evidence indicates that the com­
pany’s trade was dominated by four merchants, Cordell, 
Holmden, Paul Banning, and Garraway.
This is seen in the Port Book entries for five 
Venice Company ships in 1588 and 1589. ^Appendix B/
These four merchants accounted for over 95% of the 
official value of the goods listed. Holmden alone 
stands out from the others with imports valued at over 
twice those of the other three combined. Though there 
is little question that these four men were dominant 
in the Venice trade it should be kept in mind that the 
above figures represent the trade of only one year and 
five ships out of six years and several times five ships. 
There is no reason to insist that the relationship in­
dicated here was invariable. In fact, the time, itself -
62 They were probably related but this has not been 
established.
1588 and 1589 - provided an alternative source of in­
vestment for certain merchants. It was a period of 
very active involvement in privateering ventures and 
both Cordell and Banning were very active investors 
in such ventures. This might explain why their invest­
ment in the Venice trade was relatively small during 
those years. Holmden, on the other hand, was not heavi­
ly involved with privateering. However, these obser­
vations are suggestive rather than final.
An examination of the nature and proportions of 
the cargoes of these five Venice Company ships reveals 
a few interesting facts about the trade. But first it 
must be pointed out that these cargoes as listed do not 
include wine which was accounted in separate Port Books 
none of which have survived. Just how important wine 
was is not certain. The Company claimed its members
63
paid impost for 340 tons in 1584 and 227 tons in 1585.
But whether or not they imported more than that is not 
known. It will be noticed that the five ships under 
consideration here are not laded to their rated capacity. 
If the difference were made up by wines they would amount 
to about 150 tons. In addition a sixth ship, The Soloman
63 BM:Add. 48126 f. 197.
of Alborough, 120 ton burden, is entered along with the 
other five. However, its cargo comes to ten tons at 
most. If the remainder were wine the total for all six 
would be 250 tons, a figure that falls between the above 
two. Thus something on the order of 250 to 300 tons per 
year may represent the amount of wine imported by the 
Venice Company. This argument, however, is highly spe­
culative and will have to wait for further information 
before developing any greater certainty. There is no 
speculation about the observation that currants were 
the dominant commodity among imports from the Venetian 
islands. It could probably be argued that currants 
were the main reason for the trade. The official valu­
ation of the cargoes of the five ships that entered 
London in 1588 and 1589 was £19,927.15 of which currants 
accounted for £18,507. The remainder of the cargoes, 
excluding wine, consisted of oil, clove, nutmeg, worm- 
seed, cotton wool, silk, and brimstone. Galls and wine 
were the only additional commodities regularly imported. 
Spices were most likely a chance cargo, acquired from 
Venetians who imported them from further east. The 
dominance of currants in the cargoes is not simply a 
chance occurance. In 1584 the Mary Rose and Ascension 
entered cargoes which were primarily currants. More
important is the fact that whenever the merchants had
reason to give account of the imposts they paid cur-
rants appear as the most important item taxed• A. C. Wood
confirms that currants remained the most important com-
64modity in the Venetian branch of the Levant trade*
The trade of the Venice Company then was narrowly based
Si+,$Je
on a aigfta-fce commodity which was bulky and of relative­
ly low value* This is in contrast to the Turkey trade 
which was based on a greater variety of commodities al­
most all of which were of greater value than currants*
This dependence on currants, which came from a relative­
ly restricted area, explains the Venice merchants1 con­
tinual agitation over the imposts* During the sixteenth 
century there is no indication that their trade suffered 
significantly from this taxation* Nevertheless, it was 
a constant source of irritation which lasted all through
£ e
the seventeenth century*
About their exports the Company was nearly silent.
It stated only that they consisted of cloths, kerseys,
64 Op* cit., p. 67, 121* By the late 17th century the 
Venetian trade - and thus the currant trade - seems 
to have fallen out of the Levant Company's monopoly. 
(Ibid., 121.)
65 Wood, op. cit*, pp. 67-72, gives some account of the 
Levant Company's problems with Venetian imposts in 
the seventeenth century.
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66tin, lead,iron, wool, conyskins, and leather. This 
amounts to nearly a complete catalogue of all possible 
exports from England and is consequently not very in­
formative about the Venetian market. The Company^ 
silence on this matter can be interpreted to reflect 
a lack of real concern about the export side of their 
trade, despite Venetian imposts on English commodities.
One explanation, with two variations, can be suggested, 
though not proved. They were able to avoid the impost 
on English goods by discharging them at Venice, where 
the imposts were not levied, or by discharging them at 
Leghorn which was not Venetian territory. From an ex­
amination of the table of Anglo-Mediterranean shipping 
it is seen that many ships went to Leghorn and then to 
the Venetian islands but that no ship went to both Leg­
horn and Venice. There is always the possibility that 
more complete information on individual Mediterranean 
voyages will reveal a ship that put into both Leghorn 
and Venice. However, the number of voyages and the 
length of time covered by the table without revealing 
such a combination suggests that even if some were found
they would not be sufficient in number to alter the above
66 PRO:SPD Eliz. 233 no. 14.
generalization. This suggests that both ports served 
much the same function and putting into both would be 
superfluous. It is also seen from the table that many 
more ships went to Leghorn than to Venice before going 
to the Venetian islands. It was, in part, to alter this 
pattern that the Venetians initiated the decree of Janu­
ary 1581. The Englishman^ preference for Leghorn is 
based, in part, on the fact that it was a free port, 
and in part on the fact that the expense of sailing the
length of the Adriatic and back again was nearly as
67great as the impost. There were commodities avail­
able in Venice of greater value than currants but to 
judge from the evidence available they were not laded 
in large enough quantities to compensate for the extra 
voyage. The most valuable of these goods were silk and 
spices, but these having already been transported from 
the eastern Mediterranean could not have effectively 
competed with the same goods carried by the Turkey 
merchants•
67 HMC;Cal. Salis. Mss., IV, p. 181. This was a 
claim made by some Venetian mariners who wanted 
to be relieved of the impost in England. Doubt­
less, they exaggerated their case; nevertheless, 
sailing twice the length of the Adriatic certain­
ly added to the expense of a voyage.
There is evidence, relating to the first years of 
the seventeenth century, that English ships engaged in 
the local carrying trade in order to compensate them­
selves for the extra voyage to Venice and to cover ex­
penses while waiting for cargoes at Zante and Cephalonia.
tjQTViIn 1601 the Trinity Anderson ^unladed at Ragusa and Venice,
then carried goods for Venetian merchants to Corfu, back
to Venice and finally to Zante. At Zante, Cephalonia,
68and Petras she laded her cargo for London. A more in­
teresting example was the Cherubin. £454/ owned by Edward 
Holmden, which arrived in Zante Easter 1602, about two 
months late; consequently, her cargo had been laded 
aboard another ship, the Royal Exchange. £448/ The 
master and factor decided the Cherubin should unlade 
at Venice and then hire itself out to Venetian merchants. 
During the next several months she sailed back and forth 
the length of the Adriatic carrying passengers, salt, 
hoops, and other goods between Venice and Corfu, Zante, 
and Cephalonia. Sometime during the summer she travel­
led to Dragomaster in Turkey to lade logwood which was 
then unladed in Zante. In September she finally set 
course for London but it is not stated how much or what
68 PROsHCA Exams 35, f. 353v, 354.
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her homeward cargo was, though some of it was laded in 
69Venice. There were probably variations of the Adria­
tic carrying trade but basically its purpose was to pay 
the expenses of the ship and crew while waiting for a 
return cargo to London; and if possible to turn a little 
extra proft. In the case of the Cherubin the purser 
estimated that its summer's extra freighting netted 
Kolinden about £200.^
The Venice merchants1 problem of how to occupy 
their ships while waiting for a cargo would have been 
facilitated if they had been able to lade their own 
cargoes in the ports of the Turkish dominions. These, 
however, were all within the limits of the Turkey Com­
pany's monopoly. The Venice merchants, of course, did 
not report the extent to which they might have violated 
their rival's monopoly. Some of their ships did go to 
Petras, but if they went to other ports within the Tur­
key Company's monopoly the fact has not survived in the 
extant record. However, according to William Harbome, 
what the Venice merchants did do was use Greek inter­
mediaries to sell those goods in Turkey which they had
70 Ibid., f. 178v. The purser also stated that the 
outward lading, in kerseys, lead, hides and pil­
chards, was worth £5000 (Ibid. f. 178).
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been unable to sell in Venice or the Venetian islands* 
Relations between the two companies are of some inter­
est but there is little in the record which throws light 
on them during the lives of the companies1 respective 
charters. It is possible they may have freighted goods 
on each others ships. In 1588 when the Turkey Company's 
Mayflower unladed in London from Petras it had aboard 
currants in the names of Edward Holmden and William 
Garraway, as well as Osborne, Stapers and Company, £See 
Appendix B•/ This is the only such instance found but 
there easily may have been others. Though it appears 
the Venice merchants are here violating the Turkey Com­
pany charter with the assistance of the Turkey merchants, 
it does not follow necessarily. It was not at all un­
common for the Port Books to record only the last port 
of call; thus, the Hayflower might have called first 
at Zante or Cephalonia and then Petras. The circum­
stances, however, are not clear. But it is clear 
that the Turkey Company was in a position to know a 
great deal about the business of the Venice Company,
This was so because the farm of the customs inward at
71 Cal. SP For. 1584-5, pp. 167-8. This comes up 
by way of a complaint from Harborne to Walsing- 
ham in 1584.
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London was held by a member of the Turkey Company,
Thomas Smythe. It has already been seen that he was 
responsible for holding the bonds of the Italian mer­
chants which were made over in favor of the Venice 
merchants. More important than this, as customer, he 
had a complete record of all the Venice merchants1 im­
ports and thus knew quite accurately not only their total 
but how they were distributed among the members of the 
company. One possibility of how this information may 
have been used does appear. Before September 158S the 
Turkey Company petitioned for a broadening of its mono­
poly to include the Venetian territories and it is not 
too far fetched to imagine that before doing so it con­
sulted with one of its number, Smythe, in his capacity 
as customer, to learn what it could of the economic 
feasibility of the idea. The Venice Company, of course, 
resisted this proposal and then, itself, petitioned for
a renewal of its patent sometime after the Armada and
72before April 1589. The clash of interests between 
the Venice and Turkey merchants kept this renewal from
72 PRO:SPD Eliz, 157 no. 84. The Turkey Company's 
petition has not survived. The document cited is 
the Venice Company's response which is taken up 
in greater detail in Chapter VI. The Venice Com­
pany's petition for a renewal is PRO:SPD Eliz. 219 
no. 86.
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ever being granted. Instead the two companies entered
into a struggle with each other and then, together,
to
with the government, to finally^ form the Levant Company.
CHAPTER VI 
THE MAKING OF THE LEVANT COMPANY
Looking back, from a present day vantage point, 
to the years between the expiration of the old patents 
and the granting of the new one in January 1592, one 
can pick out three questions that dominated the dis­
cussions and bargaining that preceeded the creation 
of the Levant Company. First, should the Turkey and 
Venice Companies be joined into one? Second, who should 
be admitted to the new company? Third, should the new 
company administer a joint-stock or a regulated trade? 
There is no reason to suppose these question were set 
out beforehand and then neatly dealt with one at a 
time by the merchants involved. Nevertheless, they 
did emerge in a certain logical order - it would have 
been pointless to argue about the membership of the 
new united company before agreement had been reached 
on the union itself - so they can be treated here in 
that order. Furthermore, there is little evidence 
that the particular solution to one of the problems 
depended on the particular solution to another of them. 
Ihus they can be dealt with separately. The answers 
reached to the above questions are easy to determine; 
however, all the reasoning that lay behind these answers
3C15
is not always clear. Nevertheless, enough material sur­
vives to facilitate a more complete reconstruction than 
has thitherto been attempted and further, to hazard 
some explanation of what lay behind the final decisions* 
The first question to arise, naturally, concerned 
the union of the Turkey and Venice Companies. This had 
first been raised as early as November 1584 by William 
Harborne. In one of his dispatches to Walsingham he 
took time out from his reports on all the political 
and diplomatic machinations current at the Porte to 
complain of the Venice Company. The members of this 
company, he wrote, were selling in Turkey, by means of 
Greek intermediaries, those English goods they were un­
able to sell at Venice or in the Venetian islands. He 
stated further that they sold these goods at prices so 
much lower than those current, that they suffered a loss 
and profited only from the goods carried back to England. 
He concluded that the harm caused by this could be re­
medied by either confining the Venice Company to the 
limits of its privilege or by uniting it with the Turkey 
Company.^ Nothing further is heard on this question 
until some years later when the Venice Company addressed
1 Cal. SP For., 1584-5, pp. 167-8.
a petition to Walsingham in answer to one from the
2Turkey Company. The document is undated but its word­
ing suggests that it was written before the expiration 
of the Turkey Company1s patent in September 1588. Evi­
dently Osborne and Stapers, probably not wishing to wait 
until their patent expired and the trade was uncontrol­
led , suggested to Walsingham that their privilege be
enlarged to encompass the area of trade of both companies.
3
They then advanced four reasons to support their request; 
that they need a man in Venice to facilitate the trans­
mitting of letters to England; that they find it neces­
sary to send woolen cloth to Venice by sea; that they 
need the money earned from these woolens to purchase 
goods in Candia; and that they carry on a greater trade 
to Candia than does the Venice Company. To the first 
point the Venice merchants replied that there were other 
ways of sending letters to England and furthermore, even 
if they find this the best way, they can leave a man in 
Venice who is not engaged in active trade, without fear 
that he will be arrested; to the second they pointed out 
that the overland route to Venice is not limited by patent
2 PRO:SPD Eliz. 157 no. 84.
3 The Turkey Company*s petition has not survived and 
this reconstruction of it is based on the extant 
answers given by the Venice company.
to any group of merchants, and if the Turkey merchants 
are in such dire need they can use this route; to the 
third, that the Turkey Company has the advantage in 
trading to the very large dominions of the Grand 
Seignior while the Venice Company is limited to the 
smaller dominions of the Signoria of Venice, but that 
they - the Venice merchants - are willing to give way 
on this if the Turkey merchants will do likewise; and 
the final point they denied, stating that the record 
would show that they have imported three times as much 
wine from Candia and used four times as many ships there 
as have the Turkey merchants* These are sound and ac­
curate replies in face of which the Turkey merchants 
must have been nonplused. In any event, nothing more 
in the way of petitions is heard on the matter until 
July 1589.
During the intervening time the Turkey Company^ 
privileges expired on 11 September 1588, William Harbome 
returned from Constantinople sometime in late December 
or early January, and the Venice Company^ privileges 
expired on 17 April 1589. Exactly two months before the
4
latter date, in February, Harbome wrote to Walsingham
4 Cal. SP For., 1589, pp. 112-3.
to say that some of the more important merchants trading 
to Turkey had conferred with him* They expressed great 
discouragement with the trade, he said, and were con­
sidering recalling their agent so that 11 they might be 
unburdened of this great charge, and so end the traffic11. 
Harbome pointed out to Walsingham that not only does 
this trade provide a market for goods during the war 
with Spain but that to end it would only give the great­
est pleasure and satisfaction to her Majesty's enemies. 
However, he can see no way for it to be maintained except 
at the Queen's own expense, unless the whole trade be 
encompassed in one grant of privileges. He went on to 
say that it is his duty to convey these thoughts to Wal- 
singhazn before "...the Venice Company procure the dis­
membering of this joint traffic by reviving their former 
patent". A hint of this discouragement is found in the 
Turkey Company's letter to the Aleppo factors in June 
1586. At that time the Company stated it intended to 
send only a small quantity of goods in the next ship­
ment because of "these perylous times". But it is doubt­
ful if the merchants were as discouraged with the trade 
as Harbome makes out and were seriously thinking of 
giving it up. What seems more likely is that Harbome, 
formerly a merchant's factor, but now an experienced
diplomat - experience gained under the most trying con* 
ditions - was putting his newly found art to work. For 
certainly the suggestion to the crown that if it desired 
to see the continuance of this trade and the maintenance 
of the ambassador it could choose either to grawnt the 
enlarged privileges or carry the charges of an ambassa­
dor itself, was calculated to preclude the second alter­
native.
But a petition from the Turkey Company, dated July 
1589, testifies that still, five months after Harborne's 
letter and three months after the Venice Company's patent 
had expired, no decision had been reached.This petition 
is endorsed 11 Rep lye to the answeare of the marchantes 
tradinge Venice disuading the uniting of that trade with 
Turkye". Thus it must have been proceeded by a document 
written by the Venice Company which was an answer to a 
still earlier document written by the Turkey Company. 
Neither of these documents has survived but using the 
endorsement and the text of the extant petition a reason­
able reconstruction of the exchange can be made. It is 
clear that this reply of the Turkey merchants is not a 
reply to the Venice Company's statement discussed above 
which was written before September 1588. If it is a 
reply to the other extant petition then it is a complete
5 PROiSPD Eliz. 225 no. 50.
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non sequitor. Assuming, then, that there were three 
documents, two now lost, which followed the first pro­
test of the Venice Company, the course of the dispute 
can be described.
The Turkey Company, having proposed that the 
trade of both companies be included in their monopoly 
and having then been presented with the largely indis­
putable reply of the Venice Company discussed above, 
now proposed what they considered to be a satisfactory 
compromise: They would take over the trade of the
Venetian islands but leave to the Venice Company the 
trade of Venice, itself. The Venice merchants countered 
this proposal with four points, contained in the second 
lost petition. First, that being limited to Venice 
would be disadvantageous to them because so much of 
the trade of the Signoria of Venice is in the islands 
and into Turkey; second, that the impost laid on Eng­
lish merchants in the Venetian dominions is indicative 
of. the hostility of Venice to the English; third, that 
if all the trade of Turkey and the Venetian islands 
with England were encompassed in one company the Vene­
tians, to combat this strong competition, might join 
forces with the Spanish to prey on English ships at sea; 
and last, that if this combination of the English trades
took place the Venetians might also respond by combining 
with the Flemings and the French to carry on trade in 
Turkey* There is no way of knowing when these two pe- 
titions might have been presented except that they came 
between the two extant ones* Harbome's letter to Wal­
singham in February 1589 gives no hint of this exchange 
which may mean that it followed that letter* Finally, 
in July 1589, the Turkey merchants produced their reply, 
In this, the extant document, they argued first, that 
while it is true that Venice had much trade with Turkey 
and England, it also carried on a trade with Spain, 
Portugal, Ragusa, Sicily, Genoa, Florence, and other 
places; second, that the impost is levied only on goods 
bought and sold in the islands and is not applicable 
in Venice itself, having been conceived, not so much 
to hurt the English, as to protect the trade of the 
city of Venice; third, that the Spanish and Maltesans 
only hesitate to make greater attacks on English ship­
ping because it is under the protection of the Sultan's 
privileges and so long as the Turkey Company shall con­
tinue England's enemies will be thus restrained; and 
last, the Flemings cannot secure the necessary privi­
leges to trade with Turkey for they are reputed sub­
jects of Spain and, as for the French, they and Venetians
3LZ3L
have never been able to come to an agreement and never 
will because 11 so greate be the repugnance of their dif­
ferent humors, as the one cannot tollerate the other 
his naturall condicon11* Thus, it would seen from this 
exchange, that in July 1589 the two companies had not 
yet agreed to a joint incorporation*
A point of some confusion enters the sequence of 
events here because a document exists listing articles 
for the incorporation of the Turkey and Venice Companies 
which is endorsed 14 Hay 1589, two months earlier than 
the Turkey Company's answer discussed above* Barring 
an error in the endorsed date the simplest explanation 
is that the Turkey Company, on its own initiative, sub­
mitted this set of articles with thirty names of those 
to be included in the patent appended at the bottom*
In the meantime the Venice Company, not yet having re­
signed itself to the proposed amalgamation, continued 
its protest for independent existance, thus necessi­
tating the Turkey Company's response discussed above* 
This, of course, is only a hypothesis but an analysis 
of the list of names lends credence to it.^
6 BM: Lans* 60 no. 3* A copy of this is PRO:SPD Eliz. 
151 no. 34 but is undated*
7 See infra p.^29 for this analysis*
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Sometime between late 1589 and Spring 1590 the 
two companies came to an agreement on this matter*
A second set of articles of incorporation exists, which 
was prepared sometime after November 1589 and before 
July 1590, with a list of forty-one names appended at
Q
the bottom* By Hay 1590 there is little doubt they 
were at least cooperating with each other, for in that 
month they sent a joint memorandum to Burghley concer­
ned entirely with the trade to the Venetian territories 
and in which they included a list of the ships used by
9
both companies* Obviously the Turkey merchants were 
lending their influence in dealing with the problem of 
imposts which the Venice merchants had lived with since 
1580* Their willingness to do this may explain in part 
why the Venice merchants changed their minds; though, 
no doubt, there was more to it than that* It is also 
possible, that the Venice merchants decided the wind 
was blowing against then and that they would be unable
8 PR0:SPD Eliz* 231 no* 55* There is no date on this 
document but among the names is "Sir John Harte, L* 
maior". Harte's term ran fretom November 1589 to 
November 1590* Also among the names is "Sir Richard 
Martine". The exact date of Martin's knighthood has 
so far eluded notice but in July 1590 he is referred 
to as "Sir Richard Martin". (PRO:Signet Office Doc- 
quet Books, vol* 1, f. 250v.)
9 PROiSPO Eliz. 232 no. 26.
to make their point of view prevail in government circles 
so, rather than risk being relegated to an inferior 
position they agreed to a compromise in order to main­
tain at least equal footing in the new company.
In the following month, June, the Turkey merchants 
wrote to Burghley to complain that they had been suitors 
for almost two years for obtaining letters patent from 
the Queen. ^  They emphasized that without their de­
sired privileges they could not maintain an ambassador 
in Constantinople at their own charge. They then went 
into a lengthy analysis of the great benefit to England 
in having such an agent and what he had already achieved 
during the period of the first privileges. Further, 
that the expenses already incurred by the company for 
the ambassador's stipend and the necessary presents to 
the Grand Seignior and some of his chief ministers was 
considerable; and finally, that unless some action is 
taken for the agent's provision he will "fall into greate 
wante”. The response to this pleas for the maintenance 
of the ambassador was not immediate and in August, 
Burghley received a letter from Sir George B a m e ^  in 
which he rehearsed again the political benefits of
10 PR0:SPD Eliz. 232 no. 34. 11 BMiLans. 65 no. 27
£l%5
maintaining an agent at the Porte and the great expenses 
the Turkey merchants had incurred to that end. He com­
plained that they had paid by exchange £900 toward Mr. 
Barton's expenses and he asked that Burghley write to 
Barton admonishing him to be more moderate in his ex­
penses and to levy 4% consuledge on the merchants, 2% 
on sales and 2% on purchases , toward meeting these ex­
penses. The government evidently decided that it would 
have to give some assistance in maintaining Barton, 
especially since, in the absence of any charter of 
privileges, it could not insist that the merchants 
carry the entire burden themselves. Thus, six weeks 
later, the Exchequer received authorization to pay out 
£500 for the use of Edward Barton, her Majesty's agent
to Constantinople.
Though it may have taken four months to extract 
this money from the government, this does not indicate 
there was indifference to the future of the companies. 
Almost immediately after receiving the petition from 
the Turkey merchants in June, Burghley solicited in-
12 The authorization, dated 2 October 1590, is in PRO;
Exchequer Warrants for Issue, box 129. The actual
payment, made on 9 October to John Bates, a member
of the Turkey Company, is recorded in PRO: Exchequer, 
Teller's Roll, no. 148.
formation from the two groups concerning the extent 
and size of their trade* A month later he received
i
13both sets of answers* It is not at all clear, through­
out the period from the expiration of the first privi­
leges to the granting of the new patent, what Burghleyfs 
thought were on the matter* That he took an active 
interest at this time and continued to do so is clear 
from the above and from subsequent events* It is known 
that he favored the organization of substantial merchants 
into monopolistic companies, but beyond this, the basis 
upon which he made a decision concerning the Levant 
trade can only be hypothetical. Certainly, the crown 
was personally concerned in this matter; at least in 
respect to the maintenance of a diplomatic representa­
tive at the Sultan^ court. The payment of £500 to 
Barton is a strong statement of interest from the fin­
ancially ungenerous queen, and two months before the 
payment was made Elizabeth wrote two letters to Barton 
conanending his good work and giving him further instructions* 
Little more would seem to have been done on this 
question of uniting the two companies* There is a re-
13 PR0:SPD Eliz. nos* 13 and 14*
14 PROjSPF Turkey, 2 ff* 35 and 37* These are drafts 
in Burghley*s hand* The letters are dated 25 and 
26 August 1590.
minder, in Burghley's hand, about articles for uniting 
the companies, dated October 1590;*“* however, nothing 
seems to have been done at that time. In March of the 
next year another set of articles*^ appeared, identical 
to the second set mentioned above. These may have been 
intended as another reminder to Burghley. The only point 
remaining is to determine when Burghley and the Queen 
accepted, on their part, the joining of the two com­
panies into one. There is no evidence to suggest that 
they ever opposed it; yet it is not until July 1591, 
nearly three years after the issue arose, that there 
is evidence they had accepted it. In that month a 
petition was submitted by Henry Parvish requesting 
admission to the new company. In this he states that 
rtitt hath pleased her majesties to graunte letters 
patente for unytinge the Companye of Tripolye and the 
traders of Venyce.. .M*^ Her Majesty^ pleasure had 
probably been made known even before this though it 
was to be another six months before the patent was 
actually issued.
15 PR0:SPD Eliz. 233 no. 107. This reminder is just 
one item in a list of other matters of public busi­
ness requiring attention.
16 BM:Lans. 66 no. 12.
17 PR0:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 80, endorsed 5 July 1591.
A far more sensitive issue was that of membership 
in the new company. There was, among the London mer­
chant community, dissatisfaction over the narrow mem­
bership base of these companies and it was to become 
a far more acute problem early in the next reign. The 
combined membership of the two companies under their 
first privileges was twenty-six; twelve in the Turkey 
Company and fourteen in the Venice Company. The effec­
tive membership was even less than this, especially in 
the Venice Company. The outsiders, laid this accusation 
on Burghley^ desk to emphasize how small the companies 
really were. Something of this conflict over member­
ship can be followed from the expiration of the first 
privileges to the granting of the letters patent in 
1592.
The most obvious result of this conflict was the 
steady growth in membership and proposed membership.
The original twenty-six members of the two companies 
grew to a proposed thirty by May 1589, to forty-one 
less than a year later, to forty-nine by April or May 
1591 and finally, in the patent itself, fifty-three 
were admitted to full membership with twenty more given 
the option to join within two months; nearly three times 
the number in the original companies. Sight years later,
in the patent of 1600, the membership had become eighty- 
four and in the 1605 patent, one hundred and eighteen.
In these later patents the pressure for larger member­
ship came largely from persons outside the company who 
wanted to have a share in a profitable business. But 
in the earlier case, though there was successful pres­
sure from the outside, there is evidence also of some 
internal conflict among the original membership over 
who was to be admitted.
The first evidence of this comes from the set
18of articles for incorporation submitted in May 1589 
which has appended to it the names of thirty persons 
to be inserted in the patent. A brief analysis of 
these names gives credence to the point made earlier 
that this first set of articles was the creation of 
the Turkey Company alone. Seventeen of those named 
were original members of the two companies; nine from 
the Turkey Company and eight from the Venice Company.
Of the thirteen new persons named, nine can definitely 
be established as belonging to the Turkey Company, either 
as later members oT as servants, such as William Harbome, 
ambassador at Constantinople and John Eldred, consul at
18 BM:Lans. 60 no. 3 and a copy in PR0:SPD Eliz. 151 no. 
34.
Aleppo* The remaining four cannot be definitely con­
nected with either group, though there is a good case 
that two of them were connected with the Turkey mer­
chants* All but one of the five were named in the 
final patent and that one is listed as a member in 
1600* This loading of the membership in favor of the 
Turkey Company suggests that the Venice merchants did 
not have a hand in making up the list* In the follow­
ing year the second set of articles was submitted this
19time with forty-one names appended. Thirty identical 
to the first list and eleven new names* Only one of 
these eleven, Henry Parvish, seems to have carried on 
any independent trade* What can be learned of the 
others suggests that the Venice merchants, now in agree­
ment about the union of the companies, were trying to 
redress the balance in the membership* Three of them, 
though named in the Venice Company patent of 1583, were 
actually servants of Thomas Cordell, Edward Holmden, 
and Paul Bayning, the three most substantial merchants 
in the Venice Company. The Turkey merchants, on their 
side, added to the list James Stapers, a younger brot­
her of Richard and known to have acted as his factor
19 PRO:SPD Eliz. 231 no. 55
in the past. Nothing is known about the remaining six, 
except that four of them were not named in the Levant 
Company patent evidently being of too little substance. 
What can be detected behind these two lists of names 
is some minor competition between the Venice and Turkey 
merchants over the balance of influence in the new com­
pany. The Venice merchants did not have among their 
number very many wealthy men and thus had to resort 
to including the names of their servants; though the 
Turkey merchants were not entirely innocent of this 
practice themselves.
Nothing more is heard of this issue until the 
summer of 1591. During June and July of that year a 
number of petitions were prepared by merchants who 
wished to be admitted to the Levant Company but had 
evidently had not been acceptable to the Turkey and 
Venice merchants. The main burden of their arguments 
was that they had engaged in trade to various parts of 
the Mediterranean during the past decade or more and 
were financially able to contribute to the maintenance 
of the ambassador and the presents to the Turkish court 
The most interesting and substantial of these petitions 
was from the partnership of Henry Colthurst and Company 
which consisted of Colthurst, Simon Lawrence, and the
20brothers Oliver and Nicholas Style* These four had 
been trading together for some fifteen years, which 
alone makes them one of the more interesting and re- 
markable partnerships of their time* Very little is 
known of their business dealings other than what can 
be culled from the Port Books and occasional State 
Papers* In this petition they mention a ship they sent 
to the Western Mediterranean in 1574. /no. 16/ This 
was in addition to their activity as members of the 
Barbary Company. They evidently took immediate advan­
tage of the cessation of the Venice Company's privileges 
for they claimed to have sent a ship to Venice in 1589, 
1590, and 1591* /205, 240^and 246/ Obviously, they were
now concerned about being excluded from this trade by 
the grant of a new monopoly. No one of them, however, 
was admitted to full membership in the Levant Company, 
but all were placed on the provisional list of those 
who could attain membership upon payment of £130 within 
two months of the date of the letters patent* There is 
no explanation of why they were thus partially excluded.
The most informative of these petitions, in that
20 PRO:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 75. Most of what is known of 
these men is put together in T. S. Willan, Studies 
in Elizabethan Foreign Trade. 1959, pp. 205-110.
it sheds some light on behind the scenes maneuvering,
21is that of Henry Parvish. He was evidently accepted
22into the new company sometime in 1590 and subsequently 
excluded from the proposed company because, according 
to him, he had entered into a business arrangement with 
a number of Venetian merchants, the nature of which is 
not made clear* The basis of his claim to membership 
is that he had been trading to Venice overland for the 
past fourteen years but now, with the troubles in France, 
is unable to do so any longer* He claimed further that 
since the cessation of the Turkey and Venice Company 
privileges, he had traded by sea to Turkey and Venice* 
/228/ He specifically blamed Sir John Spencer, Paul 
Bayning, and Edward Ho linden for barring his admission 
to the company; charging them, further, with the desire 
to keep out all new members* In this context he went 
on to say that Richard Stapers and a few others favored 
admitting some four persons while Thomas Cordell and 
lfhis companye11 favored admitting anyone desirous Muppon 
some reasonable allowances11 • Though there is no reason 
to doubt this division among the merchants, knowledge of
21 PRO:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 80.
22 His name appears in the list appended to the second 
set of articles discussed above*
it is based only on Parvish•s statement and he was 
clearly quite angry over his troubles and thus prone 
to exaggerate the state of affairs. His anger may have 
paid off for he was included as a full member in the 
new patent.
There are three more petitions from persons wish­
ing to be admitted to the company. William Harrison,
23John Combes, and Robert Brooke. The first two claimed 
to have traded, during the past seven or eight years, to 
the Western Mediterranean and overland to Venice from 
Hamburg and recently by sea to Venice. They both, also, 
were engaged in trade to Spain and complained that such 
had become impossible. Harrison offered to pay twenty 
angels to 11 any of your honors servants11 if he were ad­
mitted to the new company. The reaction to this offer 
is not known. Neither of these petitioners gained their 
desired end at this time; both were to go on, however, 
and become fairly prominent men in London early in the 
next century. Brooke was a Grocer and one of the 
sheriffs of London at the time he wrote his petition 
on 14 July 1591. He made no claim about previous trading 
activities as did the other petitioners but simply asked
23 PRO:SPD Eliz. 239 nos. 42 and 43 for Harrison and Combes 
and BM: Hatfield Mss., petition no. 870 for Brooke.
for preferential treatment. "That at yor honors /pro­
bably Robert Cecil/ requeste yt might please his honor 
/.Burghley/ to cawse my name to be put into the Booke."
As with Harrison and Combes, his name did not get into 
the "Booke". The above petitions are the only ones ex­
tant, but there is no reason to suppose that there were 
not other merchants who sought admission either by for­
mal petition or by informal communication with someone 
in an influential position.
These petitions by no means ended the problem of 
membership in the proposed company; in fact, they may 
have only really begun a more strenuous struggle over 
the question, not, this time, among the Old membership 
but rather between the old members and those on the out­
side wishing to gain admission. There is a very interest-
24ing document in the State Papers, undated but clearly 
following these petitions, in which it is argued that 
"the sutes of some persons whose strange humors are 
never satisfied" should be denied. These persons, the 
petition argues, have "no regard howe weightie a matter 
it is not to overchardge a trade.•.for in verie truthe 
the one half of us allredie traders are to many and in
24 PRO:SFD Eliz. 239 no. 44.
2fit>
nomber sufficient to mayneteyne that trade with as much 
of the commodities of this Reaime as possibley can there 
be vented*• •11 • Those traders, who were already half too 
many, signed their names to the petition - nineteen of 
them. Sixteen are signatures of the leading members 
of the original Turkey and Venice Companies, eight from 
each, and the other three later members of the companies* 
This, perhaps more than anything else, is a clear state­
ment of the restrictive attitude of these older mer­
chants, who, while they were willing to bring into the 
company their former servants and factors, were unwilling 
to admit anyone from the outside who might, among other 
things, challenge their control of policy.
Burghley was not satisfied to let things go by
default and sought the opinions of William Harbome,
John Hawkins and William Burrough. Harbome, in his
25answer, received at the end of July, gave as his 
opinion that some of the wealthier merchants not at 
present free of the company, upon giving a reasonable 
contribution, should be admitted in order to help spread 
any financial loss* His concern was that a financial 
loss would discourage the trade which, in turn, would
25 BM:Lans. 67 f* 251*
&9T
place the Queen*s agent in a disadvantageous position.
In the following month Hawkins and Burrough, together
2 6gave a somewhat more liberal, though similar, opinion. 
They felt that ttas Many Merchants 6c others of abillity, 
as have traded into those partes, bee of that companie, 
yf they will, and lickwise that other Marchantes of 
abillitye suche as be desirowes to be of that Companie 
maye be accepted and insertid in the same...t>. Their 
reason for advocating this policy was that a larger 
membership of wealthy merchants would create a larger 
stock thus making possible the employment of f,shippinge 
of greater force...11. The conclusions are basically the 
same in advocating increased membership but derived from 
different points of view, each reflecting the background 
and interests of the person giving them. This could be 
interpreted as showing the unreliability of partisan 
opinion. But it can also be interpreted to show the 
wisdom and shrewdness of the person who solicited opin­
ions from among different sets of interests. Burghley 
decided, in mid-August, to arrange a conference with 
four of the most important merchants concerned, Sir 
Edward Osborne, Sir George Barnes, Richard Staper, and
26 PRO:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 124
27Edward Holmden, to settle the problem of membership.
He set down, in his own hand, the principals upon which 
individual cases should be decided, which, it will be 
seen, embody the suggestions and criticisms voiced on 
this matter.^®
1. Those who have been adventurers to Turkey 
and have contributed to the procuring of 
the Sultan's privileges.
2. Those who have been adventurers to Zante and 
Venice and have paid the Venetian imposts.
3. Those who are able and willing to bear the 
charges of the agent at Constantinople.
4* To be eliminated are the names of servants 
and apprentices who have no stock to main­
tain the trade; though, these may become free 
of the company at the time they are able to 
trade for themselves.
Burghley did not confer personally with these mer­
chants but asked Hawkins and Burrough to do so giving 
them as instructions what appears in his page of notes. 
They wrote to him on 30 August^ that they had conferred 
with the merchants as instructed and inclosed a list of 
names divided into three parts: one, those named in the 
first set of privileges; two, those who had been admitted
27 It is interesting to note that three of these men 
were Turkey merchants and only Holmden a Venice mer­
chant.
28 PRO:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 140.
29 PR0:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 157.
by the first companies after the granting of their 
privileges; and, three, those who had been factors and 
servants in those companies. They also added to the 
above the names of eight mere merchants who, in their 
opinion, were fit to be included in the new patent. Un­
happily the list they appended has not survived, so it 
is not possible to see how closely their suggestions, 
which may also have been the suggestions of the mer­
chants themselves, conformed to the final list embodied
in the patent. There is, however, a list compiled by
30the merchants in the late Spring of 1591. Many of 
the names in this are of persons about whom little is 
known. Eighteen of them do hot appear in the patent; 
ten of these are listed as persons who have not cleared 
their accounts with the companies; three of the eighteen 
died or probably died in the interim; of the five re­
maining one, Henry Colthurst, is included in the patent 
among those who will be admitted upon payment of £130,
30 BM:Cotton, Nero BXI f. 116. This list is undated but 
contains the names of Ralph Fitch and John Newberry. 
It could not have been made up before 29 April 1591, 
the day Fitch returned to London (Purchas, X, 204) 
because he was assumed dead until he unexpectedly re­
turned. (Foster, England^ Quest for Eastern Trade, 
p. 105.) Newberry^ name probably was included be­
cause it was felt he might also return. When he did 
not, it was dropped from the final list. Fitch is 
listed in the patent.
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two others, to judge by their names, may have been the 
younger relatives of full members, and about the last 
two nothing is known* The 1592 patent contains twenty- 
two names, other than the provisional names, which are 
not listed in the Cotton Mss* document* Two of them 
were gratuitous, John Hawkins and William Burrough; three 
were probably related to older members, Thomas Farring­
ton, Thomas Garraway, and Richard Martin, Jr.; three 
others were names in the Venice Company patent of 1583 
but were servants of other members rather than merchants 
in their own right* The remaining thirteen are among 
the very large group of sixteenth century merchants who 
appear on the periphery of mercantile affairs. They 
trade in their own names and act as factors for wealthier 
merchants, they appear in the Port Books and other formal 
documents but they never emerge from semi-obscurity, 
endowed with a definite history of their own.
It can be seen from the foregoing that the deter­
mination of membership in the Levant Company was not a 
simple matter* Among the original members there was a 
desire either to limit membership severely or to admit 
only those who were factors and apprentices. This was, 
naturally, countered from the outside by those who wished 
to enter the company* There appears to have been a good
301
case for many of the latter who had been trading to 
Spain and Portugal or overland to Venice and who were 
having great difficulties continuing because of the 
break with Spain and the civil war in France* The 
only recourse these merchants had was the government 
and this only because the desired charter of privileges 
emanated from the crown1 s authority. Thus if the ex­
cluded merchants could convince the government that 
the proposals of the older merchants were unfair or, 
better still, not in the best interests of the Queen's 
majesty, the navy, and the increased wealth of the fte- 
alme, then the necessary pressure would be applied to 
achieve the desired end. This would seem to be what 
happened.
With the membership of the new company finally
decided upon the letters patent were issued on 7 January 
311592. x There seems to have been no real controversy 
over the provisions of the patent as there was over the 
membership of the company. There were at least three 
proposed sets of articles which preceeded it but they 
are almost identical to each other and very little 
different from the patent i t s e l f t a l i k e  the earlier
31 Hakluyt VI, 73-93.
32 PR0:SPD Eliz. 151 no. 34 and a copy in BM:Lans. 60
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Turkey and Venice Company patents, this one gave a 
name to the new organization; 11 the Govemour and com­
pany of Marchants of the Levant11, which came to be 
known as the Levant Company. It was given a monopoly, 
to last for twelve years, of trade by sea and land into 
the dominions of the Ottoman EJnpire as well as into the 
dominions of the Signory of Venice. Added to this was 
the right to trade 11 by lande through the Countries of 
the sayde Grand Signior into and from the East India, 
lately discovered by John Newberrie, Ralph Fitch, William 
Leech, and James Storie, sent with our letters to that 
purpose at the proper costs and charge of the sayde 
Marchants or some of them11. This reference to the East 
Indies was the result of Ralph Fitch's return in April 
1591. The merchants may have hoped to follow up Fitch1 s 
reports or they may simply have had the East Indies in­
cluded in their monopoly to insure that no one else 
could try to exploit that route. Their own experiences 
with the overland route during the 1580's would seem to 
discourage its use rather than the reverse. It should 
be noted that the patent clearly specifies "by lande"
no. 3 which is endorsed 14 May 1589; PRO:SFD Eliz. 
231 no. 55, written sometime between November 1589 
and November 1590; and BM:Lans. 66 no. 12, endorsed 
12 March 1591.
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thus leaving the sea route to India still open to any­
one who wished to exploit it.
The patent appointed Edward Osborne the first 
governor, to hold that office for one year. Subse­
quently a governor was to be elected annually by the 
company at large. In addition the patent specified 
that the Company shall appoint twelve assistants who 
shall retain their office for life or until removed 
by the Company. The patent does not specify who the 
first assistants were to be nor does it specify if
33succeeding governors must come from among their number.
As in the Turkey Company's patent, the crown reserved 
the right to appoint, at any time, two persons of its 
own choice to be full members of the Company. The Com­
pany was given the usual rights to assemble from time 
to time to make laws and ordinances for the conduct of 
its affairs, to use a common seal, and to fly the arms 
of England from the tops of their ships.
With respect to customs, a concession was made to 
the relatively slow turnover of capital in long distance 
trade by the provision that it could be paid in two equal
33 In the proposed articles which preceeded the patent 
it was suggested there be six assistants. The change 
may have been an effort to keep control from falling 
into too few hands.
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installments, the first at the end of three months and
the second at the end of six months from the time it
was first due* In addition the patent took account
of the re-export of goods in this trade by providing
that merchants would only have to pay customs inwards
on such goods provided they were re-exported in English
35ships within 13 months of their landing# This proviso 
on re-exports was extended to all Englishmen, even if 
not members of the Levant Company# Thus, in effect, 
a merchant could buy imported goods from a Levant mer­
chant and then re-export them duty free providing he 
had all the necessary cockets and certificates. The 
patent explicitly provided that to forestall deceipt 
in the matter of re-exports, certificates showing pay­
ment of customs inward would be conveyed by the collec­
tor inward to the customer outward#
The presence of the Venice trade in the enlarged 
monopoly of the Levant Company is reflected by the 
patent's explicit concern with the Venetian imposts on 
currants and wine exported from their territories and
34 The original proposal was for the crown to forebare 
the entire customs payment for six months#
35 The original proposal was to give the merchants 18 
months in which to re-export goods and still be free 
of double customs#
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on English goods imported to their territories* This 
was one of the more important matters which demanded 
the attention of the Venice Company during the ISSC^s*
The Levant Company patent provided that for redress of 
these imposts all foreigners would be prohibited from 
importing into England any currants or wine of Candia 
"unlesse it be by and with the licence, consent, and 
agreement of the sayde Governour and company in writing 
under their sayd common seal*••11 If, however, the Vene­
tians should lift their imposts and recompense all im­
post money already paid then this prohibition would be 
lifted* It was further stated in the patent that no 
other persons, not of the Company, would be permitted 
to import currants and wines of Candia Hwithout the 
consent of the sayde Governour and companie in writing 
under their sayd common seale***11 This last proviso 
can only refer to other Englishmen, though it does not 
explicitly say so. Finally the patent made the usual 
proviso that if the grant should prove to be detrimen­
tal to the crown it could be recalled after 18 months 
notice given to the Company*
The final problem, which may not have been settled 
until after the grant of the patent, was the financial 
structure of the company* Should the company administer
a joint stock capital or should it be merely a regula­
tory body? There has been some discussion among the 
historians of this trade as to when the original joint 
stock trade ended. For some time historians had assumed 
the trade remained under a joint stock into the mid-90*s 
but during the past thirty years Mr. A. C* Wood, in 
1935,36 and Prof. T. A. Willan, in 1955,^ touched on 
this question. Wood concluded that the organization 
changed from joint stock to regulated sometime between 
1588 and 1595. Willan suggested that it was a joint 
stock until at least 1588; a conclusion he based on his 
examination of the Port Books. Willan is correct about 
his date - the English joint stock trade to Turkey ended 
on 11 September 1588 - but his reliance on the Port Books 
for his conclusion suggests that he failed to differen­
tiate between a partnership working tinder a joint stock 
and an incorporated monopoly, granted by letters patent, 
working under a joint stock. The Turkey trade can only 
be described as a joint stock trade if there was only 
one joint stock partnership trading there, irrespective 
of grants of monopoly, or if the entire trade, geographi-
36 A History of the Levant Company, pp. 22-3.
37 11 Some Aspects of the English Trade with the Levant 
in the Sixteenth Century11, EHR vol. Ixx 1955, pp. 
399 ff.
cally speaking, was embodied in one company with a mono­
poly based on letters patent and that company traded 
under a joint stock. The latter is, of course, the 
case at hand. The moment the latters patent expired 
the joint stock monopoly ceased to have legal existence. 
Whether or not those who had held the monopoly continued 
to trade in a joint stock is a separate question. The 
point is that now anyone so wishing and able could trade 
to Turkey without legal restriction. What seems to have 
happened, in fact, is that merchants previously excluded 
from the trade immediately took advantage of the lapse 
of the monopoly. The petitions of William Harrison,
John Combe, and Henry Colthurst and Company all make 
clear that soon after the letters patent expired they 
either sent ships of their own or adventured in other 
ships voyaging to the Levant. A similar situation de­
veloped in the Venice trade, though, here there was no 
question of a joint stock being involved.
This question - joint stock or regulated trade - 
does not appear to have entered the discussion pro­
ceeding the new charter until near the end. The first
mention of it is in the letter from William Harbome in 
38July 1591 where he recommended that the trade to Turkey
38 BM:Lans. 67, f. 251.
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be continued in one joint stock. He felt that the frag- 
raentation* of the trade among separate factors of inde­
pendent merchants would lead to disorganizing of the 
buying and selling of goods and consequently to poor 
bargaining. He dealt separately with the trade to 
Venice about which he only said ‘'for thatt it is a well 
governed Christian state, everie one maie deale aparte".
A month later Hawkins and Burrough pronounced much the 
39
same opinion. If the trade to Turkey was not to be 
in a joint stock Mwee are of opinion that yt will soone 
breede confusion to the overthrow of those trades'*.
They offered the same opinion as Harbome's about the 
trade to Venice. In his jottings for the conference 
in August of the same year, Burghley noted at the end 
of the list, that a question to be resolved was whether 
the trade to Turkey should be "mayntained by a societe 
in common or by every merchant severally".^ Another 
opinion, undated and unsigned, but prior to the letters 
patent, stated only that "thei /should/ trade together 
in a Jointe Stocke as before in time of the last pattent 
thei did..."^. The author of this document did not 
mention the Venice trade.
39 PR0:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 124. 40 PR0:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 140.
41 PR0:SPD Eliz. 241 no. 12.
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Unfortunately there was no pro and con argument 
about the financial organization of the new company 
which would make it possible to determine why a decision 
was made one way or another. The anomoly of the whole 
problem is that all the advice - at least all the ex­
tant advice - is that the Turkey trade continue as under 
its first set of privileges but, in fact, all the evi­
dence is that in the 1590's, and ever after, the trade was 
regulated. It is perhaps too soon to pronounce with 
any certainty on this issue but two reasonable explanations 
can be advanced for the decision finally taken. First 
is to note that the suggestion of Harbome, Hawkins, 
and Burrough strikes a curious note: to have one company 
function under two different financial structures at the 
same time. One difficulty, of which the merchants must 
have been aware, was that the Venice and Turkey trades 
presented different problems in one important respect.
The trade to Turkey was entirely dependent on a grant 
of privileges from the Sultan and on the presence at 
his court of an official representative of the English 
government. This was not the case in Venice. There it 
was not necessary to levy consoledge to support an am­
bassador and consuls. If the entire trade were under 
a joint stock then it would be a case of the Venice
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trade being taxed for something which was of no benefit 
to it. Under a regulated trade consoledge can be levied 
at particular centers and the money thus raised used 
only to support the official at that place.
The modem observer of this might object that 
many corporations support one branch of their business 
with revenues from another. But this situation was 
quite different. A group of merchants who had been 
trading independently to the Venetian dominions for 
some years even before they received their first let­
ters patent, were being brought into a new company 
dominated by another group of merchants. These Venice 
merchants had, over the years, established business con­
tacts, bought houses, maintained factors and run their 
own affairs in the area of their trade. It would be 
surprising if they were willing to relinquish control 
over all this in the interests of a competing group of 
merchants. Further, if a joint stock was decided upon 
it would necessitate the immense problem of determining 
the relative worth of the already existing stock of the 
Venice merchants and then what part of the total common 
stock each would represent. It might have been possible 
to unite two joint stock companies but the decision to 
unite these two companies would seem to have precluded
a joint stock for the Levant Company.
The second explanation for the regulated Levant 
trade is that it is no more than recognition of a fait 
accompli. It was seen above that as soon as the patents 
of the Turkey and Venice Companies expired several mer­
chants, who had not been members of those companj^s, 
began trading into the areas covered by their former 
privileges. But more important is that the former 
Venice merchants wasted no time in establishing them­
selves in Turkey and Syria after the Turkey Companies 
monopoly expired, Edward Barton, who became Harbome's 
successor, took up money by exchange in Constantinople 
from several merchants between 1588 and 1591.^ Some 
of these were factors of the former Venice merchants. 
One of them was Henry Farvish who, as seen above, was 
not admitted to the new company in 1592. In March 1591 
a letter to Barton from Aleppo makes reference to the 
presence there of the servants of Edward Ho linden and 
Paul Banning, two of the leading Venice merchants.^
In April of the same year Barton referred specifically 
to Thomas Dawkins, Ho linden* s factor, as being resident 
in Constantinople.^ Thus it can be seen that the
42 BM:Cotton, Nero BXI f. 200.
43 PR0;SP For., Turkey 2, f. 78. 44 Ibid., f. 100.
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Venice merchants were quickly establishing themselves 
in the Turkey trade, even to the extent of contributing 
to the maintenance of the English governments represen­
tative at the Porte. Under such circumstances it would 
have been extremely difficult for the old Turkey mer­
chants to remove these new-comers. This, combined 
with the situation described above made it almost man­
datory that the Levant Company be regulated rather than 
joint-stock in its organization.
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CHAPTER VII
The Levant Company and 
the Origins of the East India Company
The early years of the Levant Company provide 
slightly more in the way of knowledge about the inter­
nal workings of the Company than did the earlier period. 
It is possible to see a little of a regulated company 
at work, to amplify somewhat on the means of compen­
sating company and diplomatic personnel, to throw more 
light on the problem of the payment of foreign debts and 
to offer a few comments on the troubles the Company had 
with its charter in 1600 and 1605* In addition the ex­
amination of several questions from the 1580's continues 
into the final period of this study. Finally, some 
comments can be offered on why the sea route to eastern 
Asia was not effectively used before 1600.
In outline the course of the Levant trade in the 
1590's was basically littleAfrom that in the 1580's.
As stated before the Turkey and Venice Companies were 
now one. Furthermore, unlike the Turkey Company, the 
Levant Company regulated the trade of its members and 
did not conduct trade in its own name. Thus where some 
Englishmen in the Levant had been factors of the Turkey 
Company they now became factors for individual members
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of the Levant Company. John Sanderson, for example,
who had been the Turkey Company's factor from 1584 to
1588, returned to Constantinople in late 1591 as factor
for Thomas Cordell. Similarly, other former servants
of the Turkey Company became factors for one or more
members of the Levant Company. This change, of course,
made no difference in the Venetian branch of the trade,
since it had been regulated all along. The question of
who was factor for idiom seldom produces a clear answer.
Sanderson dealt for other merchants as well as Cordell.
Mathew Stoker was factor for Robert Sandy at Petras but
he also dealt for other merchants* and similarly with
Oliver Gardiner at Zante who was factor for Edward 
2Ho linden. Some factors served no master but dealt for 
anyone who required their services. Such was the case 
of Jonas Aldrich at Petras and Abraham Nottingham at
3
both Petras and Constantinople. These men were in 
constant communication with each other about the sale 
of their master's goods. Information was continually 
passed back and forth among then concerning the state 
of the market in their various locations. If it seemed 
better for a given commodity in one place than in an-
1 PRO: HCA, Exam. 35 f. 317v. 2 Ibid., f. 340.
3 Ibid., f. 317v and 319.
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other then the goods were sent there, consigned to one 
of the factors in residence who in turn sold the goods 
and either returned the money to the first factor or 
invested it in goods to be returned to England. In 
August 1596, for example, Elizeus So them, in Aleppo, 
had some cloths on hand for the account of Henry Ander­
son and John Bate in London. He could have bartered 
them, he found, but learned that in Constantinople they 
could be sold for ready money. He thus sent them there, 
and asked John Sanderson to try to sell them. In addition, 
Sothem had on hand some Muscovy tanned skins which he 
wthought good to send for a traill11.^ There were seven 
cloths in all ranging from a fine Kentish blue of about 
42 yards in length which cost £24.4s9d in London to a 
poppinjay of about 30 yards in length which cost £9.6s 
in London. The skins, twelve of them, cost together
a
£5.12 • Some months later Sanderson wrote to John Bate
5
that he had been unable so far to sell these goods.
Requests of this sort were not refused because the 
successful course of the trade depended on cooperation 
among the factors. Furthermore, there was a profit to 
be made. A factor received for each transaction he per-
4 BM:Lans. 241 f. 315v. 5 Ibid., f. 403.
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formed, be it for another factor or a London merchant, 
factorage ranging from 2% to 4%. ^
The Levant Company, itself, played no role in these 
everyday relations between merchant and factor, and fac­
tor and factor* This is clear from the letters received 
and sent by the Company* Although there are not very 
many such letters still in existence there are more for 
the 1590's than there were for the 1580's* In the earlier 
period, the Turkey Company transmitted fairly detailed in­
structions to its factors concerning the conduct of the 
trade and received in return similar reports from them 
about the state of the trade* In the 1590's, however, 
this type of information was exchanged between merchant 
and factor* The letters of William Clarke are largely 
of this nature* John Sanderson copied only four of his 
letters to William Cordell into his letter book but each 
of these contains information that one would expect a
6 A fairly detailed picture of this aspect of the trade 
can be gained from Sanderson's letters and also from 
those of William Clarke* (BM: Sloan 867) A helpful 
description of a factor's basic duties based on Clarke's 
letters can be found in P. R* Harris, "The Letter Book 
of William Clarke, Merchant in Aleppo, 1598-1602", MA 
Thesis, University of London, 1953* Almost all of the 
letters in Clarke's letterbook are those he sent* San­
derson, however, included in his letterbook a great 
many letters he received as well, thus both sides of a 
correspondence can be found at times*
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factor to send to the merchant he serves* It is possible 
to make a comparison here because Sanderson also carried 
on a brief correspondence with the Company. Between 
July 1596 and January 1597 the ambassador, Edward Barton, 
accompanied the Sultan, Mehmet III^ on his military cam­
paign into Hungary and appointed Sanderson his deputy 
while he was away* In the five letters that were ex­
changed between Sanderson, the Company, and Richard 
Stapers, governor of the Company, trade was mentioned 
only once and then seemingly only as a matter of courtesy
g
on the part of Sanderson* The communications concerned 
themselves mainly with a new secretary for Barton, who 
was on his way out, controversies with the French over 
privileges, the building of a warehouse at Scandroon, 
the provision of funds for the ambassador's stipend and 
expenses, the replacement of the consul at Aleppo and 
general news about a number of other matters* This 
pattern is seen again several years later when the Com­
pany appointed Sanderson its consul and treasurer at 
Constantinople* During the 18 months he remained in 
that position he had 10 letters sent to the Company and
7 Murad III had died in January 1595*
8 These letters were all printed, with only minor omiss­
ions, in Foster, Sanderson * pp. 158, 160, 165, 166, 168*
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two received from it all copied into his letter book
in addition to several between himself and the resident 
9
ambassador* There are also extant from this period 10 
letters from the Company to various persons in Turkey 
which were entered in a letter book, the remainder of 
which subsequently became the first court minute book 
of the East India Company* ^  All these letters serve 
to confirm that the Company did not involve itself at 
all in the conduct of the trade*
One incident reveals the sensitivity of the Com­
pany about anything which might seem to circumscribe 
its area of authority* It had appointed Thomas Sandy 
consul at Aleppo but unfortunately he died shortly after 
reaching Turkey and before reaching Aleppo* The company 
of merchants at Aleppo, unwilling to accept in his place
9 The essential parts of these letters printed in Foster, 
op* cit*, passim*
10 This entire manuscript was printed by Henry Stevens 
in The Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies*
1886, The Levant Company1s letters appear on pages 
265-83.
11 The reiteration of this point may seen a belaboring 
of the obvious; it is well known that in a regulated 
trade the company did not itself conduct trade* But 
it is known mainly from the definition of such a com­
pany rather than from evidence of the company in 
operation* These few Levant Company letters are al­
most the only surviving evidence from before the 
seventeenth century which give any insight to the 
functioning of a regulated company*
the vice-consul, George Dorrington, on their own ini­
tiative elected Ralph Fitch. Sanderson, acting for 
Barton, communicated this information to the Company 
in London stating that in his opinion by doing this 
on their own initiative those in Aleppo had shown pre­
sumption and want of discreation.•.both to the ambassa­
dor and Your Worships. ••11 He did, however, add that he
12thought Fitch to be a good choice for the position.
The Company demurred in that choice and wrote that it 
had appointed its own candidate, Richard Colthurst, 
who was on his way to take up the post. As for Fitch, 
the Company considered him a Sufficient manM but "be­
cause our orders is that the consull must be made here 
and here take his othe and enter into bond for the trewe
and upright usinge himself in his office, and therfore
13we do not allowe of their choice ther att Allepo...,,AJ 
There was in fact a Company ordinance to the effect 
that no one would be permitted to go to Turkey without 
first being presented to the governor and taking his 
oath. If any member of the Company should send out a 
servant or factor without first doing the above he was
12 Foster, op. cit., p. 159.
13 Ibid., p. 167.
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to be fined £50.^ This regulation seems to have been 
passed at about the same time the incident over the con­
sul at Aleppo took place and may have been provoked by 
it; though the sending out of a factor is not strictly 
comparable with the appointment of a consul* The Com­
pany evidently was determined to maintain some control 
over those persons who served in the Levant. There is 
no information which indicates whether or not the Com­
pany took the same position with respect to the Venetian
branch of the trade. There is no evidence of a consul
15representing the Company at Venice before 1606.
Though the Company was alert to any incursions on 
the exercise of its prerogative to appoint officials, 
once its wishes along these lines were known there seems 
to have been little resistance to then. However, with 
another matter the solution was not so easy. One of the
14 BM:Harl. 306 f. 73v. This document, occupying folios 
72-74v, is headed **Standinge Ordenaunces bothe penall 
and otherwise*1. These regulations were passed at court 
meetings of the Company and this document is simply a 
list of then, followed by a reference to the folio in 
the court minute book where the original entry was 
made. The minute book has not survived and few of
the entries are dated so the exact date of the vari­
ous rules is uncertain. They all clearly date from 
the 1590*3 and probably run throughout. The first 
reference is from folio 66 of the minute book and the 
last from folio 272. The last entry, from its context, 
dates from late 1593 or early 1599.
15 Wood, op. cit., p. 65.
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Company's main problems and perhaps one of its main func­
tions as a corporate body, was the financial maintenance 
of the ambassador and consuls and the provision of periodic 
gifts to the Sultan and his officials. This money was 
raised from consoledge of 2% on the value of goods in­
ward and again outward and from impositions raised for 
specific purposes. There seems to have been only moder­
ate objection to the payment of consoledge which was used 
to support the consul and the whole mercantile establish­
ment upon which the English factors were dependent. The 
consul was their immediate intermediary with the local 
officials, he maintained a house in which some of the 
factors lived, settled disputes among them and generally 
looked after their interests. But the payment of the 
ambassador was a different matter. Generally ambassa­
dors were paid by the governments they represented.
Some time in 1596 the Company pointed out to the Eng­
lish government that the French king supplied his am­
bassador in Constantinople with some 20,000 crowns per
year in addition to assuming the cost of the various
16presents. The English government steadfastly refused 
to assume this responsibility, though it did contribute
16 PRO:SPF Turkey, 2 f. 235.
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£500 for Barton's expenses in October 1590^ and another
18£600 in October 1594* These were extraordinary pay­
ments, however, made in response to pressure from the 
Company and did not represent a change of policy on the 
part of the government. Perhaps it can be said that they 
represent an admission from the government that it did 
have an obligation to support its own ambassador. How­
ever, it attempted to avoid this obligation as much as 
possible.
The simplest means of payment for the ambassador 
was out of consoledge. In August 1590 George Barnes,
17 See supra p.
18 PRO;Exchequer, Tellers Roll 150. The mechanics of 
these payments are interesting though specific evi­
dence exists only for the latter. The money was 
paid to William Aldridge by tallies drawn on the 
customs paid by the Levant merchants. Four such 
tallies were drawn to make up the £6Q0: £138.18S3 ,
£207.5s4d, £112.3S11 , and £141.12S6 . The Exchequer 
apparently insisted that money so drawn be accounted 
for in detail. There is a miscellaneous customs 
account £218/16/ which does this for the second 
tally listed above. It is from the account of 
Robert Dowe, collector of tonnage and poundage 
outward and lists the names of the ships, the mer­
chants and the amount of customs owed by each for 
goods laded on specific days. The entries add up
to the £207.5s4<i of the tally and at the bottom it 
is noted that “This some paide to Aldridge out of 
the Custome by the merchaunts of Levant” • Presum­
ably the other tallies were accounted for in the 
same way. Quite clearly the Crown did not intend 
to pay money out to the Levant merchants without 
assurance that they would pay the same amount into 
the Exchequer.
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wrote to Burghley to complain that the merchants in
London had paid out £900 to Barton by exchange since
Harborne's departure from Turkey. He suggested that
Barton's expenses might better be met from consoledge
levied on the merchants' sales and purchases in Turkey.
Instructions to this effect were evidently issued, though
not with the desired effect. In April 1591 Barton wrote
to Burghley that the “Companye prentises" refuse to obey
70the orders for his maintenance • w In the January and 
February preceeding he had admonished Edward Collins, 
who seems to have been consul in Aleppo at that time, 
because he had not received money due him from consol­
edge. Collins replied in March accusing Barton of seem­
ing to claim that the entire proceeds of the 4% consoledge 
should be for his own provision. He denied that was so 
and insisted only that which was left over from his ex­
penses should be sent to Barton. Part of his reply gives 
an insight to Collins' exasperation over the issue.
“Thinke you thatt wee the Companies servants 
can live heare upon nothings that you should 
geve suche order not to paye us some aspers; 
have wee noe chargs thinke you in house keping 
as servants wag/e/s and jenesaries, doe wee 
not present newe bashawes, leftadares, and 
cadies when they come, besydes thousands of
19 BM:Lans. 65 no. 27 20 PRO:SPF Turkey 2 f. 100.
other things, which I thinke you dothe knowe, 
and howe shall wee doe this butt upon the 
consoledge, for other allowance wee hav non,*. 
wee are to be mayntayned of the consoledge, 
for wee are heare to collect the same and no 
other goods or worke wee have of the com­
panies, and therefore yt dothe appertayne 
unto us to see the dewe collecting of the 
aforesaid Consoledge to the uttermoste, 
which I for in godwilling therein
will not fayle.”^ 1
The ”wee” to whom Collins makes reference were evidently 
himself, Nicholas Salter, and Christopher Audeley, Among 
them they seem to have been the London merchants1 repre­
sentatives in Aleppo and Tripoly from 1587 to at least 
1591. In October 1590, two months after George Barnes1 
letter to Burghley, a summary account was drawn up stat­
ing that from September 1587 to February 1590 they had
spent £l697.11sld in charges ”ordinary and extraordinary”
22in Aleppo and Tripoly, An account of the money received
by Barton, alone, from the time Harbome left Turkey, was
23rendered in January 1592. This shows that Barton re­
ceived, including money left by Harbome, almost double 
the amount spent by Collins, Salter and Audeley. With 
such expenditures it is no wonder George Barnes asked 
Burghley to warn Barton and that Collins found it diffi­
cult to meet his demands. This account indicated that
21 PRO:SPF Turkey 2 f. 78.
22 EM:Cotton, Nero BXI f. 196. 23 Ibid., f. 200.
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Barton had received slightly more than 12,000 ducats, 
of which only 333 came from consoledge. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the raising of consoledge was 
a recent innovation of the English in Turkey. When 
trade is in a joint-stock and thus conducted by a single, 
corporate individual, resistance to payments of this 
kind is a meaningless idea on the part of the overseas 
factors. Once, however, the joint-stock came to an end 
the raising of money to maintain an overseas establish­
ment became a problem. It was solved initially by Barton 
using his authority as the Crown's representative to de­
mand money from the factors in Turkey. He took up the 
money by bills of exchange drawn on London in favor of 
the factor's master. The first of these transactions 
listed in Barton's account was a bill in February 1589 
for 700 ducats (£188.17s) made out in favor of Henry 
Parvish. The last, for the same amount, was in February 
1591, in favor of Richard Stapers.
During the interim between the end of the Turkey 
Company and the beginning of the Levant Company there 
seems to have been no set amount of money assigned as 
Barton's annual stipend and he requisitioned vAiat he 
could from the merchant's factors. After the Levant 
Company received its corporate status it seems to have
set £1000 a year as Barton's annual compensation* But 
already in July 1592 he was writing to Burghley that he 
needed more than that. Furthermore, he found it 11 un- 
conshonable" that the merchants wanted to pay him at 
the rate of 10s the ducat. ^  If this was so it cer­
tainly was unconscienable since the usual rate was 5s 
the ducat. The money to pay Barton's regular stipend 
seems still to have been taken up by him from the mer­
chant's factors where he could find it and when he could 
persuade a factor to part with the money. He relied 
mainly on John Sanderson who was factor^ for William 
Cordell and also served Henry Garraway. But even Sander­
son sometimes had difficulty in finding the necessary 
money. This system evidently was followed until Barton's 
death in 1597. He, of course, was never satisfied and 
at one point took up an unauthorized £500 from John Bate 
with a bill drawn on the Lord Treasurer. When the Com­
pany presented this to the government the immediate re­
action was to reject it stating that Barton's expenses
25were the responsibility of the Company. This sum was 
apparently over and above Barton's regular stipend and 
he claimed he needed the extra funds because he was re-
24 BM:Cotton, Nero BXI f. 131v.
25 Stevens, op. cit., p. 267.
quired to accompany the Sultan on a military expedition
o g
into Hungary* Whether the Exchequer ever satisfied 
the Company is not clear but in 1600 the Company re­
minded Henry Lello, Barton's successor, of this inci­
dent and warned him not to exceed his authority in that 
27manner*
This rather irregular system of having the ambassa­
dor try to persuade the factors to accept his bills, which 
were then passed on to London, was not to the Company's 
liking* It decided in August 1598 to try something 
different by raising imprest money on merchant's goods 
sent to Turkey. The rate was to be a half dollar on 
every kersey, every hundredweight of tin and every 
hundred of conyskins; a dollar and a half on every 
broad cloth and a dollar on every £3 value of other 
goods* Initially this imprest was to be collected only 
on the goods going out in the Royal Exchange* then in 
February 1599 it was levied on the cargoes of the Hector 
and the Lanarett and finally in December 1599 it was 
levied again on the Royal Exchange and the George 
"•••and all such ships as shall herafter be fraighted
26 Foster, op* cit*, p. 146.
27 Steven, op* cit., p. 267.
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28by the Company to Aleppo or Constantinople...” John
Sanderson was appointed by the Company as treasurer and
consul at Constantinople for the primary purpose of col-
29lecting the imprest money and the regular consoledge.
This imprest money was to be raised only as a loan and
was to be repaid to the various merchants by bills of
s dexchange, at the rate of 5 6 the dollar, drawn by San­
derson on the Company in London. The Company explained 
to Henry Lello, the first ambassador to receive the money 
raised in this way, that it was motivated by its "care to 
avoide the sending of Billes of exchaunge made upon us 
either for Venice or for England; and also all question 
of accepting the same, when they come uppon us unexpected 
and wee unprovided. •.
Such an arrangement should have settled the matter 
but Sanderson1s efforts to collect this money raised the 
issue of the effective authority of the Company in Tur­
key. He met with resistance almost immediately and in 
August 1599 wrote to London that "the company here... 
doth not alow, nor will not accept of, the order taken 
ther by Your Worships concerning the ambassator; flattly
28 Foster, op. cit., p. 196.
29 His instructions are in his letter book, BM:Lans. 
241 f. 65.
30 Stevens, op. cit., p. 266.
3 a?
denyng either to pay imposition or consoladge.•.saing
they have no order therof from ther masters.•.Other
hath said all ther do not consent when comition is
31geven under but the govonor and treasurer*1 . In Oc- 
32tober the situation had not improved even though Lello 
had used his authority as ambassador to collect the money. 
The factors had offered to pay Lello at 6s the dollar 
and he was willing to accept it because he needed the 
money but Sanderson refused to give bills at variance 
with his instructions. By December, however, some im­
prest money began to come in and Sanderson, in order to 
provide the ambassador and to avoid trouble, agreed to
.................................. o O ..............................
accept it at 6s the dollar. From that time on^the 
money was collected more easily than at first though 
never as rapidly nor as much as Sanderson would have 
liked. In March 1600 only one-third of Lello1s 3000 
chekins stipend came from imprest and consoledge money. 
Another third Sanderson had to take up from an English 
factor in Venice and the remaining third on his own cre­
dit. ^  It was not until July 1600 that he received a
31 Foster, op. cit., p. 178. Sanderson*s instructions 
were signed only by Richard Stapers, governor and 
Henry Anderson, treasurer.
32 Ibid., p. 181. 33 Ibid., p. 188.
34 Ibid., p. 200.
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letter from the Company in reply to his complaints about
35defiance of its authority. In effect the Company said 
there was nothing it could do other than send a copy of 
the order made in the general court. In reply to San­
derson^ request for some compensation for his troubles 
in collecting this money they offered him %%• With this 
he was not satisfied and replied that tt...concerning the 
consideration Your Worships have allotted me in the col­
lection, being so smaule, I cannot like of, but looke
36for a better reward, or will present you my service11. 
Whether or not this was the reason, he had presented
his service by January 1601 though he did not close out
.............................................................. 3 7 ..........
his account with the Company until 5 Hay 1601. The
only hint he gave of his reasons is in a letter to 
Nicholas Leate in London written just before his de­
parture from Constantinople. In reference to the po­
sition of treasurer he said nGod send them a better 
officer in my place; for if I had thought it would have
bine so troblesom, I would not have medled with it for
38400 chequins, our mony11. No more is heard in detail 
about the particular problem of the collection of these
35 Ibid., p. 193. It was written on 1 March.
36 Ibid., p. 206. 37 Ibid., p. 218.
38 Ibid., p. 219.
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monies. The problem by no means ended for at the end 
of the year Lello wrote to the Company that the consul 
at Aleppo, Richard Colthurst, had informed him he could 
not afford to send any more money. Thus Lello was forced 
to take up 1500 chekins from some factors in Constanti- 
nople.
The main point about the above episodes is that they 
illustrate the difficulty the Company in London had in 
making its authority felt in the Levant, Although it is 
never said in so many words the implication is that the 
factors considered the merchants to be their masters and 
not the Company, Thus they would only follow instructions 
given to them by those merchants for whom they conducted 
trade, Whether or not Sanderson's success in collecting 
some of the imprest money was the result of instructions 
passed to the factors from the merchants in London is 
not known. The entire episode raises the image of the 
Levant merchants agreeing to a course of action at a 
general court in London and then acquiesing in its 
avoidance in Turkey, It might be asked why the factors 
should care, one way or the other, about the payment of 
this imprest since the money was not theirs in the first
39 BM:Cotton, Nero BXI f, 106v,
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place. The point is, though, that they depended for 
their income on the volume of business conducted. Money
turned over to the ambassador was money on which they 
could not collect factorage. Some of this desire to 
use the money for other purposes was suggested by Bar­
ton in October 1595 When he wrote to Sanderson and 
asked for part of his yearly pention. He stated that 
M,,.I will and requier you that you suffer nott sutch 
soms of mony as you have in your hands,, • to be imployed
on other affairs, but to reserve the same for my alow-
«40ance and pention,,," Sanderson, himself, when he was 
responsible for collecting consoledge and imprest money, 
alludes to a related but slightly different reason for 
the difficulty in collecting the money. In March 1600 
he wrote to the Company that "Consoledge, no more gather­
ed then formerly 1 have writt of,.. For as yett littell 
hath bine sould, and they that are to pay are loth to 
part from it; som answearinge that they will deliver in 
three monthes after they have made saile /sale/, and 
others unwillinge at all11. ^  Most of those resident 
in the Levant were merchants and merchants1 factors.
For them the narrower dictates of trade took precedence
40 Foster, op, cit,, p, 143, 41 Ibid,, p, 200,
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over all else.
There is less that can be said about the Company^ 
organization and functioning in London. The letters 
patent provided for a governor to be elected annually 
and 12 assistants to be appointed by the Company for 
life or until removed from office. The first governor 
named in the patent was Sir Edward Osborne. But he died 
in June of that year. For only three subsequent years 
is the governor known: Richard Stapers in 1596 and 1599^
/ *9
and Thomas Say the, son of Customer Smythe in 1600. It 
is not surprising to find Stapers, elected governor of 
the Company but the choice of Staythe cannot be explained. 
During the next 25 years he became one of the most emi­
nent and influential men in the commercial life of Lon­
don. He held the governorship of nearly all the major 
trading companies during that time including - aside 
from the Levant Company - the East India Company, the 
Muscovy Company, and the Virginia Company. But in 1600 
there was no reason to suppose he would be a likely 
choice for any such office. At least so it would seem 
from a present day vantage point. Nothing appears in
42 Cal. Salis. VI, p. 385 and BM:Lans. 241 f. 65v.
43 He is styled governor in March 1600. Foster, op. 
cit. p. 193n.
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the surviving record to give any indication of why Staythe 
was chosen governor of the Company in that year. He is 
not known to have been a member of the Company before 
that time. The only record of his trade shows him im­
porting madder, hops, Holland cloth, oker, flax, and 
raisins between October 1587 and September 1589 offi­
cially valued at £413.3s10<i and all coming from Middle-
burg.^ In early 1595 he imported some wine from the 
45same place. Aside from the above there is no record 
of his trade in the 15901s. No doubt this is due to 
the paucity of customs records for that period. But 
it is his apparent absence from the affairs of the Lev­
ant Company in the 1590*s that makes his appointment as 
governor a curious one. That his father was one of the 
founders of the trade is not a sufficient explanation.
There were clearly other considerations involved, know­
ledge of which has been lost.
The Company also had a treasurer and a registrar.
Only two of the persons who held the office of treasurer
are known: Henry Anderson in 1599 and John Eldred in
461600. The only known specific duty of the treasurer
44 PRO: Port Books 7/8, 8/1, and 8/4.
45 PRO: Port Book 9/7.
46 BM:Lans. 241 f. 65 and Foster, op. cit., p. 193n.
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was to receive bills of exchange drawn on the Company
for the purpose of paying the ambassador’s salary.^
The registrar’s function was to take account of all
goods imported and exported by members of the Company
48and to see that no one exceeded his stint. Probably
the Company had other officers but this is not known.
It did have committees but what they were is also not 
49known. Finally, there was the court of assistants 
which, with the office of governor, was the only govern­
ing body mentioned in the letters patent. Its member­
ship was probably quite stable, since it was not subject 
to annual election, but its members are not known. A 
reasonable guess can be made from two letters signed 
by members of the Company. One was directed to Robert 
Cecil in September 1596 and signed by John Spencer,
Richard Stapers (governor), William Garraway, Thomas
50Cordell, Thomas Symonds, John Eldred and Andrew Banning. 
The other was directed to John Sanderson in his capacity 
of treasurer in Constantinople in March 1600 and signed
47 BM:Lans. 241 f. 65 where Sanderson is instructed to
direct bills for the repayment of the imprest money
to Henry Anderson.
48 BM:Harl. 306 f. 74.
49 BMiHarl. 306 f • 73v where reference is made to the
election of committees.
50 Cal. Salis. VI p. 385.
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by Thomas Snythe (governor), Richard Stapers, William 
Garraway, Thomas Cordell, John Eldred, Leonard Poore, 
Nicholas Salter, and Arthur Jackson,^ However, it 
does not follow necessarily that because these men 
spoke for the Company they were of its court of assi­
stants; though five of them were named as assistants
52in the charter of December 1600,
The few statistics that can be found for the trade 
conducted by the members of this organization in the 
1590*8 indicate that its overall character had not 
changed from the previous decade but that the union of 
the two companies brought about some changes in shipping 
patterns. The most obvious and expected is that now the 
same ship visited both Venetian and Turkish ports during 
the time of its stay in the Mediterranean, thus combin­
ing the two trades in practice as well as in name. Cer­
tainly one of the functions of this patterns, as suggested 
earlier, was to allow the ships from Turkey to lade cur­
rants for ballast back to England, Such was the case 
with the Royal Exchange in 1596 £315/ whose cargo can 
be seen to fit this pattern, £see Appendix B/ Such also
51 Foster, op. cit., p, 193n.
52 Cecil T. Carr, Select Charters of Trading Companies, 
1530-1707. 1913, p. 32.
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was the pattern with a number of other ships which can 
be found in the Shipping List and no doubt there were 
others than those listed. Several ships put into the 
Venetian islands more than once while in the Mediterranean. 
The charter party in Appendix B gives instructions for 
such a route. The ships £346 and 347/ were first to 
put into Zante, then proceed on to Scandroon, then re­
turn to Zante and Petras, then return to Scandroon for 
their final lading before returning to England. With 
variations a similar pattern was followed by a number 
of ships; certainly more than are indicated in the 
Shipping List. It was probably true that very few 
ships in the Levant trade put into only one Mediterranean 
port before returning to England. A few ships are seen 
to have put into Venice, itself, in addition to Ottoman 
ports. £295, 314, 357, 448/ As before there were no 
doubt more ships that did this than are indicated.
The old route of ships going first to Leghorn then to 
the Venetian islands, and perhaps also further east, 
still was followed. With one exception £412/ there 
were still no ships putting into both Leghorn and Venice.
The number of ships per year in the Levant trade 
which show up in the Shipping List varies considerably 
from two in 1592 to 23 in 1599. This fluctuation is
33£
due in part to incomplete information. Not only were 
there probably ships in the Levant trade of which no 
record has survived but, as in the 1580*8, there is 
every reason to suppose that some of the ships listed 
as having sailed only as far as Leghorn more than likely 
went further east. For example in 1592 the Hercules« 
the Susan, the Merchant Royal, and the Charity £258,
259, 260, 261/ were all ships used in the Levant trade 
on other occasions. It is quite likely they were so 
used in 1592 because it is unlikely, though not im­
possible, that such large ships would have been used 
for the Leghorn run alone. Similarly with the Mermaid 
and the Prosperity in 1594 £304, 309/, the Centurion 
and the Mermaid in 1596 £328, 335/, the Phoenix in 1600 
£413/, the Susan Bona venture. Royal Merchant and Desire 
in 1601 £432, 440, 450/, and others. The problem in 
assessing the accuracy of the number of voyages shown 
is that there is no way of knowing how many there actual­
ly were. The only precise statement about Levant shipping
52came from the Turkey merchants in 1590. In 1600 the 
Company stated that it had employed 30 ships wthis yeare11. ^  
In January 1603 the governor of Zante reported to Venice
52 See Supra pp.
53 PR0:SPD Eliz. 276 no. 60.
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that the English send more than 30 ships a year through
54the Straight of Gibraltar. It is not certain whether 
in his estimation he was excluding those ships which 
went only to the western Mediterranean; probably he 
was. However, these last two statements are no reason 
to suppose there were thirty ships per year in the Lev­
ant trade throughout the 1590,s.
There were circumstances which serve to explain 
why one should expect to find different numbers of ships 
going out in different years. Not the least of these 
was the necessity periodically to present the Sultan 
with a present in order to insure his continued support 
of the capitulations. The present was doubly important 
upon the accession of a new Sultan. In 1595, upon the 
death of Murad III, Mehmet III became the Ottoman ruler, 
thus creating the occasion for the English to send a new 
present to his court. It was also necessary that the 
capitulation, originally secured by William Harbome, 
be renewed with the new Sultan. The ambassador, Edward 
Barton, immediately attempted to do this before the pre­
sent had been sent. The Sultan, however, refused to 
accept this arrangement and thus the English were ac-
54 CSP Ven. 1592-1603, p. 516.
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tually without formal capitulations until March or April
551601. J The delay of some four years caused the Company
considerable trepidation. It also required a letter of
congratulations from the Queen to the new Sultan and
the appointment of a special envoy to accompany the
present. In the end, the envoy was not appointed and
the gift was presented by Barton*s successor, Henry
Lello.^ The Company finally received the letter of
congratulations from the Queen early in 1596 after three
separate petitions for it.”*^  The present, however, was
not sent out until February 1599 on board the Hector
£375/. This delay is nowhere clearly explained but it
cannot have been entirely the doing of the Company.
Wood stated that it did not seem to have caused any ill
58feeling on the part of the Turks, but an action of the 
Company suggests that it must have been concerned about
55 CSP Ven. 1592-1603, pp. 435-6. The Venetian ambassa­
dor reported this situation in some detail to Venice. 
The capitulations, as finally granted are printed in 
Foster, op. cit., pp. 282-7.
56 An account of the present and its delivery is to be 
found in Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant, 
ed. by J. Bent, lod3.
57 Cal. Salis. V, pp. 486, 501; VI, p. 21. In June 1596 
Richard Stapers, as governor of the Company, sent a 
present of two Turkey carpets to Robert Cecil as a 
return for his favor in obtaining this letter from 
the Queen. (Ibid., p. 215.)
58 Levant Trade, p. 27.
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the Turks actions with respect to its trade in the ab­
sence of the present. In August 1598 the Company passed 
an ordinance to the effect that "No ship shall go to 
Scio, Constantinople, Smyrna or other ports of the 
Archepelego, Alexandretta or Tripoly befor the present 
be sent11. If a ship should violate this its lader would
erg
be fined £500. In about December of the same year
this restraint was reiterated but at the same time the
60Royal Exchange was licensed to go to Scandroon [355/.
The Shipping List show three ships having departed for 
the eastern Mediterranean in 1598 and eight in the follow­
ing year. The difference may, in part, be the chance sur­
vival of records, but certainly is also explained by the 
restraint imposed because of the present to the Sultan.
In 1600 there were again eight ships which put into the 
various Ottoman ports. It is tempting to suggest that 
this represented about the number which would have gone 
if nothing interfered but this cannot be affirmed. Several 
years earlier than the incidents described above the Com­
pany passed an ordinance to the effect that "This year no 
one shall ship out more than one half his stint".^ The 
year is not given but the statement's position in the
59 BM:Harl. 306 f. 73v.
61 Ibid., f. 73.
60 Ibid., f. 74v.
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"Standinge Ordenaunces11 suggests 1596. In that year no 
Company ships have been found in the eastern Mediterranean 
and only three in the Venetian possessions. Again the 
lack of surviving records no doubt explains this in 
part - it was suggested above that the Cherubin and 
Mermaid may have gone east from Leghorn in 1596 - but 
the action of the Company also must have contributed to 
the small number of ships in the trade that year. No 
explanation whatever has been found for this ordinance; 
though, it might have been related to the accession of 
a new Sultan.
Another element that possibly contributed to ir­
regularity in the Levant trade was privateering. It is 
not that the privateers interfered with the legitimate 
trade but that they often used the same ships which at 
other times were used by the Levant Company. For example 
the Shipping List shows only two ships in the Levant in 
1591. In that same year at least seven large ships which 
had been used in the Levant and were to be so used again 
were at sea on privateering ventures: the Centurion. 
Cherubin. Golden Noble. Margaret and John. Mayflower.
62Susan, and Tiger, ranging in burden from 170 to 300 tons.
62 Andrews, Privateering, pp. 243-9.
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In April of that same year the Merchant Royal set out
as part of James Lancaster's first expedition to the
Indies* It returned to England before the rest of its
63companion ships and by January 1593 was at Leghorn £260/ 
on a merchant's voyage and possibly went further into 
the Levant* In 1594 the Royal Exchange and the Mayf lower *
(LA
in 1595 the Allcedo. in 1597 the Ascension* all ships 
used in the Levant trade, were on privateering ventures 
and there were probably others* Aside from the removal 
of these ships from their use in legitimate trade it 
should be noted that many of them were set out by mem- 
bers of the Levant Company, especially Cordell, Banning 
and Garraway* These privateering ventures may have ab­
sorbed that capital which would otherwise have been in­
vested in the Levant trade, thus reducing the size of 
that trade from time to time* This last conclusion, 
however, is quite speculative* The above discussion is 
not set forth to prove that the Shipping List contains 
a view of shipping which is not open to doubt* Rather 
it is intended to show that there were at work circum­
stances which would lead one to expect irregular flue-
63 The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster* ed. by Sir 
William Foster, London, 1940, pp. 1, 4*
64 Andrews, op* cit*, p* 76.
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tuations in the number of ships in the Levant trade 
from year to year* It should be remembered also that 
decisions about shipping in this trade were taken by 
the individual merchants and not by the Company* Thus 
there was no overall policy about the number of ships 
that went out each year* As pointed out above, if a 
merchant-ship owner decided upon an alternative use 
for his vessel, then it was not laded for the Levant.
By the same reasoning the total value of goods 
and money sent to the Levant each year was not deter­
mined by a common decision but rather by individual 
decisions based on capital available, success with 
previous investments, alternative uses for capital, 
and news received in London about the market* These 
all had to be weighed and balanced before a final de­
cision was reached by each individual merchant* To a 
certain extent wealthier merchants who carried on a 
substantial trade and maintained one or more factors 
had to trade every year in order to support their 
establishments both in London and in the Levant* The 
extent of this problem can be seen from a list of the 
Levant Company members and their servants compiled in 
June 1600*^ There are 83 members listed of which 17
65 Cal* Salis* X, pp. 214ff*
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each had five or more servants which came to about 60% 
of the Company's servants - Edward Holmden had twelve 
and William Garraway and John Eldred each had nine.
Some of the servants listed were, of course, resident 
in London and functioned to keep up the home end of the 
business. They, undoubtedly, could be supported by other 
branches of a merchant's activities as well. But those in 
the Levant were dependent on their master's continued in­
vestment in that trade. In only one case does the list 
distinguish between the two groups of servants. For 
Richard Stapers it states he had "7 persons on the 
other side of the Streights" and six other servants - 
presumably in London. Below these merchants there were 
22 others each of whom had four or fewer servants. 
Finally, there were those who pooled their resources 
and used the services of only one factor among them.
John Hanger, best known as John Sanderson's servant, 
also served Ralph Fitch, Hewet Stapers, and William 
Was tall. William Goumey and William Yeoworde each 
served five different merchants, and Owen Trewe was 
factor for eight merchants. In the case of these latter 
merchants, it is clear that no one of them was under the 
same compulsion to maintain an investment in the trade 
as were the greater merchants.
Some of this is reflected in the few glimpses
there are of the relative amounts traded by some of
the merchants* In 1594, when the Hercules departed
from Scandroon, 75% of the value of its cargo was
accounted for by Edward Holmden, John Spencer and
66William Garraway. u In 1595 when the Susan departed 
from London for the Levant 63*5% of its cargo was 
accounted for by Paul Banning and some associates* his 
brother Andrew, and Thomas Cordell, out of a total of 
13 merchants listed* At the same time 51*5% of the 
cargo of the Royal Exchange was accounted for by Thomas
67Cordell and William Garraway out of 14 merchants listed. 
When this ship returned to London in Kay 1596 the same 
two merchants accounted for 51.4% of its cargo out of a 
total of 20 merchants. /Appendix B/ Each of the above 
merchants is included among those 17 mentioned who had 
five or more servants. Clearly the trade was concen­
trated in the hands of a relatively few wealthy mer­
chants. No doubt the concentration was not as narrow 
as would seem from the evidence of the cargoes cited 
here, since some of those known to be active in the 
trade do not appear to have laded on these few ships.
66 PR0:SPF Levant 109 f. 16. 67 PROrCustoms Account 218/16
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The Company attempted to control this aspect of the
trade by setting a maximum stint for a merchant of
£4000 per year.^ In the late 1590*s four ,,stinters,f
were appointed: Thomas Cordell, Henry Anderson, Leo-
69nard Poore, and Nicholas Leate. Also there were laid 
down regulations for the stint of currants but the de­
tails are not given. ^  The possibility is open that 
the £4000 per year refers to currants alone but this is 
not clear from the context of the "Standings Ordenaunces". 
In the cargo of the Royal Exchange ^Appendix B/ the goods 
of William Garraway are officially valued at £3900 thus 
the real value would easily be over the £4000 allowed on 
a merchant's stint unless it be accepted that the stint 
was only for currants; or that the Company did not en­
force the rule.
Questions about the total trade can be raised again 
and some new evidence brought to bear on them; but, still 
no conclusive answers provided. The Company^ export of 
kerseys is shown in Table III. These figures from the 
Customs Accounts are the result of the provision in the 
letters patent that the Companyfs customs payments need 
not be paid in full until six months after goods are
68 BM:Harl. 306 f. 72. 69 Ibid., f. 74v
70 Ibid., f. 72.
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entered in the Customs House, The very low figures of
4500 kerseys in 1592 can be explained by the fact that
the accounting for customs purposes only began with the
granting of the privilege which was in January 1592,
But the major shipping period was during the three or
four months preceeding that, thus a large number of the
kerseys shipped that year would not have been included.
In subsequent years the number increased, reaching a
high of 21,000 in 1596, There is not enough detailed
information about the market to explain why there were
such differences from year to year. The overall pattern
seems to indicate a growth to about 18,000 or 20,000 per
year. If this is translated into notional short cloths
it can be compared to the few figures available from the
early seventeenth century, ^  Such a comparison shows
little growth above this level to 1622. During the 1590's
there is little doubt that about 90% of the cloth exported
to the Levant was kerseys. Only for 1598 can the total
be broken down. In that year 6784 notional short cloths
were exported by the Levant Company of which 750 were
72broadcloths and the remainder kerseys. The literary
71 B. £. Supple^ Commercial Crisis and Change, 1964_ 
p. 258.
72 PRO:SFD Eliz. 268 no. 101.
evidence makes almost no references to broadcloth and
it is safe to assume that its portion of the total re-
73mained about the same* The evidence from the first 
two decades of the next century indicates this propor­
tion changed radically. In 1601 Suffolk broadcloth 
alone accounted for one-fourth of the cloth exported 
to the Levant and Italy, in 1620 this had risen to over
one-half, in 1622 it was just below one-half, and in
741628 was just over one-third. If other types of 
broadcloth were also exported, then the portion of 
kerseys would be even smaller. This shift from ker­
seys to broadcloth has been explained in terms of the 
development of the English cloth finishing industry 
which broadened the market for English cloth and success­
ful price competition with Venetian cloth based on the
75lower«r cost of labor in England.
Exports other than cloth have left an itemized 
record in only two cases. These indicate that such ex-
73 In light of this it must be cautioned that other 
figures for kerseys exported by the Company should 
be reduced slightly since they contain a small 
number of broadcloths.
74 Supple, op. cit., p. 258 and 267.
75 Ralph Davis, "England and the Mediterranean, 
1570-1670”, in Essays in the Economic and Social 
History of Tudor and Stuart England. 1961, pp. 
122-4.
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ports were basically unchanged in their character from 
the 1580*s, though there were a few additions. For the 
year ending Michaelmas 1599 there is a record of the 
goods shipped from London to Venice, the Venetian is­
lands and the Turkish ports. These consisted of tin, 
lead, iron wire, pewter, black conyskins, sheepskins, 
lambskins, sasaparilla, and re-exports of ebony and 
brazilwood. The official value of the goods going to 
Venice was £3240.4S8^ and of those going to the other 
Levant ports was £4278.6s4d. ^  For the year ending
Michaelmas 1604 the offkial value of goocls^fSan cloth
a 77
laded for Venice was £1250.10s and for Zante £2124.2 . 
These were carried on three ships and no other goods 
were listed going to Levant ports. Among these goods 
were the usual English exports, but in addition there 
was a large quantity of re-exports from the Muscovy 
trade, such as tallow, caviar, furs - in particular 
sable - and various skins. It was noted above that 
in 1596 Elizeus So them had some Muscovy hides on hand 
in Aleppo for which he was testing the market. Evidently 
the market proved fairly good not only for hides but
76 T. S. Willan, “Some aspects of English trade with 
the Levant in the sixteenth century11, EHR, vol. lxx, 
p. 409.
77 PRO:Port Book 12/3.
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also for a variety of other Russian commodities. In 
1604 many Levant merchants also shipped goods to Leg­
horn. There is no way of knowing if this represented 
any greater quantity than usual but with only three 
ships specifically designated for the Levant the num­
ber going to Leghorn in particular stands out. Further­
more many of the Levant merchants were shipping to Leg­
horn exactly the same goods that were going to Venice 
and Zante. On the one hand, this may have been related 
to the fact that the letters patent had been given up 
by the Company in a controversy with the King and were 
not replaced until 1605. It is not possible to do more 
than suggest that this may have altered some usual shipp­
ing patterns. It did have the effect of opening the door 
to a few merchants, whose names appear in the Port Book, 
who were not members of the Company. On the other hand 
this shipping to Leghorn was almost certainly also re­
lated to the problem of raising credits to pay for east­
ern imports. But before considering this question, two 
other points should be raised. One concerns another 
type of export to Leghorn and the second is a re-exami­
nation of the question concerning the balance of imports 
over exports in this trade.
First it should be observed that throughout the
35a
1590*8 various of the Levant merchants were in the ha­
bit of lading herring from Yarmouth and Harwich to 
Leghorn and sometimes other west Mediterranean ports*
In 1590 William Harborne and Henry Colthurst were shipping
78red herring to Marseilles and Leghorn. In 1593 Richard
7Q
Stapers was doing the same, in 1596 Paul Banning and
80Edward Holmden, in 1599 Thomas Norden, Richard Stapers,
81Francis Dorrington, and Henry Anderson; and in 1600,
1601, and 1602 all these and several other Levant mer-
82chants are listed as exporters of herring to Leghorn.
In addition Stapers also exported herring and Newfound-
83land fish to Leghorn from Dartmouth in 1599. Only a 
few ships are found going directly to the Levant Company 
ports with fish; the Merchant Bonaventure £358/, and the 
Phoenix of London £365/ in 1598; the latter ship again 
in 1599 £376/; the Swallow of Ipswich, from that port 
in 1599 £387/; the Hope of London £394/ and the Susan 
Parnell £402/ in 1599; from then on the incidence of 
such voyages is higher. Reservations must always be 
held about the full incidence of any particular shipping 
pattern because of the uncertain nature of the evidence.
78 PRO: Port Book 476/8. 79 Ibid., 478/2.
80 Ibid., 478/22. 81 Ibid., 480/1.
82 Ibid., 480/12, 481/2, 482/9. 83 Ibid., 937/8.
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It is clear that the greatest amount of fish was exported 
to Leghorn but that some went directly to the Levant ports, 
the quantity increasing from 1599 onwards* Finally, it can 
be observed that there is no record of fish ever being ex­
ported directly to the Ottoman ports, nor is there any 
mention of fish in any of the letters to and from Turkey 
and Syria*
The second problem, a re-examination of the question 
of the balance of imports over exports}produces the same 
answer as it did for the 1580*3 but there is a little 
more evidence and thus the conclusion for the 1590*s is 
on firmer ground* The only detailed list for an incoming 
cargo in the 1590,s is that of the Royal Exchange which 
entered London in May 1596 /Appendix B/. The official 
value of its cargo was £13,423.16sll^* The real value 
was higher than this, perhaps by a factor of two* This 
question is discussed in some detail in Chapter £3.
There is fortunately a record of the ad valorem duties 
paid on the cargo of the same ship in its outward voy­
age* This shows an official value of £2320 on such
goods as paid that duty* At the same time the Great
84Susan carried goods officially valued at £2300. But
84 PRO:Customs Account 218/16*
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there is no knowledge of the quantity of cloth carried
by the ship* Though there are figures for total cloth
exports there are none for the quantity carried by a
particular ship* The closest one can come is with the
report of George Dorrington to Sanderson in June 1597
that the Royal Exchange and Great Susan had arrived in
85Syria carrying 11,000 kerseys. There are one or two
further clues to this question of the balance of trade
to be found in the accounts kept by Michael Lok when he
was consul at Aleppo* Based on consoledge of 2% the
value of goods both inward and outward on the three ships
Ascencion* Centurion* and Consent in 1593 was about 
86£40,000* But this cannot be broken down between im­
ports and exports. However, in 1594, also based on con­
so ledge, the value of the cargoes inward of the Hercules
and Susan was about £1600 and that outward about £11,500
87for the Hercules and £900 for the Susan* The inward 
figure seems rather low and may be simply a reflection 
of incomplete collection of consoledge or the unlading 
of part of the cargo elsewhere* Finally in 1596 the 
Levant Company reported to the government that it was 
expecting certain ships to return from Syria, Turkey and
85 Foster, Sanderson, p* 172
86 PRO:SPF Levant 109 f. 16. 87 Ibid.
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the Venetian ports. The Company estimated that the total 
customs inward paid on the cargoes of these ships would 
come to about £5300. This would represent an official
88value of £106,000 and a real value considerably higher. 
Even barring the undoubted exaggeration in that figure 
it represents a value of imports which it is difficult 
to imagine was matched by exports. The evidence above 
is patchy, open to reservations and sometimes ambiguous, 
but despite this, it is abundantly clear that the value 
of goods imported by the Levant merchants greatly ex­
ceeded that of those exported.
Thus again the question comes up of how the Levant 
merchants raised the purchasing power to pay the differ­
ence between their sales and purchases. It will be re­
called that the Turkey merchants faced the same problem 
and in Chapter it was tentatively concluded that 
money raised in one branch of trade was transferred to 
the Venetian Islands and to the Turkish ports to pay for 
purchases. It should be reiterated here that no evidence 
has appeared which contradicts the statement made earlier 
that money for this purpose was not transferred by bills 
of exchange, There were, of course, bills in use as has
88 PRO: SPF Turkey 2 f. 235
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been seen above but these were solely for transfers 
within the Company and not for the purpose of bringing 
money in from outside. Furthermore, except for those 
few which were used for transferring money between 
Aleppo and Constantinople, all the bills were taken 
up in the Levant and drawn on London. The Company, it­
self, did not like to pay for its housekeeping operations 
with bills. This is probably one of the reasons it in­
stituted the system of levying imprest money. A general 
court passed a regulation related specifically to this 
when it decreed that the consoledge of 2% inward and 
2% outward in Turkey should be paid all at once when
goods are returned home. The purpose was to avoid the
89sending of money to Turkey by exchange. A reflection 
of this was seen above in John Sanderson*s complaints 
about the difficulty of collecting money before sales 
were made.
The major problem, however, was finding the money 
with which to make purchases. The evidence indicates 
that this was carried aboard ships from Venice and other 
ports to the west in the form of ready money. This ready 
money is actually to be seen in only two cases. In 1596
89 BM:Harl. 306 f. 73
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the George Bonaventure £314/, going from Venice to Chios, 
was captured by some Spanish galleys and 70,000 ducats 
taken from her.^ Then in 1600 Henry Anderson was re­
ported to have dispatched 4000 Spanish rials of eight 
91to Zante. fthere Anderson's money originated is not
stated; possibly Marseilles since he is known to have
conducted business there. These two instances are the
only evidence of the physical presence of ready money
being transferred to Levant Ports. There are, though,
one or two interesting references which lend greater
credence to the existence of the general practice. In
June 1596 George Dorrington in Aleppo wrote to John
Sanderson in Constantinople that 11 God sendinge the
Minion from Venis, I hope we shall have some money to
92put awaye our comodi ties...11 In the same letter Dor­
rington expressed some of the frustration the merchants 
felt when they were short of money. He reported that 
four Venetian ships had arrived with both money and 
commodities and three more were expected soon. In add­
ition some French ships were reported on the way and the 
prices of commodities were thus expected to rise. All 
of which provoked him to comment that MSo they with their
90 CSP Ven. 1603-07, p. 80. 91 Ibid.
92 Foster, Sanderson, p. 148.
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money shall doe what they please, and we with our tinne
and kersies what we can". The most conclusive evidence
testifying to this practice is that the Company found
it necessary to place limitations upon it. One of its
ordinances stated that "He that malceth over to Turkie
from forreine partes anie more money then the one halfe
of his stinte shall forfeite after the rate of X pro C.
93for soe much as he exceedeth". Subsequently another
ordinance was passed stating that 11 He that sendeth money
94or bulleyn out of the land shall forfeit his freedome". 
The second of these regulations is no more than an affir­
mation of already existing government regulations. The 
first is not this, but it is reasonable to suggest that 
it was passed in response to concern shown on the part 
of the government. Throughout the Elizabethan period 
Burghley and his exchequer officials showed continued 
interest in the balance of trade. They could not have 
been unaware of the general state of this balance in 
the Levant trade and probably communicated their con­
cern to the Company. It would be no more than politic 
for the Company to respond in some conspicuous way.
Hie seriousness of the Company's intent could only be
93 BM:Harl. 306 f. 73 94 Ibid., f. 74.
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tested by the degree to which it tried to enforce the 
regulation; the government would find it extremely 
difficult to check on this* Similarly the present 
day historian has no way of knowing the extent to which 
the Company tried to enforce this regulation. But it 
may be instructive to point out that there is nothing 
which indicates that the Company ever thought that 
limiting the transfer of foreign credits to Turkey 
would be of any benefit to its commercial operations.
In fact, all that can be learned about this trade points 
toward the conclusion that it would have been vastly 
simplified if English exports could have been kept to 
a minimum and Asian goods bought with ready money. That 
the Company had to re-affirm a government regulation 
against the export of money and bullion certainly re­
flects the pressure that must have been felt along the 
above lines. A reflection seen also in the Company's 
effective admission that, at best, only half of its 
imports were paid for by sales in Turkey. In fact, 
it is safe to conclude that the real ratio of the value 
of the Company's imports to exports was closer to three 
or four to one.
A final consideration in the Levant Company's 
affairs is its currant trade. The role currants played
in bringing to an end the letters patent of 1592 is well 
known and will require here only a few comments* First, 
though, it might be well to try to gauge approximately 
what quantity of currants was imported into England*
As with so much such information in sixteenth century 
trade the information is incomplete and ambiguous* In 
a well known document, Richard Carmarden, a surveyor of 
the customs at London, compiled a record of the currants 
imported by strangers and Englishmen upon which was paid 
an impost of 5S6^ cwt. from 1591/2 to 1598/9.^ These 
were currants imported by those not free of the Levant 
Company* The average quantity was 880 tons per year 
ranging from a low of 624 tons in 1595/96 to a high of 
1018 tons in 1598/99* The strangers share of these im­
ports was an average of 107® over the eight years, rang­
ing from nothing in 1592/3 to 27% in 1596/7. The question 
to be considered is what portion of total currant imports 
is represented by the above* There is only one year for 
which a direct comparison can be made* Sometime after 
1592 Alderman Billingsley, an official of the customs 
house, reported to Lord Burghley the quantity of currants 
imported to London for each of the three years running
95 PRO:SPD Eliz* 272 no. 127.
from 9 May 1589 to 9 May 1592.^ These figures are not 
exactly comparable to those based on the Exchequer year 
but they give some indication of the relationship looked 
for here. For the year beginning May 1591 Billingsley 
reported a total import of 1693 tons of currants. For 
the year beginning Michaelmas 1591 Carmarden reported 
an import of currants of 947 tons by those not free of 
the Levant Company, The latter is 56% of the total - 
a surprisingly high figure which would probably be al­
tered by an exact correspondence of dates. The other 
figures reported by Billingsley are also instructive. 
First the average for all three years is an import of 
1800 tons per year. However, in the first year - May 
1589 to May 1590 - there were 3054 tons of currants im­
ported, During the next twelve months there were 762 
tons imported. What must have happened is perfectly 
clear. The year 1589/90 was the first during which 
the trade as open after the expiration of both the 
Turkey and Venice Company patents. The 3000 tons re­
present the result of unrestrained trade. The 760 tons 
represent the result of a glutted market. Finally, the 
1700 tons for 1591/2 represent something close to the
96 BM:Lans. 71 no. 11.
3 bi
real English market for currants. There is other evi­
dence that bears on this last point. When the whole 
question of this trade was at issue, early in the next 
reign, a number of petitions and memoranda were directed 
to the government with respect to it. In one of these 
it was stated that the customs records would show about 
1100 tons imported in 1600, 1200 tons in 1601, and 1400 
tons in 1602 with probably another 200 or 300 tons con­
cealed from the customers.^ In 1633 the Levant Company 
placed a limit of 2200 tons per year on the import of
currants. A quantity it thought to be the maximum the
98market would bear. The actual import of currants in 
1634 was 2005 tons, in 1638 2262 tons, and in 1640 1622 
tons.W Thus the import of currants during the period 
of the 1590*8 and first decades of the seventeenth cen­
tury would seem to have fluctuated between 1600 and 2200 
tons per year. Based on these limits the average import 
of 880 tons per year during the 1590*8 by those outside 
the Levant Company, represents about 40% to 55% of the
97 FROsSPD James I, 10 no. 26.
98 Wood, op. cit., p. 70 no. 4.
99 These figures were compiled from the London Port 
Books by Mr. Robert Brenner for a Princeton Univer­
sity doctoral thesis on the seventeenth century 
London merchant community. Mr. Brenner was kind 
enough to communicate some of the results of his 
research to the present writer.
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total import of currants* This portion is surprisingly 
large* It raises a number of questions none of which 
can be answered. The evidence of the 1580's suggests 
that the portion imported then by strangers was much 
smaller and that the amount imported by English non­
members of the Venice Company was minute* The lading 
of the Royal Exchange in 1596 ^Appendix B/ does not in­
clude goods by non-members of the Company* There are 
no surviving London Port Books for the 1590's which 
would have recorded the import of currants* Thus there 
is no record of who imported these currants nor where 
they were originally laded* What few records there are 
do not suggest a trade of this size being conducted by 
native non-members of the Company* In the absence of 
evidence the most reasonable explanation is that much 
of what was imported as the merchandize of Englishmen 
was really that of aliens entered falsely at the customs 
house* There were complaints about this same practice in 
the export of cloth and there is no reason to suppose it 
was not done in other branches of trade. However, this 
is speculation and the question remains unanswered.
There is no doubt on a related issue; that of the 
role of an imposition on currants as a reason for ann­
ulling the Company patent in 1600* The sequence of events
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relating to the lifting of the patent and the granting 
of a new one in December 1600 and again in November 1605 
has been fairly well related by Dietz and Epstein.
But a few comments can be added to what already has been 
said. Some point has been made of the fact that the 
patent was lifted because the collection of impost money 
was illegal. Rowland, Epstein, and Wood all state this,*^* 
though each somewhat less positively than his predecessor. 
Continuing this line of thought it can be stated here 
that there is little evidence the government tried to 
make out a case for the illegality of these imposts; 
further, that there probably were no grounds for such 
a case in the first place. It was pointed out above, 
in some detail, that such imposts had been collected 
before under the authority of the government. Further, 
that the letters patent all contained a clause to the 
effect that the companies could license outsiders to 
import goods from the areas of the monopolies. Epstein 
did not see how such a clause could carry the suggested
102authority; Wood thought it might imply such an authority.
100 F. C. Dietz, English Public Finance. 1558*1640.
1932, pp. 326-30; Epstein, op. cit., chap. V.
101 Rowland, op. cit., p. 173; Epstein, op. cit.,
pp. 43-4; Wood, op. cit., pp. 35-6.
102 Epstein, op. cit., p. 44; Wood, op. cit., p. 35.
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It is difficult to tinderstand why the explicit authority 
to enter a licensing agreement excludes the right to 
collect a licensing fee. Even as early as 1575, xdien 
the English merchants were objecting to Velutelli's use 
of his licensing authority, they never once suggested 
that he did not have the legal right to charge a fee or 
impost; they based their objections on other consider­
ations.
The formal order annulling the Levant Company^
patent has not survived so its terms are not known.
There is, however, one memorandum in which the reason
given for calling in the 1592 patent is that fl...wee
were named merchaunts of the Levant, and should have
103bin called merchaunts trading of the Levant”. The 
new patent of December 1600^^ changed the name of the 
new company to ”The Governor and Company of Merchants 
of London trading into the Levant Seas”. This difference, 
though technically a real one, seems hardly a sufficient 
one, alone, on which to annul a grant of royal privilege.
If it was the formal reason given for the action then it 
can only be concluded that it was merely a legalism and
103 PR0:SPD James I, 6 no. 69.
104 Cecil T. Carr, Select Charters of Trading Companies, 
1530-1707. 1913, pp. 30-43.
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was the only ground in law which the crown could find 
upon which to lift the patent. A contemporary critic 
of the Company stated that it had no Mexpresse warrant 
given them by theire said privilidgw to levy an impost 
on those not free of the Company. At the same time 
a supporter of the Company explained that Mr. Carmarden, 
the surveyor of the customs, observed the large sums of 
money collected by means of this impost and brought it 
to the attention of the Queen to point out that the 
Company Mdid wronge her Majestie, in using her preroga­
tive Royall to laye an imposition uppon merchantdize.. •11 
Thus the f,saide graunte of priviledge was called in 
question and made voidew.^^ Whether or not this im­
post really violated the royal prerogative is probably 
a matter of interpretation. It would, however, be a 
different matter than the point about whether or not 
the licensing clause of the 1592 patent implied the 
legal right to levy a licensing fee. The 1600 patent 
states that the earlier one was found tfto be doubtful 
and questionable in law1*. This could refer to any of 
the several points at issue. One point was corrected 
by changing the name as indicated above. Another point,
105 PR0:SPD James I, 10 no. 27.
106 PRO:SPD James I, 20 no. 25.
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that of the right to license was mentioned twice in the 
new patent. In the first instance it reads as in the 
past instances: that all foreigners are prohibited from 
bringing into England currants, olive oil or wine of 
Candia "unless it be by and with such license and 
agreement11 of the Company. In the second instance
the terms of the license are made more explicit. The 
patent states that to encourage "merchant strangers and 
others11 to import those commodities, the Company is grant­
ed the right to give licenses for the purpose "for any
108consideration or benefit to be taken to their own use". 
This refers only to foreign merchants, however, and that 
clause in the patent which prohibits the trade to other 
English merchants does not, as it did in the earlier 
patents, waive this prohibition upon a license from the 
Company. This omission suggests that its earlier in­
clusion was at least legal ground upon which the Com­
pany could claim the right to collect an impost. Whether 
or not the government had in mind that such would happen 
is not clear. Probably it did not and so deleted the 
clause in the new patent while at the same time strer&h- 
ening the Company*s position vis-a-vis foreign merchants.
107 Carr, op. cit., p. 39. 108 Ibid., p. 40
It is clear that the government had knowledge of the
impost collected from foreign merchants for it received
petitions from the crew of Venetian ships asking to be
109excused from paying it. Whatever the legal techni­
calities involved in the case of these imposts it is 
fairly clear that the reason for calling in the patent 
was that the government saw it as a nex? source of in­
come. The crown was in need of money both because of 
the war with Spain and the troubles in Ireland. Car- 
marden^ report that the amount collected by the Company 
over an eight year period averaged £4848.10s per year 
certainly must have seemed to the hard pressed govern­
ment an easy source of increased revenue. The fact that 
the only basic change in the new patent was provision 
for an annual payment to the crown of £4000 leaves little 
doubt about this.^^
The £4000 per year was paid until Elizabeth^ death,
109 There are documents testifying to this knowledge 
dated February 1592 (BM:Lans. 81 no. 20), June 1595 
(BM:Lans. 78 no. 87), and November 1596 (BM:Lans.
81 no. 19).
110 Dietz, op. cit., p. 326 sees this as the motive, 
though he seems to accept the illegality of the im­
post. It is to be noted x*ith respect to this that 
the Company could hardly have collected the impost 
without the knowledge of the customs officials and 
that Carmarden could hardly have compiled the in­
formation without reference to the customs records.
at which time the Company relinquished its patent while
still owing the crown £2000. Its real reason for doing
this, though never stated, can only be the hope that it
might be able to negotiate more favorable terms with
James I. Certainly one of the Company's chief aims was
to persuade the crown to assume support of the English
diplomatic establishment in Turkey. Added to that issue
was the great outcry against monopolies of the early
seventeenth century. All these questions are reflected
in a great number of petitions, counter-petitions and
memoranda directed to the government up to 14 December
1605 when a new patent was issued to the Levant Company.
The arguments and counter-arguments are summed up by Ep- 
112stein and in the end the new patent struck a compro­
mise. In part the 1605 patent is a recognition of the 
fact that unless the crown were willing to underwrite 
the diplomatic costs of maintaining the trade itself, 
it would have to give the merchants the authority to 
collect some form of dues from among themselves for that 
purpose. This could only be done by creating a company 
with the power to discipline its members to that end.
The reconstituted Levant Company was thus explicitly
111 It is printed in Epstein, op. cit., pp. 153-210.
112 Op. cit., pp. 47-57.
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given the right to levy imposts on goods carried out
of or into England and likewise out of or into the
113ports of the Turkish and Venetian dominions. No 
mention is made in the charter of any right to license 
non-members of the Company to engage in the trade. This 
possibly is a consequence of an open admission policy to 
the Company.
The preamble to the patent stated the principles
upon which admission was to be based and reflects the
anti-monopolistic feeling of the time:
,f...we being desierous not onely to uphold 
and mayntayne the trade and traffique of 
our Kingdomes for the increase of our navi- 
gacion and the benifit of our subjects but 
by the best means we may devise to advance 
and enlarge the same have resolved here­
after not to appropriate the said trade of 
the Signiore of Venice and Turkey to any 
lymited nombre of merchants nor to anie one 
cittie towne or place within these our re­
alities and Domynions nor to suffer the same 
to be used or enjoyed in anie degree of 
monopoly but to lay open the same to all 
our loving subjects using onely the trade 
of marchandize whoe are willing to enter 
into the said trade upon such reasonable 
tearmes and condicions as shall necessaryly 
belong to the supporte of the same."!^
The patent laid down complicated details with re-
113 Epstein, op. cit.,p. 189. A list of the rates in
force in the 1630's is printed on pp. 232-38.
114 Epstein, op. cit.,p« 154. Quoted also by Wood,
op. cit. p. 40.
spect to admission but in the end they amount to the 
fact that any mere merchant, over 26 years of age and 
out of his apprenticeship, could enter the Company upon 
payment of £25 within a year of becoming 26 and £50 after 
that* There were also a number of categories of persons 
who could enter for less* This open admission policy, 
aside from being a reflection of anti-monopolistic feel­
ing on principle, may also have been a reflection of some 
practical pressure from those who took advantage of the 
period when there was no: organized trade* There is 
evidence that even during the very short time there was 
no patent in 1599/1600, efforts .were made by outsiders 
to enter the trade* In August 1600 Buckhurst, the Lord 
Treasurer, wrote to the customers of Bristol to the 
effect that he understood there were six ships there 
lading for the Levant* However, because the Queen was 
about to renew the privileges of the Levant Company they, 
the customers, were to prohibit those ships from leaving
for the Levant Ports and require each to enter a £1000
115bond for compliance* There is also evidence that in
1604 non-members of the Company were conducting a trade
116to the Levant ports. It was seen earlier that similar
115 BM;Cotton, Nero BVII, f. 185*
116 PRO: Port Book 12/3 where goods are entered for Venice 
and Zante in the names of non-members* Also PRO:Exchequer 
Accounts Various, 467 (actually a Port Book) where cur­
rants are entered from Venice xn the names of non-members
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pressure existed in 1592 and may have been an element 
in determining the financial structure of the first 
Levant Company* A similar situation probably played 
its part in the open admission policy of 1605. In the 
long run the open policy proved to be a fiction. The 
specialized knowledge necessary for this trade required 
that for a merchant to be successful he first had to 
serve an apprenticeship. The Company was able to re­
strict admission to apprenticeship and thus largely 
control and limit its effective membership. With
some changes in 1661 and again in 1753, the charter of 
1605 remained the Levant Company*s legal basis for ex­
istence until its dissolution in 1825*
The final episode in the Elizabethan trade to 
Asia was the formation of the East India Company in 
1600 with a trade based on a sea route to the Indies.
It has been pointed out several times in this study 
that the English merchants always desired to make direct 
commercial contact with India and east Asia. In view of 
this it might be well to ask why nearly 50 years passed 
between the first effort in 1553 and success in 1601*
117 Epstein, op. cit* pp. 104-8 makes some few remarks
about this* This conclusion, based on more through
research, is made more explicit in the work by
Brenner cited above.
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“ftAttempts to reach the Indies were made from time to time 
during Elizabeth's reign both by the trading companies 
concerned and by others outside the companies* The 
companies confined their activities to the overland 
routes and the Northeast Passage* Those outside the 
companies limited their activities to finding one of 
the other three sea routes to the Indies. The repeated 
failure of these attempts to establish a trade using 
the desired route provoke an inquiry for explanations*
The explorations of the trading companies have been 
examined above* It is sufficient to observe here that 
their failures were due to conditions and circumstances 
beyond their control. In the Northeast Passage they were 
stopped by ice and fog* In the overland routes they were 
stopped largely by political problems arising in the 
intervening territories. The failure of those outside 
the companies is related to the question of why the com­
panies, themselves, did not undertake to use one of the 
other sea routes* Lack of success here cannot be attri­
buted so easily to circumstances beyond the control of 
those involved. Space does not permit a detailed ex­
amination of each voyage for the Indies* But a few 
general remarks about them should suffice to point up 
some of the reasons for failure* Perhaps the most basic
is that most of these expeditions did not represent 
serious attempts to establish a commercial route. An 
immediate criticism of this point is that a route must 
be found before it can be used for trade and that much 
of the purpose of these expeditions was supposedly to 
find such a route. It has been pointed out already how 
the need to explore and exploit at the same time placed 
an inhibition on the activities of the Muscovy and Tur­
key Companies. But with respect to the present problem 
such an inhibition would only have been applicable in 
the case of the northwest route because the two southern 
routes were known and their exploration was not a basic, 
preliminary requirement. The East India Company was con­
fident enough to commit a trading capital of £28,600 in
118money and goods for its very first voyage. It is no 
doubt true that from the point of view of navigation, 
the East India Company benefited from the earlier voy­
ages. But even with the first of these Cape voyages, 
that of Edward Fenton in 1582, there was no question 
that the route did exist and in which direction it lay. 
This was not so with the northwest. The three voyages 
of John Davis from 1585 to 1587 were serious and well
118 Chaudhuri, The English East India Company, p. 115.
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run efforts to discover a sea passage to the north of 
America. That they failed was not the fault of their 
intent or conduct. This was so, as well, with Martin 
Frobisher's first voyage in 1576. His subsequent voy­
ages, in 1577 and 1578, however, cannot be taken seri­
ously as attempts at exploration. Their main purpose 
was to scavenge for what was thought to be gold and 
silver ore.
A similar purpose would seem to have been behind 
most of the voyages which headed into the South Atlantic. 
Though obsensibly to establish the English in the Indies, 
their real motives were fame, glory, and quick wealth 
through the plunder of Spanish shipping* This was the
case with Drake, Fenton, Cavendish, Chidley and Lan-
119caster. It is less clear with the voyage of the
Samaratin of Dartmouth in 1590 intended for "the East
120India". Which way it planned to go is not known be-
119 For Drake see K. R. Andrews, Drake1 s Voyages. 1967; 
for Fenton E. G. R. Taylor, The Troublesome Voyage 
of Captain Edward Fenton. 1551-53* 195^; for Caven- 
dish, Foster, England's Quest* Chap. XI; for Chidley, 
K. R. Andrews, English Privateering Voyages to the 
West Indies. 1588-1595. 1959, pp. 59-85; for Lancas- 
ter, Sir William Foster, The Voyages of Sir James 
Lancaster to Brazil and the East Indies. 13^1-1663.
r m : -----------------------------------------------1--------------
120 Foster, Sanderson, pp. 8-9 and 54-55. These brief 
entries in Sanderson's letter book are the only 
source for this voyage.
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cause storms and damage received in an encounter with
Spanish ships forced her to return home from Madeira.
Fenton's voyage was intended officially to establish the
first English trading station in the East Indies sailing
121by way of the Cape of Good Hope. But Fenton, and
others of his party, subverted this intention and turned 
the enterprise into an expedition for plunder. Lancas-
122ter's voyage of 1591 was not designed as a trading venture 
though it did follow the Cape route. The voyages of Caven­
dish and Chidley were attempts to emulate the exploits of 
Drake's circumnavigation. It can be doubted that any voy­
age attempting the Indies route by way of the Straights 
of Magellan had serious intentions of establishing trade. 
Though Magellan's ships made clear in 1519 that the route 
existed his expedition also made clear that it was not a 
viable commercial route.
A final point to be made about the lack of serious 
commercial intent in most of these voyages is their lack 
of serious mercantile backing and the presence of sub­
stantial non-mercantile backing. Detailed lists of the 
backers of these voyages do not exist in all cases, thus 
generalizations about them are open to correction. It
121 Taylor, op. cit., p. xxvii.
122 Andrews, English Privateering Voyages, p. 214.
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can be said that though merchants did invest in these 
ventures they usually did so in the spirit of adventure - 
as a gamble on which one might make an easy and substan­
tial profit, When merchants had serious commercial in­
tentions they did not try to realize them by investing 
their capital in expeditions inspired by adventurers and 
courtiers. Instead they undertook the entire operation 
themselves and confined participation to mere merchants. 
Some of the difference in point of view of merchants and 
gentlemen comes out in George Best's account of Frobisher's 
first voyage. He states that Frobisher tried a long time 
to persuade some merchants to support his idea for find­
ing the Northwest Passage "But perceyving that hardly he 
was hearkened unto of the Merchantes, whiche never regarde
Vertue, withoute sure, certayne, and present gaynes, hee
123repayred to the Courte,,," The voyages of Edward Fenton 
was supposed to have a legitimate commercial objective and 
thus had the support of some Muscovy merchants who super­
vised the preparations. Their fears and apprehensions 
about the kind of men who went along came out when they 
proposed "That noe other gentlemen be appointed to goe on 
the voiage but the three captaines specified, the rest to
123 Richard Co Hinson, The Three Voyages of Martin 
Frobisher, 1867, p.
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be Factors and meere Seamen: for avoyadance of super-
124fluous charge and hinderance of the voiage...*1. Five 
merchants did go along and Fenton found them very irri­
tating because they insisted the voyage be carried out
125according to the official instructions. The mer­
chant's experience with Fenton must have made it clear 
to them that they could not really hope to open up a sea 
route for legitimate trade to the Indies in association 
with those who were not merchants. To achieve their 
ends they would need complete control of the operation 
from its very beginning with the power and authority to 
follow through with its continuation.
There is no certain knowledge that any of the mer­
chant groups involved in the Asian trade attempted to 
establish a sea going trade to the Indies before 1600. 
There is a petition submitted to the crown in 1589 with 
a proposal for such a venture. Nothing came of it and 
its authors were not identified. However, the three 
ships they proposed to use were owned by Paul Banning 
and Thomas Cordell and it is thus likely they, at least, 
and possibly other Venice merchants, were behind the pro-
124 Taylor, Fenton, p. 18.
125 Ibid., p. xxxv.
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126posal. It will be remembered that in 1589 both the 
Turkey and Venice Company patents had expired and the 
whole issue of the continuation of the trade was under 
discussion* Perhaps the final decision of the Venice 
merchants to join with the Turkey merchants in the Lev­
ant trade was related to their inability to get this pro­
posed East Indies voyage under way.
There are no comments from the companies about their 
attitude toward the sea route to Asia, so it cannot be 
known with any certainty why they did not attempt it. 
Before the union of Portugal with Spain, the English 
crown was not prepared to antagonize the Portuguese by 
challenging their claim of monopoly over the Cape route. 
For this reason the merchants who began the Turkey trade 
in the lSyO^ probably did not think seriously of exploit­
ing the Cape route. By the time the government was ready 
to acquiesce in the use of this route by Englishmen, the 
Turkey merchants had committed a substantial investment 
in the Mediterranean route* It is unlikely that they 
were prepared to disinvest and re-direct their capital; 
it is equally unlikely that they could have financed the
126 The petition is in Cal* SF. East Indies. 1513-1616. 
no. 239. It is cited and commented on by Foster, 
Lancaster, p. xii and Andrews, Elizabethan Privateer­
ing. p* 214.
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use of both routes at the same time. Furthermore, the 
Turkey Company's monopoly did not include the Cape route; 
thus the Turkey merchants would have had to form a se­
parate company for that purpose. A similar situation 
ensued when the Muscovy Company's Persian trade came to 
an end. That Company could not encompass the Mediterranean 
trade in its monopoly but it did retain an interest in the 
trade by investing in the new company, as did several of 
its members individually. Possibly a separate company 
could have been inspired and organized by the Turkey and 
Levant merchants in the 1580's or 1590's. However, they 
could not have failed to be aware that to do this would 
have been to compete with themselves. Perhaps this re­
alization, more than anything else, explains the absence 
of an organized English trade using the Cape route. Once, 
however, competition was provided by the Dutch there was 
nothing more to be gained and everything to be lost by 
the English if they did not take immediate steps to estab­
lish their own East Indies trade based on the Cape route.
In the Levant the reaction of the Company's ser­
vants to the news that the Dutch had returned from the 
East Indies, was one of pessimism and then relief. Pessi­
mism that the Levant trade would fall off and not be able 
to support itself if the Dutch succeeded in re-routing the
3 8 1
Indies trade. Relief to learn that the Dutch ships
carried mainly pepper and cloves and no indigo or nut- 
127megs. The consul at Aleppo, Richard Colthurst, appa­
rently expressed concern to the Company over the ability 
of the trade to continue to bear his charges. In March 
1600 the Company replied that he should not be overly 
concerned f,for that wee our selfes • • • are noe way doubt- 
full of anie preiudice that can spedelie growe unto us by 
ther discoverie for ther are manie impediments that may 
hinder ther voiages of soe longe courses and great adven­
tures. .. h!28 t0 be £oubt:ed that the Company was as
sanguine about the matter as it would have Colthurst think. 
In fact, it was being less than honest with him, for six 
months earlier the groundwork had been laid for the form­
ation of a new enterprise designed to pursue a trade to 
the East Indies in the wake of the Dutch.
Though there is no direct evidence on the point 
there is no reason to question the accepted view that 
the Levant merchants were the driving and leading force 
of the East India Company. They clearly stood to lose 
more than anyone else from the activities of the Dutch.
127 Foster. Sanderson, p. 186. 189. 190; BM: Sloan 
867, f. IT.
128 Stevens, op. cit., p. 270.
3S5L
The latter had succeeded in detaching the spice trade
from what was the main stream of Asian trade and the
Levant merchants could only step in quickly to capture
a share of the market or lose nearly everything* A
capital of £30,133.6S8^ was pledged from among 138 mer- 
129chants; 27% of this sum was pledged by 23 merchants 
who were members of the Levant Company of 1600. There 
seems to have been no other comparable and identifiable 
group among the investors, which clearly placed the Lev­
ant merchants in a paramount position in the East India 
Company. In addition the governor of the new company, 
Thomas Smythe, was also governor of the Levant Company; 
and eight of the 24 members of the committee were Levant 
merchants* Throughout the first years of the East India
Company's life these Levant merchants played an active
130and leading part in its affairs*
Because of a delay caused by political considerations 
the enterprise did not really get under way until the 
Autumn of 1600 and the first ships, under the direction 
of James Lancaster, did not sail until February 1601. The 
Company was apparently so confident of its success, and
129 Ibid., pp. 1-4.
130 This can be seen from a perusal of the first Court 
Minute Book as printed by Stevens, op. cit.
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probably so aware of the head start had by the Dutch, 
that within six months of Lancaster’s departure a pro­
posal was laid before the generality that a new stock 
be raised for a second voyage* From there the Company 
proceeded to send out voyage after voyage and to develop 
and expand the trade in several directions. The subse­
quent history of the East India Company is beyond the
scope of this study and has already been thoroughly ex-
131plored and analysed. A It remains to observe that the 
success of the Company was built not only upon the care­
ful and detailed planning by professionals and experts 
but also upon a background of nearly 50 years of experi­
ence with trade to Asia. The full extent to which this 
experience may have benefited the East India merchants 
can never be known. But in two matters of great import­
ance to the trade the fruit of experience is to be seen.
When they petitioned the government for a grant of pri­
vileges, in September 1599, they specifically requested 
that they be incorporated because they could not conduct
the trade except in a joint-stock and that they be per­
mitted to transport out of the realm any foreign coin
131 K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company. 
1965.
132which is brought in by English merchants. These two 
points were the basis of the successful conduct of this 
trade. If the East India Company had not been in a 
joint-stock its directors could not have maintained 
the detailed control over its various and complex de­
tails that was necessary if the business was to succeed. 
If the Company could not have re-exported coin it would 
have had very little purchasing power and there would 
have been no trade. Enough has been said in this study 
about the concern of the merchants over both of these 
problems to make it clear that the East India merchants1 
plans were the fruition of long experience.
132 This petition is mentioned in the Court Book under 
25 September 1599 (Stevens, op. cit., p. 8). A 
full text of it is in BM:Salisbury Mss. 83 no. 22. 
The text of the East India Company's letters patent 
is printed in George Birdwood and William Foster, 
The First Letter Book of the East India Company,
1600-161$. 1593 :~pp'. ~rg5rr&>~--------------------
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APPENDIX A
Biographical Sketches
The biographical sketches included in this section 
are of the original Turkey and Venice merchants. They 
are arranged alphabetically without respect to company 
membership. The sketches include information on the 
subject's activities in mercantile and public affairs 
and any other information which may throw light on their 
position in the company. They do not attempt to present 
all that is known about each person, though in some cases, 
because so little is known, they may do so. The sources 
are given separately for each sketch. Details about a 
person's office holding in the London government come 
mainly from A. B. Beaven, The Aldermen of the City of 
London, 2 vols., 1908-13. This will be cited simply as 
Beaven, followed by volume and page number. Sources for 
membership in the various trading companies are given 
below and not repeated. Sources for Russia Company 
membership are scattered and so are listed separately 
within.
Eastland Company PR0:SPD Eliz. 131 no. 70
Spanish Company PRO:Patent Roll 19 Eliz. pt. 8
Turkey Company PRO:Patent Roll 24 Eliz. pt. 13
Hakluyt V, 192-202 
Venice Company PRO:SPD Eliz. 160 no. 10
Barbary Company T. S. Willan, Studies in Eliza­
bethan Foreign Trade% p. 188
Levant Company 1592 Hakluyt Vi, /3-92
Levant Company 1600 Carr, Select Charters. pp. 30-43
Levant Company 1605 Epstein, Levant Company,pp.153-210
East India Company First Letter Book, pp. 163-189
Table VI
Subsidy Assessments
Following is a table of the assessments for the 
subsidy for the members of the Turkey and Venice Companies. 
They are arranged separately by company and listed in the 
order given in the source for the respective company.
Blanks indicate that no assessment has been found. These 
assessments cannot be used for determining a merchant*s 
wealth but they can be used for comparative purposes.
Assessment
19 Eliz 24 Eliz
Turkey Merchants £ £
Edward Osborne 250 250
George Barne 240 240
Richard Martin 200 260
Martin Calthorpe 200 300
John Harte 260
William Masham 150 200
John Spencer 300 300
Thomas Smythe 150 150
Richard May 170 180
Richard Saltonstall 200 200
Richard Stapers 90 90
Henry Hewitt 150 170
Venice Merchants £ £
Thomas Cordell 70 80
Edward Holmden 60 60
Paul Banning 50 100
Richard Glascock 50 50
Robert Sadler 60
William Garraway 120
Henry Anderson
Andrew Banning 
Edward Lechland
Henry Farrington
Thomas Dawkins
Edward Sadler
Richard Dassell
Thomas Trowte
70 100
Sources:
19 Eliz.: PRO; Exchequer Subsidy Roll 145/252 
24 Eliz.: PRO: Exchequer Subsidy Roll 251/16
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HENRY ANDERSON: bom 1544,1 died 13 April 16052 
Anderson was a grocer and master of the company in 1599- 
1600, an alderman from 1601 to 1605, and sheriff in 
1601-2, He was knighted 26 July 1603.^ He married a 
daughter of Francis Bowyer, one of the pioneers of the 
Morrocan trade and was a brother-in-law of William Gar-
4
raway. He was a member of the Venice Company and the 
Levant Companies of 1592 and 1600, In 1598 he was trea­
surer of the Levant Company,"* In the same year he is 
also listed as a member of the Russia Company but there 
is no indication of when he first entered that trade.
He seems to have been only slightly involved with pri­
vateering, No record of his trade has survived from 
before 1588, In that year and the following he imported 
£240 worth of raw silk from Hamburg, £1266,13,4 worth 
from Stade, £2232,13.4 worth of goods from Marseille 
in partnership with Henry Farrington, and £132.10 worth 
of silk and spices from Venice and Zante. In 1596 he 
imported £189.2.9 worth of silk and Indigo from Scan-
Q
deroon. In December 1598 he exported 50 last of herring
9
to Leghorn and a year later 200 barrels.
1 R. G. Lang, The Greater merchants of London in the 
early 17th century» B. Litt., Oxford, 1963, p. 35^, 
states that he was 61 at the time of his death.
2 Beaven II, 48 3 Ibid.
zn
4 T. S. Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade« 
1959, p. 13a. 5 BM:Lans. 241 f. 65v.
6 T. S. Willan, Muscovy Merchants of 1555. 1953, p. 76.
7 PRO: Port Books 8/1 and d/4. 8 BM:Lans 81 f. 125v. 
9 PRO: Port Books 480/1 and 480/12.
ANDREW BANNING: bom 1547,^ died 21 December 1610^
Andrew Banning was a member of the Grocers Company. He 
was sworn an alderman on 26 March 1605 and discharged
3
16 April 1605 with a fine of £500. He was a younger 
brother of Paul Banning. He never married and in his 
will left £10,000 plus all his plate, jewels, and house­
hold goods to his nephew, Paul. In addition he left
4
£800 to his factor, Jeffry Kirby. He was a member of 
the Venice Company, the Levant Companies of 1592, 1600, 
and 1605, and of the East India Company. As a young man 
he may have served as factor for his brother Paul. In 
1576 goods were entered in the Custom House by Andrew
«5
in the name of Paul Banning. There is no record of his
own trade before 1596 when he imported goods from Scan-
deroon in partnership with William Rowles and his brother, 
6Paul. In November 1600 he exported 350 barrels of her­
ring to Leghorn and a year later another 600 barrels.^
1 PR0:HCA Exam. 20 f. 229v. 2 Beaven II, 49.
3 Beaven I, 158. 4 PCC 11 Wood.
5 PRO: Port Book 6/4. 6 BMsLans. 81 f. 125.
7 PRO: Port Books 481/2 and 482/9.
3 * 1
PAUL BANNING: born 1545,* died 30 September 1616^
Paul Banning was a member of the Grocers Company, an 
alderman from 1593 to 1602, and sheriff in 1593-4.^
He was the elder brother of Andrew Banning. He was an 
assistant of the Spanish Company, a member of the Venice 
Company, the Levant Companies of 1592 and 1600 and one 
of the committee of the East India Company. The earliest 
mention of Banning is from 1568 when he was a merchant^ 
factor in Spain.^ He seams to have acted as an indepen­
dent factor in Spain for several years, serving no par­
ticular master. He acted at least once, for John Spencer, 
the future member of the Turkey Company. During the war 
with Spain he was one of the most active and influential 
investors in privateering ventures. Considering the 
active career he led there is very little record of his
own trade. In 1576 he exported sundry goods to Bayon
7and Lisbon valued at £511.12.8. In 1589 he imported
8currants and oil valued at £1856 and in 1595 with
q
Edward HoLmden he exported 50 last of herring to Leghorn.
1 PR0:HCA Exam 28 f. 176. 2 Beaven II, 44.
3 Ibid. 4 PRO:HCA Libels 54 no. 29.
5 HCA:2xams 19 f. 11, 86v, 123v, 127.
6 K. R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering. 1964, p. 120.
Andrews has a long entry on Banning's career.
7 PRO: Port Book 6/4. 8 PRO: Port Book 8/4.
9 PRO: Port Book 478/22.
SIR GEORGE BARNE: died January 15931
Same was a haberdasher and became master in 1586-7.
He was an alderman from 1574 to 1593, sheriff in 1576-
77, Lord Mayor in 1586-87, for which he was knighted,
2
and HP for London in 1588-89. He was a son of Sir 
George Barne, a charter member of the Russia Company.
He married Anne, daughter of William Garrard, one of 
the leading merchants of his day and also a founding 
member of the Russia Company. Barnet sister, Anne, 
was the first x*ife of Sir Francis Walsingham. Barne1s 
name appeared in the charters of the Spanish, Eastland, 
Turkey, and Levant Companies. He was a member of the 
RussiatCompany and was its governor in 1580, 1583, 1591 
and 1592.^ He and his father-in-law were charter members
c
of the Mineral and Battery Works Company. As a leading 
member of the Russia Company he was active in the'pre­
parations for Edward Fenton's voyage of 1582 but there 
is no positive evidence he personally invested in the 
venture.^ He engaged in privateering to a moderate 
degree.^
Barne's trade, as recorded in the Port Books, was 
primarily with France and Spain to which he exported 
cloth and cottons and from which he imported raisins,
g
oranges, oil, wine, molasses and other commodities.
9
In 1587 he imported sugar from Barbary though he does
10not seem to have been a member of that company. He 
is recorded as importing £238 worth of flax from Russia 
with Sir Francis Walsingham in 1587.^
1 Beaven II, 40. 2 Ibid.
3 Willan, Muscovy Merchants, p. 78.
4 T. S. Willan. The Early History of the Russia Company. 
1558-1603. 1955,— TS 6;
5 M. B. Donald, Elizabethan Monopolies. 1961, p. 72.
6 E. G. R. Taylor (ed.) The Troublesome Voyage of Captain 
Edward Fenton. 1582-83. 1959. passim.
7 Andrews, Privateering. 113, 203.
8 PRO: Port Books 2/1, 4/2, 6/4, and BM:Lans. 41 f. 118v.
9 PRO: Port Books 7/8, 8/1. 10 Willan, Studies. p. 280 
11 PRO: Port Book 7/8.
WILLIAM BARRETT: died 19 June 15841
Barrett seems to have been a clothworker. In his will he
2
left £5 to the poor householders of that company. His 
name appears in the original Turkey Company letters patent 
At the time they were issued, however, he was in Aleppo.
He left London in September 1580, aboard the White Hind 
to take up the post of agent at Aleppo for the Turkey 
merchants.^ He retained that position until his death. 
There is no record of him conducting any independent 
trade though in 1578 his name appeared among a list of 
merchants trading to the East Countries.This, however, 
was probably connected with his relations with Osborne
z>°i a
and Stapers.^ His association with them stems possibly 
from Sir William Hewitt, Gsborne1s father-in-law. In 
his will^ Hewitt mentions his apprentice Robert Barrett. 
William Barrett in his will mentions an uncle and a 
brother named Robert. It is probable that one of these 
was Hewitt's apprentice and through him William became 
acquainted with Osborne who inherited Hewitt's business.
1 Hakluyt VI, 9. 2 PCC 30 Watson
3 In the printed version in Hakluyt his name appears 
as "Garrett". See supra p.
4 Purchas VIII, 450. 5 PR0:SPD Eliz. 127 no. 73.
6 This point is explained more fully supra p.L£5/
7 PCCfStonnarde.
MARTIN CALTHORPE: bom 1523,1 died May 15892
Calthorpe was a draper and master of the company in 1580-
81, 1584-85, and 1587-88. He was an alderman from 1579
to 1588, sheriff in 1579-80, Lord Mayor in 1588-89, and
3
was knighted before 6 March 1589. He was a Merchant
4
Adventurer and a member of the Turkey Company. The only 
record of his trade shows 258 cloths shipped to Antwerp
in September 1559,"* 317 cloths to an unknown destination
ft ' 7in January . 1565, and 28 cloths to Hamburg in 1571.
1 PR0:HCA Exam 22 f. 272. 2 Beaven II, 40.
3 Ibid. 4 Oskar de Smedt, De Engelse Natie te
Antwerpen in de 16 eeuw, 2 vols., 1950-54, II, p. 448.
5 PRO:SPD Eliz. 6 f. li3. 6 PRO: Customs Account 89/8.
7 PRO: Port Book 5/1.
3*13
THOMAS CORDELL; bom 1537,1 died April 16122 
Cordell was a member of the Mercer's Company of which 
he was master in 1605 and 1612. He was an alderman in 
1595.^ In 1574 he married the mother of John and Thomas 
Hun and was responsible for putting both of them into the 
Levant trade.^ Cordell was a member and assistant of the 
Spanish Company, the Venice Company, the Levant Companies 
of 1592, 1600 and 1605, and the East India Company of 
which he was one of the committee. He imported sugar 
from Morocco in 1567-8 with John Hun, probably the hus­
band of his future wife, and was trading there in 1590^ 
but he was not a member of the Barbary Company. In 1587 
he went with Drake as the merchants' representative.^
Much of Cordell's activity in the 1580's and 1590's was 
taken up with privateering. He was one of a group of 
wealthy London merchants who represented the nucleus of
o
privateering activity. The Port Books show him shipping
9
modest amounts of cloth to Antwerp and Barbary in 1565, 
importing wine, sugar and oil from France, Spain and 
Barbary in 1567-8,*^ exporting cloth to Hamburg and 
Barbary in 1571.** All these entries are for only rela­
tively small quantities of goods. His trade was more 
extensive than these Port Books show. In 1585, in part­
nership with William Garraway, he claimed losses of over
344
£9000 in Spain^ and in 1589, with others, he imported
13£3300 worth of currants and silk from £ante and Venice.
1 PK0:KCA Exam 26 f. 158. 2 Beaven II, 45.
3 Ibid. 4 William Foster (ed)
The Travels of John Sanderson,1581-1602, 1931, p. 9n.
5 FuoT~FoFE~Book~47^
6 K. R. Andrews, The Economic Aspects of Elizabethan Priva­
teering » Phd. Thesis, Univ. of London, 1951, p. 233 n. 2.
7 HAG: Gal. Salis. ilss. Ill, p. -281.
8 Andrews, Privateering, p. 120.
9 PRO: Port Book 2/1• 10 PRO: Fort Book 4/2.
11 PRO: Fort Book 5/1. 12 Andrews, Privateering% p.111.
13 PRO: Port Book 8/1.
RICHARD DASSELL: died before June 16001
Das sell was a member of the Venice Company and Levant Com-
  ■ • ■  2 ..........
pany of 1592 and a servant of Thomas Cordell.
1 HMC:Cal. Salis Ilss. X, p. 215.
2 Ibid.
THOMAS DAWKINS: died between 1 July and 14 August 1596^
Dawkins was a member of the Venice Company and the Levant
2
Company of 1592 and a servant to Edward Holmden. He en­
gaged in some trade on his own importing £145 worth of 
goods from Scanderoon in 1596. He is also listed as 
one who imported and exported through the Straights during 
the period September 1588 to June 1591.^ Dawkins seems to 
have died without any family other than an uncle in Wales,
3S5
another in Somerset, and some cousins. His life appar­
ently revolved around the Company and around Holmden 
and Ho linden's family. He appointed his master, who he 
had served for at least thirteen years, sole executor 
of his will and left to him and his wife gowns worth 
£10 each. To each of Holmden's seven children he left 
a gown and £100 and to his own servant, Simon Broadstreet, 
he left £100. A token legacy, in the form of a gown or 
a ring, he left to other associates of his in the Company: 
James Higgins, Oliver and William Gardner, Francis Dor- 
rington, William Barrett, Charles Glascock, Philip Grymes, 
Ralph Asheley and Philip Dawkins. The latter he referred
5 ....................................
to as his friend.
1 PCC 62 Drake. 2 HMCsCal. Salis. Ms s. X, p. 214.
3 Bxl:Lans• 81 f. 125v. 4 PR0:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 62.
5 These details are all to be found in his will PCC 62 Drake.
HENRY FARRINGTON: born 15501
Farrington was a draper and a member of the Venice and 
Barbary Companies. In the Levant Company charter of 1592 
he was listed as one who had the option to join the company 
within two months but there is no evidence that he ever did 
this. Much of his trade was with France, in particular 
Marseille. He had a factor there, Simon Garway, who died
o
in 1584# This factor could possibly have been related 
to William Garraway (Garway) though there is nothing be­
sides their names to indicate this. In 1584 Farrington 
and Henry Anderson obtained from the French a royal pri­
vilege in recompense for assistance to some merchants of 
Marseille whose ships had been captured by English priva­
teers. The privilege allowed them to sell freely in all
3
the ports of France merchandise which came from England. 
In 1588, with Anderson, he imported £2232.13.4 worth of 
goods from Marseille.^ He was still trading to Marseille
5
in the 1590*s with his father-in-law, Thomas Bromley.
1 PRO:HCA Exam 26 f. 206 V. 2 PROJHCA Exam 25 f. 210v.
3 Collier and Billioud, Histoire du Commerce de Marsille, 
p. 245. For this statement the author cites a document 
in the Archives des Bouche-du-Rhone. The two merchants 
are called “Henri Hardresson1 and “Henri Ferenton“.
4 PRO: Port Book 8/1.
5 PR0:HCA Exam 34 f. 51v and Willan, Studies, p. 292.
WILLIAM GARRAWAY oc GARWAY: born 15381
Garraway was a draper and a member of the Venice Company,
the Levant Companies of 1592, 1600, and 1605, and one of
the committee of the East India Company. He was an active
investor in privateering ventures, of ten in partnership
2 3
with Thomas Cordell. In 1568 he had a factor in Bruges
though there is no record of his trade there. In 1571 he
3n
exported 72 cloths to Hamburg,^ in 1584 with Thomas 
Cordell, he imported £2081.4*4 worth of currants from 
Zante,^ in 1588-89 he imported £153.6.8 worth of silk 
from Stade and £1899 worth of currants and spices from 
Venice, Petras and Zante.^ In 1596 he imported £3909.9.1 
worth of goods from Scanderoon on the Royal Exchange.^
1 PRO:Exam 32 f. 124v.
2 Andrews, Privateering, pp. 77, 111, 121, 205.
3 PRO:Court of Requests Proceedings 77/38.
4 PRO: Port Book 5/1. 5 BI4:Lans. 41 f. 128.
6 PRO: Port Books 7/8, 8/1, and 8/4.
7 BM:Lans. 81 f. 125.
RICHARD GLASCOCK:
Glascock was a merchant taylor and a member of the Venice
and Levant Company of 1592. In 1574 he exported 4 tons
of iron to Barbary.^ In 1577-78 he exported kerseys,
raisins and cottons to Hamburg but was listed as one not
2
a member of the Merchant Adventurers. He was an early 
investor in the Venice trade, importing from there with
3
Edward Holmden and George Holmes in 1580.
1 PRO: Port Book 6/4. 2 BM:Harl. 167 ff. 75-80.
3 PR0:HCA Exam 26 f. 102.
SIR JOHN HARTS: died January 16041
Harte was a member of the Grocers Company, an alderman 
from 1580 to 1604, sheriff in 1579-80, Lord Mayor in 
1589-90, for which he was knighted, and an MP for London 
in 1592-93 and 1597-98.^ He was a member of the Turkey 
Company and of the Levant Company in 1592. He is listed
3
as a member of the Levant Company in June 1600 but his
name is not in the letters patent of December 1600. He
was, however, a member of the East India Company. He also
belonged to the Russia Company and served as its governor
in 1583, 1591-92, 1596-98, and 1600.^ Though he is listed
as having imported goods from the Straights during the 
....... 5
period 1588-91 there is almost no reference to him as 
an active merchant in the Customs Accounts and Port Books. 
He was one of the leading investors in the Earl of Cumber­
land's expedition to Puerto Rico in 1598 but otherwise he 
is not known to have been an investor in privateering 
ventures.^
1 Beaven II, 41. 2 Ibid.
3 HMC:Cal. dalis. Hss. X, p. 214.
4 Uillan, Russia Company, p. 286.
5 BM:Lans. 57 no. 1; PRO:SPD Eliz. 239 no. 62.
6 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, p. 77.
HENRY HEWITT: died 15981
Hewitt was a clothworker and the brother-in-law of Richard 
2
Stapers. He was a member of the Spanish Company and the 
Turkey Company. In the Levant Company patent of 1592 he 
is listed as one who had the option to take up membership 
within two months but there is no indication of whether 
or not he did. Hewitt was probably also a Merchant Ad­
venturer. From 1573 to 1580 he was trading to Hamburg
3
with Clement Draper and Henry Clitheroe. The latter two 
appear in a list of those trading to Hamburg who are not 
Merchant Adventurers bxit Hewitt does not appear on that 
list.^ The record of his Spanish trade consists of a few
........... c .....................
cloths shipped there in 1575J and the import of 729 bags 
of Spanish wool in 1578-79 in partnership with Sir George 
and Uilliam Bond.^
1 PCC 12 Lewyn. 2 Ibid.
3 BM:Sloan 320. 4 BM:Harl. 167 ff. 75-80.
5 TRO: Port Book 6/4. 6 BM:Lans. 29 f. 56.
EDWARD HOLMDEN: born 1544,1 died 4 July 16162
Holmden was a grocer and master of the company in 1596-97,
and alderman from 1597 to 1603, sheriff in 1598-99, and was
o
knighted on 26 July 1603. He was a member of the Venice 
and Barbary Companies and of the Levant Companies of 1592
Ho 0
and 1600 and was one of the committee of the East India
Company, Though he invested in privateering it was on
a very limited scale.^ The earliest official record of
his trade is from 1533-84 when he was exporting cloth
to Spain and Ba r b a r y . H i s  trade as a Venice merchant
was substantial. In 1584 with Paul Banning, he imported
6£1716,15 worth of currants and oil and probably more.
In 1588-89 he imported £13,207,3.4 in currants, oil, cot­
ton, and brimstone, as well as £1663.10,8 in sugar and
7
anniseeds from Barbary.
1 PRQ:HCA Exam 26 f. 194v. 2 Beaven II, p. 46.
3 Ibid. 4 Andrews, Privateering, p. 104.
5 BM:Lans. 41 f. 137v, I38v. 6 " bit:Lans. 41 f. 128.
7 PRO: Port Book 7/8, 8/1, and 8/4.
EDWARD LECHLAND:
Lechland was a haberdasher^ and a member of the Venice
Company and Levant Companies of 1592 and 1600. In the
2
1590*8 he invested in several privateering ventures. 
There is no record of his commercial activities other 
than his membership in the above companies.
1 Andrews, thesis, p. 245 n. 1.
2 Ibid. and PRO:Court of Requests Proceedings 210/61.
Hoi
1 7SIR RICHARD MARTIN: bom 1534, died July 1617*
Martin was a member of the Goldsmiths Company of which
he was prime warden in 1592-93. In 1572 he was appointed
warden of the mint and was master from 1581 to 1617. He
was an alderman from 1578 to 1602 when he was dismissed
for bankruptcy. He was sheriff in 1581-82 and he filled
the unexpired mayoralty of Martin Calthorpe in 1589, for
3
which he was knighted. Through his daughter, Dorcas, 
he became father-in-law to Sir Julius Caesar, judge of 
the High Court of Admiralty.^ He was a member of the 
Prussia Company, of which he was governor in 1584, 1585, 
and 1536.^ He was also a member of the Spanish and Turkey 
Companies and of the Levant Companies of 1592 and 1600.
He held shares in the Mineral and Battery Works Company. ^ 
There is almost no record of Martin engaging in any trade 
in his own name. He seems to have been an active money 
lender. There is record of his having lent a total of 
£5762.5.6 between August 1576 and August 1586.^
1 Donald, Elizabethan Monopolies, p. 43.
2 Beaven II, p. 40. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 174.
5 Willan, Russia Company, p. 286.
6 Donald, op. cit., p. 43.
7 FRO:Chancery, Close Rolls, passim.
4oa,
WILLIAM HASHAH or MAS SAM; died November 1600*
Masham was a member of the Grocers Company, an alderman
2from 1582 to 1594 and sheriff in 1583-84. He was a
3
Merchant Adventurer and was active in the Morocco trade 
in the 1560's,^ though he does not appear as a member of 
the Barbary Company in 1585. He was a member of the Russia
5
Company in 1584, an assistant of the Spanish Company, and 
a member of the Turkey Company and the Levant Company of
1592. In June 1600, a few months before he died, he was
£
still listed as a Levant merchant. The record of his 
trade shows he exported 22 tons of molasses to Dunkirk 
in 1576.^ In 1583-84 he exported 480 cloths to Spain 
and France and imported from Spain fruit, spices, oil, 
cochineal and wool valued at £3195,15.^ In 1587-88 he
9
was exporting cloth and madder to Stade and Amsterdam.
1 Beaven II, p. 41. 2
3 de Smedt II, p. 444-7. 4
5 PRO:SPF Russia 1 f. 30. 6
7 PRO: Port Book 6/4. 8
9 PRO; Port Book 7/8.
Ibid.
Willan, Studies. p. 133. 
HHC:Cal. Salis. Mss. X,p.214 
BM:Lans. 41 ff.ll7-148v, psm
RICHARD MAY:
May was a merchant taylor and a member of the Russia,^ 
Spanish, and Turkey Companies and the Levant Companies 
of 1592 and 1600. His individual trade, as shown by the
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record, was all with Spain and Portugal. In 1567-8 he
2
imported £350 worth of goods from Spain and in 1576
3
he exported £235 worth of goods to Bayon. In 1583-4
4
he imported £1519.6.8 worth of spices from Lisbon.
1 BH:Cotton, Nero BVIXI f. 53. 2 PRO: Port Book 4/2.
3 PRO: Port Book 6/4. 4 M:Lans. 41, ff. 119,126,134
1 2 SIR EDUARD OSBORNE: b o m  1530,1 died 4 February 1592
Osborne was a clothworker, an alderman from 1573 to 1592,
sheriff in 1576-86, Lord Mayor in 1583-84, for which he
was knighted on 2 February 1584, and an PIP for London in
31586-87. As a young man he was apprenticed to Sir-William 
Hewitt, clothworker, and later Lord Mayor of London* Some­
time in the early 1550's Osborne was admitted to the free­
dom of the Clothworkers Company and shortly after married
Anne, daughter and heir of his former master. In 1566,
4
upon Hewitt's death, Osborne inherited his business.
Osborne's name appears in the charters of the Spanish,
Eastland, Turkey, and Levant Companies. He was also a 
member of the Russia Company in 1584,"* but his date of 
entry is not known. The earliest record of Osborne's 
trading activities dates from September 1559 when he 
shipped 13 cloths to Antwerp. During the years 1563 
to 1565 he exported cottons, short cloths, and lead but
HOH
7
their destination is not known. With the advent of the 
Port Books it becomes clear that the greatest part of
Osborne1s early trade was with Spain and some with
8
France. He exported cloth and imported wine, oil, rai-
9
sins and canvas. In 1587 he imported goods from Amster­
dam with Richard Stapers and in 1589 he imported soap ashes 
from iilbing. ^  His association with Stapers dates from
at least 1575 and possibly earlier. In that year they
11are known to have shipped goods together to Spain, and
in the following year they together imported from Lisbon
1217,000 lbs. of pepper and 1800 lbs. of cloves. From 
that time until Osborne's death they were in continual 
association with each other, though each also traded in­
dependently. They were related through their wives both 
of whom were Hewitts and first cousins. Ho will has ever 
been found for Osborne. He was obviously a wealthy man
though how wealthy is not known. There is an inventory
13of his personal goods taken at the time of his death.
The total value listed is £994.7. Most of this is ac­
counted for by the leases on his house in London, £110, 
and his house and farm at Braddes in Suffolk, £600.
1 DN3. 2 Beaven II, p. 39. 3 Ibid.
4 DHB. 5 PRO:SPF Russia l,f.30. 6 PR0:SPD Eliz.6 f.114
7 PRO:KR Customs Accounts 90/11 and 89/8.
8 PRO: Port Book 2/1. 9 PRO: Port Books 4/2 and 6/3.
10 PRO: Port Books 7/8 and 8/4. 11 PRO:SFD Eliz.106 no.57.
12 PRO; Port Book 814/10. 13 BIT:Add. 42082.
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EDWARD SADLER: died about 1608*
Probably related to Robert Sadler, he was a member of the 
Venice Company and the Levant Company of 1592♦ He died 
overseas leaving to his wife all wages due to him* He 
also provided that all his goods **in the ship'* and his
chest be sold at the mast and the proceeds to go to his
2
wife. It can be presumed from his will that at the time 
of his death he was a factor or servant to some member of 
the Levant Company.
1 PCC 56 Wingfield. 2 Ibid.
ROBERT SADLER; bom 1538*
Robert Sadler was a haberdasher and a member of the Venice
Company and Levant Company of 1592. He was a fairly pro-
2
minent investor in privateering. The only record of his 
trade appears in 1567-63 when he imported £1298.6 worth
3
of canvas and paper from Rouen.
1 PR0:HCA Exam 22 f. 139v.
2 Andrews, Privateering, p. 203. 3 PRO: Port Book 4/2.
RICHARD SALTONSTALL; b o m  1520,1 died 17 torch 1601 
Saltonstall was a skinner and master of the company in 
1589, 1593, 1595, and 1599; he was an alderman from 1588
*40 b
to 1601, sheriff in 1588-89, HP for London in 1586-87
3
and Lord Mayor in 1597-98 for which he was knighted.
He was also appointed collector of the petty customs 
for London on 24 October 1597.^ Saltonstall was a mem­
ber of the Merchant Adventurers Company of which he be­
came governor. He was also a member of the Spanish, 
Turkey, and Russia Companies-* and of the Levant Companies 
of 1592 and 1600. The record of his trade shows he ex­
ported 270 cloths to Hamburg in 1571.^ small quantities 
are entered in his name in 1575 and 1576. In 1584 he 
exported £206 worth of goods to Spain and imported £2800
Q
worth from there. Between 1587 and 1588 he imported 
£1468 worth from Spain and £4795 worth from Stade and 
Hamburg•y
1 Lang, op. cit., p. 380, states that he was 80 years 
old when he died.
2 Beaven II, p. 43. 3 Ibid.
4 PRO:Exchequer, Privy Seal Warrants, 232.
5 3M:Cotton, Nero BVII f. 53. 6 PRO: Port Book 5/1.
7 PRO: Port Book 6/3 and 6/4. 8 BM:Lans. 41 ff. 148, 149, 
117v, 118v, 120, 122v, 124, 126v, 128, 129v, 132, 134.
9 PRO: Port Books 7/8, 8/1, and 8/4.
THOMAS SMYTHE: bom 1521,1 died 7 June 15912 
Snythe was a member of the Haberdashers Company of which 
he was master in 1583. He was not a merchant in the sense 
that he carried on an active trade though he was a member
HOT-
of the Spanish, Turkey and Russia Companies. He was pro-
2bably a charter member of the latter. During most of 
his life he was a customer of London. From before 1558 
to 1570 he was the collector of tonnage and poundage on 
imports. In the latter year he contracted for the first 
of several leases of the farm of these duties. In 1576 
Southampton, Ipswich, and Woodbridge were added to his 
farm. The cost of the farm rose with each extension of 
the lease from about £17,500 per year in 1570-1576 to 
£30,000 per year in 1584-1588.^ Smythe also actively 
participated in the Company of Mines Royal and the
5
Mineral and Battery Works Company. He invested in 
Humphrey Gilbert's expedition of 1578 and Edward Fenton's 
voyage of 1582.^ The record of his own trade is slight.
o
In 1571 he exported 12 kerseys to an unknown destination, 
in January 1575 13 barrels of herring were imported under 
the entry "Thomas Smythe, customer and his friends", and 
in 1584 he exported 110 clothes to Lisbon and Bayon.^
There may have been much more than this* As customer 
he was in an ideal position for evading the customs and 
there is nothing known about him which suggests he might 
have been averse from such a course. Stoythe married Alice, 
daughter of Sir Andrew Judde, a charter member of the 
Muscovy Company. By her he had thirteen children, twelve
40S
of whom survived to adulthood and in turn produced 45 
grandchildren for the Customer* His third son, Thomas, 
is the only one who followed a commercial career. In 
the early seventeenth century he became the leading mer­
chant of his day. He was the governor of the Levant 
Company in 1600, the first governor of the East India 
Company and the Virginia Company as well as being gover­
nor of most of the other important trading companies of 
the time.
1 DNB. 2 Ibid.
3 Cal. SPF 1583-84, no. 677 and Willan, Muscovy Merchants
4 F. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641Vp. 317-19.
5 M/b/ Donald. Elizabethan Copper. 1955. pp. 66-72 and 
psm.; Donald.‘ Elizabethan Monopolies. p. 72.
6 D. B. Quinn (ed.) The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises
of Sir Humphrey Gilbert. 2 voIs.. 1940. p. 332.
7 Taylor. Fenton, p. 23T7 8 PRO: Port Book 5/1.
9 PRO: Port Book 6/3.
10 BiI:Lans. 41 f. 140v, 141v, 142, 142v.
SIR JOHN SPENCER: died 3 March 16101
Spencer was a clothworker and master of the company in 
1580. He served as an alderman from 1583 to 1610, sheriff
in 1583-84, and Lord Mayor in 1594-95 for which he was
2knighted. He was a member of the Spanish Company, Tur­
key Company, and the Levant Companies of 1592, 1600, and 
1605 as well as the East India Company. He was also a
3
member of the Russia Company from at least October 1584.
Ho^
He was engaged in the Barbary trade in 1577^ but was not 
a member of the Barbary Company in 1585. Almost all of 
his trade, as recorded, was with Spain. In 1565 he sent
S
78 short cloths there, and in 1567-68 he imported goods 
valued at £605.^ In 1571 Paul Banning acted as his fac­
tor and exported 140 short cloths to Spain.^ In 1583-84
Q
he imported £1350 worth of goods from St. Lucar and in 
1587 he received a small quantity of iron and whale oil
o
from St. Jean de Luce. The only record of his Levant 
trade comes from 1596 when he received £1000 worth of 
silk and nutmeg aboard the Royal Exchange from Scanderoon.^
1 Beaven II, p. 42. 2 Ibid.
3 PRO:SPF Russia 1 f. 30. 4 PR0:SPD Eliz. Ill no. 34.
5 PRO: Port Book 2/1. 6 PRO: Port Book 4/2.
7 PRO: Port Book 5/1.
8 3M:Lans. 41, ff. 118v, 127v, 129, 129v.
9 PRO: Port Book 7/8. 10 ki:Lans. 81 f. 125.
RICHARD STAPERS; bom 1540,1 died 30 June 16082 
Stapers was a clothworker and master of the company in
o
1590 and an alderman in 1594. He was a cousin of Edward
Osborne through their marriage into the Hewitt family and
4
the brother-in-law of Henry Hewitt. Stapers is known to 
have traded into every geographical area regularly fre­
quented by the English except Russia. He was a member 
of the Spanish, Eastland, Turkey, and Barbary Companies,
4-10
as well as the Levant Companies of 1592, 1600 and 1605 
and the East India Company* He was the governor of the
r i
Levant Company in September 1596 and in February 1599 
and it is probable that he was governor from the death 
of Osborne in 1592 to the appointment of Thomas Smythe 
in 1600* The customs records show that Stapers actually 
conducted trado to the areas of monopoly of the companies 
to which he belonged* Spain and Portugal were probably 
the areas of his greatest activity. In 1567 he imported 
goods to the value of £655 from Spain.^ He was importing
Q
from Spain in 1583, 1587, and 1588. He is known to have
9been trading there in 1590. He traded to Barbary in the 
1580's^ and to France throughout the period. In the 
1590's he was exporting large quantities of fish to Leg­
horn from Yarmouth and Dartmouth.^
1 PR0:HCA Exam 28 f. 51. 2 Beaven II, p. 45.
3 Ibid. 4 PCC 72 Windebank.
5 HMCrCal. Salis. Mss. VI, p. 385.
6 BM:Lans. 241 f. 65v. 7 PRO: Port Book 4/2.
8 BM:Lans. 41 ff. 119v, 132; PRO: Port Books 7/8 and 8/1.
9 PR0:HCA Exam 28 ff. 178v-79.10 BM:Lans. 41 f. 146.
11 PRO: Port Books 478/5; 480/1, 2, 12; 481/2; 482/9; 937/8.
THOMAS TROWTE; died before June 16001
Trowte was a member of the Venice Company and a servant of 
Paul Banning.^ In 1588 he imported £38 worth of goods in
3
his own name from Xante.
1 HMC:Cal. Salis. Mss. X, p. 214. 2 Ibid.
3 PRO: Port Book 7/8.
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APPENDIX B 
Incoming cargoes of the Levant trade
The following transcripts represent the only sur­
viving cargo entries for incoming ships in the Venice, 
Turkey and Levant trades during the Elizabethan period• 
They are mainly from the Port Books covering the periods 
Michaelmas 1587 to Michaelmas 1588 /Port Books 7/8 and 
8/1/ and July to Michaelmas 1589 /Port Book 8/4/. The 
absence of such records for the period prior to 1588 
is explained by the fact that the ad valorem duties 
inward at London were farmed by Customer Thomas Smythe 
from 1572 to 1588; thus no official Port Books were 
ever compiled for the Exchequer during that time. That 
such books were compiled unofficially is suggested by 
BM:Lans. 41 ff. 104-168v, which is a transcript of all 
customs entries for the Spanish trade, both inward and 
outward, at several ports for 1584. These include London 
and Southampton which were part of Customer Snythe^ 
farm, testifying to the fact that he must have kept 
records which were in effect Port Books but which re­
mained in his own possession. Among these transcripts
are two entries, included by mistake and then crossed
. l
out, of two ships which entered from Zante /nos. 116
4 i a
and 127/. Unfortunately the clerk noticed his error 
before he had transcribed the entire cargo, What the 
clerk did transcribe is included in this appendix.
The absence of customs records for the Levant trade 
for the remainder of Elizabeth^ reign is due only to 
the chance failure of survival. There is one Port Book 
/10/11/ for tonnage and poundage outward for 1599, which 
should record exports of tin, lead and conyskins. How­
ever, it has been misplaced in the Public Ilecord Office 
and is thus unavailable. There are two other Port Books 
which record alien imports to London for 1600 and 1602 
2^ 11/1 and 12/1/. At the beginning of each of these 
books is a list of the ships that entered London, during "^e 
period covered by the book, from the Mediterranean. There 
are, however, no cargo entries. The only official record 
of a Levant cargo of the 1590,s is to be found in Lans- 
downe Mss. 81 f. 125, which gives the Customs House en­
tries for the Royal Exchange which entered from Scandroon 
in May 1596. This document was noted by Harris, William 
Clark, pp. 289-93. A Transcript of it is included in this 
appendix.
Thus the entries transcribed below are a nearly 
unique surviving record of the Levant trade. Their in­
terest lies not simply in this uniqueness but in the fact
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that they throw light on the nature and quantity of com­
modities imported, the distribution of the cargoes among 
the various merchants of the Venice and Levant Companies, 
and some measure of the possible value of the cargoes 
imported from Turkey and the Venetian islands*
In the interests of space the transcripts are not 
verbatim but include, for the cargo, only the total 
quantity of each commodity imported by each merchant*
Thus the first entry for The Gift of God of London reads 
in the Fort Book /abbreviations are written out/ *'38 
great butts, 25 small butts and pipes, 174 hogsheads 
and puncheons, 100 bags of currants, containing 188 lawt.'* 
This has been reduced to the quantity only and all sub­
sequent entires are treated in the same manner. The 
valuations given are the official values given in the 
Fort Books and are based on the 1558 Kate Book* It is 
possible to add up all the weights given and arrive at 
a measure of the total burden of a cargo. This, however, 
would be deceptive because for the purpose of freight 
charges tonnage equivalents were worked out making les­
ser weights of bulky goods equal to a ton of lading.
These equivalents were always set down in the charter 
party for a given voyage. No complete charter parties 
for Levant voyages have been found; however, the essen­
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tials of one are transcribed in John Sanderson's letter 
book /BM:Lans. 241 f. 319/* It was for a voyage made 
by the Royal Exchange* The year is not given but was 
probably 1597 /346, 347/* The tonnages below in brack­
ets for each ship are worked out on the basis of the 
document in Sanderson which reads as follows:
To receive for her tonnage outward 1500 ton­
nes in barres barrelled for every tonne £sic - 
This can only be a clerical error. It pro­
bably refers to tinnj and six ordynary balletts 
of Carseys or cloth for every to tonnes to 
saile from hence to Zante there to stay six 
dayes to discharge and recharge and from 
thence to Alexandretta there to stay 20 dayes 
likewise to discharge and recharge and thence 
back again to Zante and Petrasse there to stay 
30 dayes likewise to discharge and recharge 
and from there backe to Alexandretta ther to 
stay 31 dayes ther to receave in the rest of 
her ladinge to retome for London. Tonnage 
as followeth 20 cwt neat currants beside the 
caske per ton 20 cwt of sope per ton 15 cwt of 
loose gales per ton and in bagges 14 cwt per 
ton 14 cwt pepper per ton synnamon and seny 8 
cwt per ton fine siIke cotton woo11 cloves and 
cotton yarne 10 cwt per ton wormseed or long 
pepper 12 cwt per ton nutmeges 13 cwt per ton 
all which waight to be accompted after the rate 
of 112 lbs englishe waight for every hundreth 
besides casks baggs chists ropes and wrappes 
with the cotton which cotton shall not excede 
the quantitye of 3 rotilois per bale: A pro­
vise that the merchant shall not lade aborde 
the said shipe above one ton of cotton woll 
or Yarne for every ten tonnes and so after 
that Rate for greater or lesser quantitye 
the freight 12L per ton.
The Sussan word for worde with 
the Exchange god send them well 
to speede.
H15
These surviving entries do not include wines which are 
thus unknown and may account for the difference between 
rating and lading of the ships.
VENICE COMPANY SHIPS 
/incomplete record of lading/
13 May 1584 /Lans. 41 f. 128/
THE MARY ROSE OF ALBOROUGH /I17/ - Alexander Bents - from 
Zante /burden 130 tons (SPD Eliz. 219 no, 86^ ./
Thomas Cordell and William Garraway
currants - 104,051 lbs.; sweet oil -
86 barrels £2081,4.4
Richard Burrell, grocer
currants - 300 lbs. 4.10.0
Ambrose Woodcock, grocer
currants - 1000 lbs. 15.0.0
/58 tons of lading/
19 May 1584 /Lans. 41 f. 128/
THE ASCENSION OF LONDON 0-27/- John Eustace - from Zante
/burden In) tons (SPD Eliz. 219 no. 86/
Edward Ho linden and Paul Banning
currants - 855 cwt.; sweet oil -
289 barrels £1716.15.0
I[79 tons of lading/
Hit
TURKEY COMPANY SHIPS 
11, 14, and 16 March 1587/88 /Port Book 7/8/
THE GIFT OF GOD OF LONDON /I96/ - 100 tons - Robert Harrison,
Mr. - from Petras
Sir Edward Osborne, Richard Stapers 6c Co.
currants - 188 mwt.; raw silk - 1500 lbs. 
great weight £3820*
Richard Thompson, merchant
raw silk - Ifi lbs. great weight 46.13.4
John Muffett
currants - 14 cwt. 21.
I'95 tons of lading/
13, and 14 March 1587/88 /port Book 7/8/
MAYFLOWER OF LONDON /198/ - 160 tons - John Vassell, Mr.
from Petras
Edward Holmden, grocer
currants - 60 mwt. 8 cwt. £ 912.
Sir Edward Osborne, Richard Stapers 6c Co.
currants - 130 mwt.; anniseed - 10 mwt.;
raw silk - 960 lbs. /sic/ 2723.6.8
John Vassell, Mr.
currants - 20 cwt. 30.
William Garwaie, merchant
currants - 106 cwt. 159.
John Vassell, draper
currants - 25 cwt. 30.6
William Gilbert, mariner
currants - 16 cwt. 24.
/117 tons of lading/
11 and 15 April 1588 /Port Book 8/1/
TOBY OF LONDON [191/- 200 tons - Anthony Eaminge, Mr.
from Tripoly
Sir Edward Osborne, Richard Stapers & Co.
galls - 617 cwt.; nutmegs - 113 cwt.;
sal-ammoniac - 4 cwt.; tumeric -
10 cwt.; raw silk - 1414 lbs. /sic/ indigo -
800 lbs.; cotton yarn - 78.5 cwt.;
cotton wool - 510 cwt.; damaske raisins -
107 cwt. £6203.
Anthony Eaminge, Mr.
nutmegs - 160 lbs.; indigo - 160 lbs.;
galls - 12 cwt.; damask raisins -
150 lbs. 60.
j120 tons of lading/
11 and 13 April 1588 /port Book 8/1/
HERCULES OF LONDON /190j - 250 tons - Richard Parsons, Mr.
from Tripoly
Sir Edward Osborne, Richard Stapers & Co.
raw silk - 5012 lbs. great weight; cin­
namon - 1296 lbs.; bark of cinnamon - 
101 cwt.; nutmegs - 373 cwt.; indigo- 
528 cwt.; cloves - 104 lbs.; sal-ammoniac - 
456 lbs.; fusees of cloves - 476 lbs.; 
mirobolans - 256 lbs.; mace - 428 lbs.; 
pepper - 6780 lbs.; 301bs. (1 box); sanquis 
iracanis - 260 lbs.; aloes epatica - 360 lbs.; 
botans of cotton cloth - 1580 pieces; watered 
and unwatered chamblettes - 660 pieces; gro- 
grams - 1770 double pieces; mirrors - 23 lbs.
(1 box); cotton yam - 7650 lbs.; chascles - 
518 pieces; iser cloth - 25 pieces; comashes - 
55 pieces; wormseed - 1500 lbs.; galls - 416 cwt.; 
cotton wool - 155 cwt.; quilts of cotton cloth - 
9;scammony - 110 lbs.; Turkey carpets - 13; 
ginger - 550 lbs.; mummy - 300 lbs.; casia fistula - 
1120 lbs.; long pepper - 1420 lbs.; mastic - 
600 lbs.; sponges - 1 cwt. 37,683.2.8
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HERCULES (cont.)
John Sanderson, Anthony Bate 6c Co.
raw silk - 177 lbs. /sic/; cotton yam - 
200 lbs.; pepper - 180 lbs.; nutmegs - 
55 lbs.; pistachios - 200 lbs.; indigo - 
120 lbs. £ 100.
Jean Durand, pilot
indigo - 250 lbs.; nutmegs - 250 labs. 125.
Thomas Hitchcocks, purser
nutmegs - 640 lbs.; cotton yam - 150 lbs. 56.10
£165 tons and more of lading - for some 
goods the equivalents are not known/
VENICE COMPANY SHIPS
13 March 1587/88 £port Book 7/8/
CHERUBIN OF LONDON £197/- 160 tons - John Pierson - from Zante
Thomas Trowte, grocer
currants - 1800 lbs.; sweet oil - 4 barrells; 
vermillion - 100 lbs. £ 39.
Edwa rd Ho Imd en, g ro c er
currants - 273 mwt. 6 cwt. 4104.10
£137 tons of lading/
9, 10, and 12 July 1589 £Port Book 8/4/
MINION OF LONDON £206/- 160 tons - John Gram - from Zante
Edward Holmden, grocer
currants - 236 mwt.; oil - 2 butts £3561.10
John Grant
currants - 27 cwt. 27.10
William Johnson
currants - 6 cwt. 9.
£120 tons of lading/
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9, 10, 11, and 17 July 1589 /Port Book 8/4/
CHERUB IN OF LONDON [102/ - 170 tons - Richard Gibbens, Mr. -
from Venice and 2ante
Edward Ho linden, grocer
currants - 246 mwt.; cotton wool -
30 cwt. - powder of brimstone - 56 mwt. £3991.3.4
William Rowles
short silk - 130 lbs. great weight 32.10
William Bamabe
looking glasses - 6.5 dozen large and 
3 dozen small; odds and ends not legible 46.13.4
Thoma s Hud son
raw silk - 55 lbs. great weight; short
silk - 95 lbs. great weight; sweet oil -
1 pipe 73.8.4
Thomas Turfoote
Candy oil - 4 barrels 6.
/123 tons of lading/
9, 10, and 15 July 1589 /Port Book 8/4/
MARGARET AND JOHN OF LONDON £203/- 160 tons - John Burrell,
Mr. - from Venice
Mathew Butler, goldsmith
currants - 30 cwt. £ 45.
George Salter, mercer
sword blades - 75 dozen 150.
Henry Anderson, grocer
cloves - 300 lbs. 75.
Andrew Banning, grocer
currants - 192 cwt.; Candy oil - 
8 barrels 300.
Paul Banning, grocer
currants - 220 cwt.; Candy oil -
14 barrels 351.
Ha o
MARGARET AND JOHN (cont.)
Thomas Cordell & Co.
currants - 1600 cwt.; nobs of silk -
300 £2410.
William Garraway, draper
currants - 204 cwt.; olive oil -
15 barrels 328.10
Edward Holmden, grocer
currants - 80 cwt. 120.
John Burrell, Mr.
currants - 10 cwt. 15.
£120 tons of lading/
10, 11, 12, and 16 July 1589 £Port Book 8/4j
GEORGE BONAVENTURE OF LONDON £204/- 140 tons - Roland
Jurdane, Mr. - from Zante
Thomas Cordell 6c Co.
currants - 600 cwt. £ 900.
William Garraway, draper
currants - 697 cwt.; clove - 3 cwt. 80 lbs.; 
nutmeg - 5 cwt.; - wormseed - 2 cwt. 20 lbs.; 
staveacres - 8 cwt. 1412.
Edward Holmden, grocer
currants - 26 mwt. 4 cwt. 396.
Paul Banning, grocer
currants - 804 cwt. 1206.
Henry Anderson, grocer
clove - 150 lbs.; short silk - 80
lbs. great weight 57.10
Eliazer Hickman
oil - 4 hogsheads; marmelade - 3 cwt.;
short silk - 2 cwt. 90 lbs. £sic/ 122.10
Thomas Farrington, vintner
currants - 32 cwt. 48.
£127 tons of lading/
H-ai
LEVANT COMPANY SHIP 
May 1596 £Lans. 81 f. 125/
(The valuations are not given in the document and were 
worked out from the Rate Book as printed by T. S. Willan, 
A Tudor Book of Rates)
THE ROYAL EXCHANGE OF LONDON £315/- 240 tons - William
Brodbent - from Alexandretta £scandroon/
Sir John Spencer
long silk - 871 lbs.; indigo - 410 lbs.; 
nutmeg - 2590 lbs.
Thomas Symonde
cotton wool - 3500 lbs.; indigo - 
1650 lbs.; silk - 660 lbs.
william Garraway
indigo - 4728 lbs.; long pepper - 
360 lbs.; silk - 1928 lbs.; nutmeg - 
3835 lbs.; cotton yarn - 365 lbs.; 
cotton wool - 11,550 lbs.; galls - 
19,100 lbs.; currants - 65,300 lbs.
Thomas Cordell
cotton wool - 10,500 lbs.; galls -
15,800 lbs.; indigo - 4154 lbs.; silk -
1819 lbs.
Raphe Asheley
indigo - 615 lbs.; galls 1500 lbs.
Leonard Poore
indigo - 640 lbs.; cotton wool - 
1900 lbs.
Thomas Cordell
currants - 63,800 lbs•; Turkie 
carpets - 3
Andrew Banning and William Roweles
indigo - 320 lbs.: cotton yarn - 480 lbs.;
silk - 90 great Ids.
William Wilke
nutmeg - 936 lbs.; indigo - 940 lbs.; 
cotton wool - 1200 lbs.
John Huntley
pischaces (probably pistachio) - 240 lbs.
£1014.8.7
694.2.3
3909.19.1
2096.13.7
69.2.2
116.11.10
921.6.6
110.13.1
273.12.8
6.0.0
4-3.3-
ROYAL EXCHANGE (continued)
George Salter
indigo - 5100 lbs.; nutmeg - 1050 lbs.;
silk - 330 great lbs.; blue botans -
450 pieces; cotton yarn - 900 lbs. £ 866.2.7
Paul Banning and Andrew Banning
indigo - 12,020 lbs.; silk - 880 great lbs.; 
nutmeg - 2100 lbs.;cotton yarn - 1440 lbs. 1357.9.8
Edward Parvishe
indigo - 548 lbs.; silk - 40 lbs.;
cotton wool - 625 lbs.; cotton yarn -
550 lbs. 122.4.8
Thomas Dawkins
indigo - 300 lbs.; nutmeg - 560 lbs.;
cotton yarn - 150 lbs.; currants - 1500 lbs.145.10.4
Pdchard Stapers, Philip Grimes, and Robert Sandy 
indigo - 850 lbs.; chamblets - 64 double 
pieces 198.16
Henry Anderson
indigo - 750 lbs.; silk - 190 lbs.
James Stapers and John Kildnall
indigo - 1020 lbs.; wormseed - 200 lbs.; 
carpets - 1 long, 16 short
Charles Glascock
indigo - 310 lbs.; nutmeg - 480 lbs.; 
blue botans - 5 pieces; cotton yarn - 
1000 lbs.
Philip Grymes
indigo - 4890 lbs.; cotton yarn - 1600 lbs.; 
nutmeg - 1250 lbs.; wormseed - 250 lbs.; 
goatskins dressed - 200; storax - 140 lbs.; 
cotton v/oo 1 - 400 lbs.; silk - 30 lbs.; 
botans - 30 pieces; chamblets - 64 pieces 896.10.0
Arthur Jackson
indigo - 150 lbs.; clove - 140 lbs. 47.9.10
£170 tons of lading/
189.2.9
132.11.4
155.10.0
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APPENDIX C (Table VII)
List of English Shipping to the Mediterranean:
1572-1604
This shipping list contains an entry for every 
known English merchant ship which voyaged to the Med­
iterranean during the inclusive dates. The list started 
out a more modest affair as an attempt to take note of 
as many ships as possible sent out by the Turkey, Venice 
and Levant Companies. But as work proceeded with the 
project it turned out that a ship which one source 
placed only in a west Mediterranean port was found, 
from another source, to have sailed also further east 
to a Venetian or Turkish port. The logic of this situ­
ation was that from the point of view of this compilation 
any single ship found headed for the Mediterranean may 
have been destined for the Levant trade, no matter what 
a particular source stated about it. Thus all such ships 
had to be included and a list of Levant shipping turned 
into a list of Mediterranean shipping.
It is only natural to inquire into the reliability 
of this Shipping List. First it can be said, with vir­
tually complete confidence, that if a ship is entered 
in this list then it did make the voyage to the Med­
iterranean so listed. Other items of information about
the voyage may be in question but not the existence 
of the voyage itself. A discussion of the reliability 
of the entries in each column of the list is presented 
in the notes below. The next question about reliability 
to raise is that of completeness. There are two parts 
to this question; first, the number of voyages and se­
cond) the ports of call during each voyage. For the 
first part^there is no way of knowing how complete a 
record is presented here because nowhere in the contem­
porary English records is there indication of how many 
English ships actually set sail for the Mediterranean 
in any given year in the later sixteenth century. The 
estimate of 30 per year made by the governor of Zante in 
1603 is open to interpretation (see supra p.B3<P). In 
fact, one of the contributions of this shipping list is 
that it makes possible, for the first time, to take some 
measure of the extent of this branch of English merchant 
shipping. It is the first step toward, what one hopes, 
will eventually be a much fuller record. There is no 
question that the record presented here is not complete, 
especially for certain years in which very few ships 
appear in the list. The second part of the question, 
about ports of call, is taken up in the notes below 
under "Destination11.
<+3lS
It will be seen from a perusal of the Shipping List 
that it was compiled from a multitude of sources. A few, 
however, stand out as especially important. Perhaps 
first mentioned should be Hakluyt^ Principal Navigations; 
not necessarily because from it came more entries than 
from elsewhere, but because knowledge of its contents 
first inspired the thought that it might be possible to 
compile a reasonably complete list of Levant shipping.
As a source^ the Principal Navigations has the further 
virtue, in many cases, of giving more complete information 
about* the entire route of a voyage than is to be found in 
any other source. This lack is the case with the Port 
Books, the most important source for the entire period 
covered. It is well known to all who have ever used
them that the port of call entered in them is either
the first or last made by the ship. In the Mediterranean 
trade a ship seldom made only one port of call and know­
ledge of these other ports depends on supplementary 
sources. In addition to Hakluyt, the most important of
these are the records of the High Court of Admiralty.
There, in the libels and examinations, is to be found 
a variety of detail about ships in the Mediterranean 
trade, including often an account of their several ports 
of call. These three sources, then constitute the main
4at
body of material found in England from which the Shipping 
List was compiled* For the rest, use was made of a 
variety of other sources of varying helpfulness. Finally, 
specific mention must be made of a source from a foreign 
archive. This is a record of ships entering the Tuscan 
port of Leghorn from about 1540 onward. A description of 
this source will be found above on p.-l^ ^7 • It was con­
sulted on microfilm and the present writer wishes to 
reiterate here his gratitude to the Central Research 
Fund of the Uhiversity of London for a grant which made 
it possible to acquire the microfilm and to Dr. A. A. 
Ruddock of Birkbeck College for her support in securing 
the grant and her assistance in using the document.
Notes on the Shipping List:
General: The main reference for each entry is the one
under the footnote for the name of the ship. All in­
formation about the voyage not found in the source so 
indicated is separately cited. Any information for a 
voyage not separately cited can be assumed to come 
from the main reference. The numbers in the first 
column preceeding each entry are for convenience of 
reference to individual entries and are so used through­
out the text.
4-3L4-
Year: This is the year in which the ship is presumed
to have departed from England and is done in this way 
simply for convenience. Contemporaries did not necess­
arily refer to their voyages in such terms. To take a 
hypothetical case,' if the Turkey merchants stated that 
they had adventured some ships to the Levant in 1585^ 
they very likely were referring to the fact that the 
ships were in the Levant seas in that year. It was en­
tirely possible, and most likely, that they had departed 
from England late in 1584 and may not have returned until 
early 1586.
Ship. Burden. Master: The first and last of these are 
fairly straight forward. Sometimes in the Leghorn re­
cords one or the other was not decipherable. Where no 
sense at all could be made of the name^it has been left 
out. Some of the names from that source which are entered 
are probably not rendered accurately. The burden of Eliza­
bethan ships was a quality which seems to have expanded 
or contracted at random or with circumstances. Some­
times the burden is an element in deciding whether or 
not two ships with the same name are, in fact, the same 
ship. If the difference is small and other factors sugg­
est identity then the difference is ignored.
43L?
Cargo: The commodities listed here are those which are
known to have been laded on the ship. But any ship 
listed may have, and probably did, carry other commo­
dities as well. It usually required several Port Books 
to account for the cargo of a ship because of the differ­
ent duties paid on different classes of commodities. No­
where is there a complete set of these Port Books extant. 
Ships also often laded and unladed in more than one Eng­
lish port. Again the complete set of relevant Port Books 
has not survived. When knowledge of a cargo comes from 
court records or literary sources^reference was usually 
made only to a few of the most important items laded. 
Thus^ there is almost never any justification for one to 
assume, from the evidence cited, that a complete cargo 
is known.
Date. Port: The port listed in these columns represents
that from which the ship was known to have set sail or 
to which it returned. The date is less straight for­
ward. If the source is a customs record then the date 
represents the time the ship was lading or unlading.
This sometimes took several weeks and seldom is it 
known exactly when the ship set sail or arrived. This 
holds for the Leghorn records as well. When the source
is literary evidence the dates may be more exact* This 
is often the case with Hakluyt where the exact date of 
departure or arrival is often given* On the other hand 
testimony in the Admiralty court can be very vague at 
times and some entries are the result of judicious guess­
work with respect to their dates* When the source gives 
only a date for a ship's return to England there is an 
element of guesswork involved in assigning its departure 
to one year or another because of uncertainty about the 
length of the voyage* This is true also of those ships 
appearing in the Leghorn records* Often the best that 
could be done* was to make an estimation of departure 
time* Thus it might be that a number of ships are 
assigned to the wrong year*
Destination: It was the practice for only the first or
last port of call to be entered in the Port Books* If 
such is the only source for a voyage it must not be 
assumed that the destination given was the ship's only 
port of call* In most cases it probably was not* as can 
be seen from those voyages for which there are other 
sources as well* The dates given represent the time 
the ship was known to be at the given port* It is not 
often known how long a ship remained at the port*
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